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The point is straightforward: in both philosophy and literature style is substance. 
Rhetorical amplitude and laconic contraction offer contrasting images of readings of 
the world…Within philosophy resides the perennial temptation of the poetic, either to 
be made welcome or to be rejected.  
 
The Poetry of Thought, George Steiner. 
 
 
 
Really, I am not a good writer; I am a speaker, a lecturer. 
 
Writing and the Living Voice, Hans-Georg Gadamer. 
 
 
 
Living in poetry is rather one of the ways through which we experience being moved 
within ourselves. In this only are humans able to find their self-fulfillment. 
 
The Verse and the Whole, Hans-Georg Gadamer. 
 
 
 
Modernity was, among other things, a gigantic exercise in abolishing individual 
responsibility other than that measured by the criteria of instrumental rationality and 
practical achievement.  
 
Intimations of Postmodernity, Zygmunt Bauman. 
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Introduction. 
My objective in this thesis is to reformulate how we think about theory in the human 
sciences. I focus my argument on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s theme of methodological 
alienation in the human sciences. In addition, I focus on the following terms: theoria, 
poetics, truth, rhetoric, beauty. Gadamer’s recovery of the question of truth (the “event 
of truth”) and reformulation of what we do in conversation, provide an account of 
theory that permits us to break free of misconceptions that have pervaded the human 
sciences.  
               I discuss several key sociologists, writing at a critical time in the history of the 
sociology, during the 1960s and 1970s, by counter-pointing them with Gadamer’s 
ideas. In doing so, we can see that they present the paradox of speech (i.e., how we 
make things known with words). Alvin Gouldner and C.W. Mills, for example, by 
focusing on the legacy of structural-functionalism, begin to assert a common theme that 
pointed to the linguistic nature of the problems of sociology. This theme is more fully 
explored in Chapter 2.  
               My methodology is Gadamerian insofar as my discussion rests on probing a 
series of questions considered by Gadamer. My presentation of ideas involves a 
conversational tendency, analogous in some ways to Gadamer’s own Hegelian voice, 
but in no way corresponding to his. I proceed in a language of logical compositions. 
The key question is: What is theory in the human sciences? I do not formalize known 
rules of procedure but proceed through an encounter with Gadamer’s language and 
several specific texts to set up a dialogue with the human sciences. To encounter 
Gadamer is to encounter the voices of Plato, Heidegger and Hegel. 
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             This thesis develops a narrative about Gadamer’s recovery of truth and its 
impact on the rhetorical norms of social theory. “Might it not be”, Gadamer asks, “just 
a prejudice of modern times that the notion of progress that is in fact constitutive for the 
spirit of scientific research should be transferable to the whole of living culture?”1 To 
what extent, then, does theory lie outside the metaphor of scientific research?  
              In Gadamer’s view theory concerns our belonging (being-with-others), as a 
sharing in dialogue that simultaneously means our being “at home” in speech. If so, we 
can ask why theory is dominated by alien speech? Gadamer first articulates this theme 
in his doctoral studies on Plato’s Philebus, published as Plato’s Dialectical Ethics, 
where in the chapter “Conversation and the Way We Come to Shared Understanding,” 
he argues that Plato is concerned with the truth’s “happening” in dialogue.2  
              Hence, Gadamer’s major work, Truth and Method, concerns the question: 
“How do we live in theoria today?” Theory, then, it seems reasonable to say, is no 
longer reducible to the transference of scientific norms to social life (modern theory), 
                                                
1 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, “Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy,” in Reason in the Age 
of Science. Translated by Frederick G. Lawrence. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT 
Press, 1983. pp.104-105. 
2 In his reading of Plato, Gadamer came to challenge Heidegger’s reading of Plato as a 
major step toward “metaphysical thought’s obliviousness to Being.” [Translator’s 
Introduction to Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Plato’s Dialectical Ethics, Phenomenological 
Interpretations Relating to the ‘Philebus’. Translated and with an introduction by 
Robert M. Wallace. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.] At the same time 
Gadamer adopts Martin Heidegger’s lifelong question of becoming at home in thinking. 
Heidegger writes in, “The Provenance of Thinking” (1973), “Are we already at home 
there? Hardly. What does it mean: to become at home in the province of thinking? It 
says: to attain a grounded residence in Dasein where thinking receives the 
determination of its essence. Parmenides provides us with a first hint as to which way 
the provenance of thinking is to be questioned. This hint is contained in the claim: 
“‘Thinking and being’ (i.e., perceiving and presencing) belong, namely, to one 
another.” In Heidegger, Martin, Four Seminars, translated by Andrew Mitchell and 
Francois Raffoul. p. 93. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012.  
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rather it concerns the ancient question of truth; of speaking truth and not alienating 
truth. Once our theoretic awareness falls under the dominance of science, Gadamer 
argues, the natural link to the commonality of our understanding is broken. We lose our 
concern for the art of truth speaking, the rhetorical dimension of speaking, for we have 
now entered into alien models of speech. Speaking, therefore, with its power to 
generate a commonality of understanding and self-understanding, happens in the 
performative and rhetorical dimension of theory that cannot simply be subordinated to 
the norms of “science” – or as Gadamer would say, method (methodological 
alienation).3  Gadamer states his intention:  “Today one must say it with emphasis: The 
rationality of the rhetorical mode of argumentation, which seeks to bring “feelings” into 
play but fundamentally validates arguments and works with probability, is and remains 
a far stronger factor of our social determination than the certainties of science.  
Therefore I oriented myself expressly to rhetoric in Truth and Method, […]”4 
                The human sciences, historically, reside in a tension, as it were a mid-point, 
between understanding truth as participation (found in the commonality of 
understanding and linguistic expression) and truth as objectification (following the 
norm of science). The way out, as Gadamer states, is to recover both rhetoric and truth. 
It will not strike us as odd that this mimics the ancient question of poetic and 
conceptual thinking.  Still further, it resonates with Martin Heidegger’s comment as he 
struggled with Greek metaphysics: “Language is the most extensive way for the 
                                                
3 In “Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy,” Gadamer writes “The commonality of all 
understanding as grounded, therefore, in its intrinsically linguistic quality seems to me 
to be an essential point in hermeneutic experience.” p. 110. 
4 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, “On the Origins of Philosophical Hermeneutics”, in 
Philosophical Apprenticeships, translated by Robert R. Sullivan, Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1985. p. 182.  
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‘humanizing’ of beings (poeticizing beings) as well as for ‘dehumanizing’ human 
beings (objectifying them).”5  
             The human sciences are produced within of normative modes of knowing that 
has become symptomatic of modernity.6 Symptomatic that is of alien speech. Gadamer 
points to the hermeneutic universality of our linguistically communicative 
understanding, what he terms Sprachlichkeit, to show that we gain access to the 
communication of truth through speech and not method. Since we dialogue among 
beings we simultaneously author ourselves as ethical beings. Our modernity, therefore, 
presents to the human sciences a paradox in relation to the question of alien speech, 
pointing back, via Gadamer, to the Greeks and Plato’s Phaedrus. Plato’s distinctive 
struggle over the nature of theoria is vividly re-witnessed today in the question of 
modern theory: Truth and theory. Hence, our central question: “How are we to live in 
[modern] theory when we have become estranged (alienated) from the question of 
truth?”7 
          In his major work, Truth and Method, and in many other writings, Gadamer 
seeks to answer this question. Part of the trajectory of this work focuses attention on, 
                                                
5 See, Heidegger, Martin. Contributions to Philosophy (of The Event). Translated by 
Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2012. 
6 Theory, and specifically, social theory by, as Gadamer says “subscrib[es] to the logic 
of research and so present[s] itself as self-certifying, the interest in theoretical 
knowledge understands itself as extending humankind’s power by way of knowledge.” 
From “Praise of Theory.” In Praise of Theory, Speeches and Essays, translated by Chris 
Dawson, p. 23. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998. 
7 Andrea Wilson Nightingale identifies this theme as central to Plato’s Phaedrus when 
she writes: “By offering in the Phaedrus a dramatization of and a meditation on the 
natures and varieties of alien discourse, Plato demands from the reader a vigilance 
concerning the logoi, external or internal, analytic or non-analytic.” From Genres in 
Dialogue, Plato and the Construct of Philosophy. Cambridge UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995. p.166 
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among others, Plato, Martin Heidegger and Paul Celan as his journey unfolds. Our 
guiding theme is to show how hermeneutics and these figures help to illuminate the 
relation of truth and theory. One essential move for Gadamer is to show that art makes 
a special aesthetic and ethical claim upon us that cannot simply be understood as 
conceptually derived.  Truth, in other words, is an experience that is not solely 
conceptual. Truth goes beyond the conceptual, but theory derives from truth. Art, in 
Gadamer’s view, has its being in the living event of its appearance, or its performance. 
Thus it challenges us to rethink the dominant approach of the human sciences that has 
been governed by the rule of method, a challenge that art asks us to recognize because, 
as Gadamer argues, art itself lies in the universal meaning of Sprachlichkeit 
[lingusiticality] as do the human sciences:  
In my book Truth and Method, I began my considerations first of all with art, 
and not with science or even the “human sciences.” Even within the human 
sciences it is art that brings the basic questions of human being to our awareness 
in such a unique way – indeed, in such a way that no resistance or objection 
against it arises. An artwork is like a model [Vorbild] for us in this regard.”8 
 
Art opens us to the question of truth. It is, in Gadamer’s words, like a model. The 
modernist work of art especially, for him, takes on significance because, put simply, art 
defies rationalization and the technological world by offering an alternative mode of 
being which addresses us beyond our conceptual schemes. Hence, the poetry of Paul 
Celan is important to Gadamer since it points to the fact that language exists in the 
mystery of an encounter. Art itself points to something that is irrefutable, that always 
remains un-circumventable. Art too consists of the mystery of an encounter. When we 
                                                
8 Gadamer, Hans-Georg. “From Word to Concept: The Task of Hermeneutics as 
Philosophy.” In The Gadamer Reader, A Bouquet of the Later Writings. Edited and 
translated by Richard E. Palmer. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 
2007. p. 115. 
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encounter a poem, exemplified as we noted, in Gadamer’s own encounter with the 
poems of Paul Celan, we see that the meaning of the poem is the poem itself, but also 
implies a dialogue. The poem, therefore, speaks. “The poem compels through the way 
it says what it says. Indeed, this holds for all rhetorical uses of language.”9   
           The human sciences, we argue, require the rhetorical power of language to 
convey theoretically valid truth. A theoretically valid truth in Gadamer’s view will also 
have a proximity to the good. Gadamer’s work, therefore, relies on the recovery of the 
question of the truth of art to show how the communication of truth happens, along 
with our ethical attachment to the good, within the human sciences. He writes: 
The hermeneutics developed here is not therefore, a methodology of the human 
sciences, but an attempt to understand what the human sciences truly are, 
beyond their methodological self-consciousness, and what connects them to the 
totality of our experience of the world.10  
 
In his essay “From Word to Concept” he adds: 
 
[…] hermeneutics is not a doctrine of methods for the humanities and social 
sciences [Geisteswissenschaften] but rather a basic insight into what thinking 
and knowing mean for human beings in their practice life, even if one makes 
use of scientific methods.11 
 
           For Gadamer, modernity’s paradox is epitomized by the human sciences in 
many ways. Specifically in two attitudes: First, their assimilation of the ideal of the 
modern advancement of science and, second, their simultaneous movement toward the 
effacement of truth.  As a point of departure, Gadamer, of course, turns to the 
experience of truth in art. What connects us to the totality of our experience of the 
world, according to Gadamer, is displayed by the work of art. Therefore, he reminds us, 
                                                
9 “From Word to Concept,” p. 115. 
10 Truth and Method [First Edition], 1975. xiii. 
11 “From Word to Concept,” p. 113. 
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art counters the dominance of science. When struck by the ancient artistry of the 
dialogue found in Plato, for example, we see that the locus of theory lies in the spoken 
art, where theory is more like an event than an object. It is this insight that lays a basis 
for considering our relation, not simply to art, but to the idea of theory as performative. 
It is Gadamer’s twofold interest in the presentation and the performance (of art and 
theory) that contrasts to method and the dominant procedural approach to truth found 
historically in the human sciences. Hermeneutic identity and art allow us to recognize 
the different ways in which we communicate precision and truth. Gerald Bruns notes 
that: 
Hermeneutic identity is not something to be construed like a meaning but 
something to be traced, like a pattern or arrangement: it is a formal 
intelligibility. In Truth and Method, Gadamer calls this event (perhaps less than 
facetiously)  “transformation into structure” [die Verwandlung ins Gebilde]”, a 
taking shape in which the work materializes as the thing it is in our experience 
of it.12 
 
            Art “speaks,” the poem “speaks.” How, then, might theory “speak”? Both art 
and speech concern, in some measure, this transformation, so does the authoring of 
theory. Every interpretation we make, while it concerns knowing the world, is a 
speaking, a speaking to me, you, us. What makes speaking possible is always there; 
speaking makes speaking possible. Theory is, therefore, in some measure always 
language speaking. In Gadamer’s view, the phenomenon of Sprachlichkeit 
[linguisticality] is the way we voice something, including our writing; therefore, 
writing rests on the speaking voice. He claims that: 
The way the voice is articulated as a speaking voice – perhaps even when one 
reads without making any sound – suggest that writtenness [Schriftlichkeit], 
                                                
12 Bruns, Gerald L. On the Anarchy of Poetry and Philosophy: A Guide for the Unruly. 
New York: Fordham University Press, 2006. p. 35. 
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even that of the alphabet, is an articulation of a high level of complexity. The 
voice that the writer or reader “hears” as he or she writes or reads clearly attains 
a far higher level of articulation than could any possible writtenness.13  
 
            Our entire experience of the world, therefore, is linguistically mediated by 
speech, which means that everything, even what is non-linguistic (i.e. art) is capable of 
linguistic interpretation.14 This does not mean that everything is language.  Art speaks 
to us.  Art, like the word, presents a limit to experience, one that resides in the poetic 
word or the work of art. In both we find the infinite task: to understand and establish 
new ways of speaking. 
            Speech encompasses the world. When we speak we are in the world. Speech 
concerns both our finitude and the infinite power of the word. Speech is the carrying on 
of the infinite conversation born out of our finitude. Our being “at home” in speech is a 
non-place in language, and language, as Schmidt says, “throws itself ever anew into a 
darkness beyond reach of its own reflexivity.”15  But there is a knowing that happens 
here, a knowing that cannot be brought under control. This is expressed in the poetic 
realm. Speech encapsulates us in the ethical dimension of our life struggle, a struggle 
that concerns the way we put ourselves into words, when seek to find the right word, 
when we seek to open ourselves to truth at the threshold of our lyrical utterances.  
            In contrast to method as knowing, we must look to modes of utterance and 
forms of authorship other than those belonging to science. Gadamer describes this other 
                                                
13 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, “Hermeneutics Tracking the Trace [On Derrida],” in The 
Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of the Later Writings, p. 389. 
14 See Gadamer, Hans-Georg. “Aesthetics and Hermeneutics.” In Philosophical 
Hermeneutics. Translated by David E. Linge. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1977. pp. 90-100. 
15 Schmidt, Dennis, J. Lyrical and Ethical Subjects: Essays on the Periphery of the 
Word, Freedom, and History. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. p. 
131. 
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knowing as rooted in our encounter with language, a knowing that concerns coming up 
with the right word at the right moment, a form of exactness in what we say, that is 
found in the Ancient concept of rhetoric.16 
            Truth and Method, therefore, sets before us two key questions. First, art is not 
necessarily linguistic but it does convey truth that is capable of interpretation (art 
constitutes a strong kind of evidence, yet its meaning is conceptually imprecise, e.g. it 
is not itself linguistic). How does our experience of art direct us to understand the 
restriction that scientific thought imposes on truth? Second, how might this help us to 
understand the norms of truth as they actually appear in the concerns of the human 
sciences? How might the poetic in other words, in contrast to science, offer a corrective 
to the dominant understanding of the human sciences and their communication of truth?   
               We are a part of the totality of language. We always stand in the stream of 
tradition. This is where we find and know ourselves through the other. Society concerns 
the conditionality of our being a part of the being of language. Speaking is not the 
before, or after thinking, but is its happening. Language is a phenomena of non-
objectivity. Language, Gadamer says, concerns an “essential self-forgetfulness that 
characterizes the performative character of speech.” 
              Hermeneutics draws our attention to an alienating effect of a technical way of 
relating to our speech. The poet is the witness of this. His word throws light on the 
collective experience of modernity found in the paradox of technical speech, 
methodological and alien speech, speech that disconnects us from being with others as 
                                                
16 Gadamer, Hans-Georg and Jean Grondin. “A Look Back over the Collected Works 
and Their Effective History,” in The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of the Later Writings, 
pp. 421-423. 
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communicative partners in life. Gadamer says, we are neither “subjects on the one 
hand, nor objects, on the other.”17  What really matters, argues Gadamer, “is the human 
beings encounter with himself in relation to an other different from himself.”18 How we 
come to understand one another, and ourselves, cannot be embraced by method. Rather 
we participate “in an association with things with which we are dealing,” things that are 
already under way, where we already understand other people; it is not about 
contrasting methods.19  
               Method, then, sets itself apart from the way we participate in the living life of 
language. In this way we can see why, for Gadamer, method and poetics become an 
internal tension in the human sciences and beyond. Poetry involves forms of 
questioning, as Gadamer says, that do not let go of us. The one who speaks resides in 
living speech; we speak with the naming power of words in a linguistically mediated 
world in which we are able to experience and secure truth. While the experience of the 
word is an experience that “even in its communicative actuality, escapes capture and so 
remains always an unthinkable finitude.”20 Consequently, Gadamer identifies the 
universality of science in terms of a curious yet binding tension: “The path of the West, 
which is also the path of science, has forced upon us the separation and never 
completely achievable unity of poetizing and thinking.”21 This speaks deeply to 
                                                
17 Gadamer, Hans-Georg. The Beginning of Philosophy. New York: Continuum, 1999. 
p. 31. 
18 Ibid. pp. 22-23. 
19 Ibid. p. 30. 
20 Schmidt. p.114. 
21 Gadamer, Hans-Georg. “Thinking and Poetizing in Heidegger and in Holderlin’s 
Andenken”, Hans-Georg Gadamer, in, Heidegger Toward the Turn: Essays on the Work 
of the 1930s, edited by James Risser. Albany: State University of New York, 1999. 
p.145. 
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Gadamer’s affinity with Heidegger and his teaching, and, in turn, Heidegger’s recurring 
concern with the primacy of the poetic as an opening up to the truth of being in the 
word.   
               Our focal question, in light of the conflict between participation and 
objectivity, is our relationship to the truth of the word.  The truth of the word will not, 
notes Dennis Schmidt, be found “if we begin with the assumption that the word is 
unproblematically found in the written word or the sign.”22 The self-understanding of 
the human sciences, because it is primarily a verbal experience, we can see, 
presupposes a question of our proximity to speech – to the living word. Schmidt adds: 
“…in its original form, reading is an act that mimes spoken speech. In other words, the 
experience of the written word returns us to the spoken word.”23   
             Things speak to us; we interpret what we hear and what we say, hear words that 
are spoken to us, words that convey an exactness about that which is true. We live in a 
universality of listening and speaking. We detect a living voice behind the written 
word. The truth of the word is not to be found in written word or sign. The truth of the 
word concerns the meaningfulness that occurs in what it is possible to say 
(unconcealment), meaning that  we lack the word as much as we find the right word, so 
that something is there (that we listen too), which is what happens, for example, with 
the poetic word.  To find the right word means we voice something in words. Seeking 
the right word is not about information but about questioning, seeing new questions. 
Finding the right word concerns the right understanding, which means a process of 
                                                
22 Schmidt, p.107. 
23 Ibid. p.102. 
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questioning that remains open to unconcealment along the way. It concerns following a 
path and finding the right words that will reach out to the other person. 
              Jean-Luc Nancy speaks of the voice opening us to the other. Every word 
involves an indeterminate voice, or as he says, “Voice exists outside of both 
contradiction and unity.”24 Our words, our way of speaking in this manner does not 
concern simply our use of words, since words, like human beings, can never be thought 
of as objects to be used, but rather they are testimony to our voicing something in living 
speech.  
             How, then, can we hear the truth of the word? How might this hearing of the 
word concern the human sciences? The human sciences experience the word, not in 
terms of living speech, but in terms of conceptual exactitude and abstraction. Thinking 
is tied to the grammatical concept of the proposition, yet it is here that we face in these 
spaces of concept formation our estrangement from the power of the truth of the word – 
the separation of the living voice from the truth of the word. The truth of what is said, 
according to Gadamer, concerns the way words show and display what is there when 
something is spoken about. He calls this the truth of the said [Gesagtes], that is, the 
truth of what is that comes to stand in speaking.25 The living voice remains central to 
Gadamer’s work.  
               Dieter Misgeld notes in, “Poetry, Dialogue and Negotiation,” that it is 
Gadamer’s love of poetry that shapes his deep suspicion of any instrumental attitude 
                                                
24 Nancy, Jean-Luc. “Vox Clamans in Deserto.” In The Birth to Presence, translated by 
Brain Holmes & others. Stanford, California:  Stanford University Press, 1993. p. 241. 
25 Gadamer, “Thinking and Poetizing in Heidegger and in Holderlin’s Andenken,” p. 
149. 
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toward truth, knowledge and interpersonal relations.26 We know too that poetry was the 
theme of his life since his youth. The poem is significant because it shows truth as 
unconcealment, when we recognize something to be there, to be present in poetic 
speaking that is not a consequence of judgment or logic, but rather concerns the way we 
can hear the rightness of what is being said.  
               Hermeneutics has nothing to do with providing a method (especially for the 
human sciences). Gadamer’s vision of language is not about how we adopt procedures 
for the human sciences, rather hermeneutics provides the context for reconstructing our 
modernist view of theory and the world (the logical unfolding of metaphysics), one that 
is dominated by methodological estrangement, rooted in a metaphysical conception of 
the subject who stands over its objects of study – a subject who is external to himself. 
We come to find out that the path away from the poet now entails a return to the poet. 
Hermeneutics involves a recovery of the power of the poet’s word and the power of the 
Greek conception of theoria, theory. What the poet reveals concerns the truth of the 
word and the way we experience truth and estrangement in the human sciences. In this 
way Gadamer defines his main thesis: Truth is not Method.  
               The hermeneutic speech challenges the logic speaking that governs human 
sciences: “One would really honor the realm of the Geisteswissenschaften [human 
sciences] much more adequately, I think, if we brought them back under the older 
                                                
26 Misgeld, Dieter. “Poetry, Dialogue and Negotiation.” In, Festivals of Interpretation: 
Essays on Hans-Georg Gadamer, edited by Kathleen Wright.  Albany: State 
University of New York, 1990. 
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concept of rhetoric, where one deals with believable statements and not scientifically 
compelling truths.”27  
              The human sciences lie in proximity to the poetic. Like the poetic word event, 
the human sciences are concerned to use the power of the spoken word. In the broadest 
sense, we argue, this is what drives and shapes the deeper aspect of their activity. 
Strictly speaking, the human sciences have estranged themselves from the truth of 
words by adopting a restrictive view of the naming power of words. Their conceptuality 
is shaped by a tendency to treat language as an instrument or a system of signs. Yet, 
when language is in kinship with methodological ideal of objectivity, it creates a 
twofold loss: a loss of self-discovery and self-formation (being moved within ourselves 
by the word) and, as a consequence, a disenchanted attitude toward the communicative 
power of theory. The poet presents to his readers the word, and thus the concept, in the 
naming power of his words. 
             By turning to the posture of the sociologist, we see that his posture is composed 
of a fundamental relationship to dialogue and community, as is the poet’s, but with a 
fundamental difference. Theory becomes alien to this kind of self-fulfillment, thus 
failing to approximate a dialogue with the other. What we find is that the sociologist is 
caught between living speech and theory and consequently is caught between the 
objectification of social life in theory and the objectification of his own self-
formation.28 This is the crux of the problem. In contrast to the poet’s utterances, the 
externalization of truth, becomes an estranged knowing (objectification), that can only 
                                                
27 Gadamer and Grondin. Interview, p. 415. 
28 See, for example, Gadamer, Hans-Georg. “Modern Theory and the Greeks.” In The 
Beginning of Knowledge. New York: Continuum, 2003. p.119-126. 
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be answered by returning to the poet, a return that evokes the power of the poet’s word, 
that allows us to identify a fuller understanding of the importance and potency of the 
ethical and the lyrical aspects of theory.  
             The reassertion of the dialogic as a poetic space points a way to overcoming the 
dialogue of disenchantment, with its methodological alienation, its estrangement of 
knowing that happens in the human sciences. A shift is required in our view of 
language. Encapsulated by Gadamer’s famous expression: Being that can be 
understood is language. Di Cesare notes, “Truth and Method converts a Heideggerian 
ontology into hermeneutics. Heidegger’s fundamental ontology: There is no Being 
without the understanding of Being, according to Di Cesare, shows that “ontology must 
recover itself in hermeneutics – which means at the same time reestablish itself, as if 
after an illness, but also retreat or revoke itself. To put it differently: ontology 
necessarily becomes hermeneutics.”29    
              Being is now the question of understanding. The truth of the word shows us 
that what comes to stand in thinking is not simply a consequence of a proposition but 
involves in the Being of language itself. The poets cannot say what Being is, because 
they do not make any ontological claim about Being (they are not philosophers), but 
they bring forth words as an event of being that is happening in the poetic mode of 
presentation. We know that Plato’s dialogues are displays of the natural performative 
mode of poetic speech and its tension with the dialectical speech. The Greek word had 
a power; it could both challenge and yet give birth to the enchantment of conceptual 
thinking. When we contain the word with the concept, as we do within the logic of the 
                                                
29 Di Cesare, Donatella. Gadamer, A Philosophical Portrait. Translated by Niall Keane. 
Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2013. p. 179. 
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human sciences, we at once situate ourselves in these two occurrences: the 
performative and the ontological.  
            Gadamer is sensitized to and critically suspicious of conceptuality 
[Begrifflichkeit], especially philosophical terminology, because the real being of 
language, what is being said, compromises the speaking voice. This suspicion 
underscores his work; it concerns how the terminology of concepts results in a loss of 
the concrete immediacy of truth. Conceptual speech resides in a speaking that goes on 
in all language, in the power of words. The mysterious power of language itself 
concerns how the truth of the word is disclosed in speech. The word lets us see, so that 
something is “there.”30 
             Every word concerns experience; experience is a hermeneutic act, as the word 
opens us to the world. The poetic word can stand forth as true, yet the word can never, 
as Dennis Schmidt puts it, “bring itself to a concept, nor can it disclose itself to itself as 
such.”31 As a consequence of our finitude and the infinity of the word, every experience 
is open. Experience, therefore, transforms us. The poetic word comes to epitomize this.  
“Experience is the experience of human finitude.”32 There is no outside to experience 
or outside to our finitude. To think critically we must be open to experience and able to 
give birth to words that convey that experience conceptually. To think critically is to 
deconstruct and overcome acts that are forced upon us in recognizing our limits. It is 
the limits placed on understanding that force us to understand. Since the social sciences 
favor external description – implying a self-disposition of objectification – they create 
                                                
30 Gadamer, “Thinking and Poetizing in Heidegger and in Holderlin’s Andenken,” p. 
150. 
31 Schmidt, p. 114. 
32 Truth and Method. [Second, Revised Edition] 2011. p. 357. 
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as well as become alienating and disruptive of the genuine power of dialogue in the 
expression of experience. The poet is a figure of non-instrumental identity as well as a 
counterpoint to the ideal of objectivity as the estrangement of truth. Poetry is dialogical, 
life becomes possible through our relationship with the other, the other as a positive 
limit, were we engage and share ourselves in dialectical movement of thought. It is this 
that truly illuminates our relationship to theory, especially in the human sciences.33  
              Sociology, Bauman notes, offers solutions for the crisis in which it stands and 
consequently mirrors. Sociology is to be seen as a symptom of the crisis of western 
metaphysics, since, to use Carlo Sini’s words, their preconceptions as science have 
been put to work as an “estranged knowing.”34 As we know, a key part of the human 
sciences concerns their communication with others, and, crucially, how others speak to 
them. Scientific conceptuality enters into to contest the value of everyday speech. 
Metaphysical thinking comes to engage and yet distort the realm of everyday 
communication by introducing a misunderstanding that consequently imposes itself, 
between the voice and the speaker, as a limitation on the being of language. Our second 
intention in this thesis is to show that it is this limitation, this vision of a scientific 
language that has shaped the so-called “crisis” of sociology.  
                The human sciences pose the problem of language and truth (in the Greek 
sense) because they are embedded in restrictive metaphysical assumptions. Contrary to 
                                                
33 Jean Grondin describes how Gadamer’s recognition that the poem “[…] fed his 
doubts about science’s monopolistic claim to corner truth.” See, Grondin, Jean. Hans-
Georg Gadamer: A Biography. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003. p. 50. 
34 See Sini’s, Ethics of Writing, translated by Silvia Benso and Brian Schroeder. 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009 as he discusses Heidegger’s work, 
especially, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking, where some interesting 
parallels can be found between Sini’s writings and aspects of Gadamer’s work 
(methodological knowing and estranged knowing, for example). 
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their desires, the human sciences come to question their grounding in a traditional 
metaphysics (method) as they seek alternate self-understandings. Gadamer offers a 
view to us for the identity of the human sciences that lie in their relationship to the 
living experience of the word, to the hermeneutic situatedness of the human being in 
the primacy of the spoken word, and into the infinite dialogue that escapes complete 
conceptual capture.  
              The human being encounters himself in relation to the other who is different 
from him.35  This is a dialogical encounter. The “I-lessness” for speaking is always 
involved in what Gadamer terms the sphere of the “we.” Speech constitutes itself in the 
essential self-forgetfulness of language (i.e., grammar, structure and the syntax of 
language).36  We simply speak. We also encounter language. We encounter something 
that goes beyond everything conceptual that now concerns the ethical and lyrical 
dimension of theory.  Theory is an ethical encounter that occurs in the experience of 
conceptual capture. In striving to experience the word, in striving for conceptual 
understanding, we always experience ourselves in relation to the other. Speech 
preserves our belonging together. Poetry captures this encounter, for the poetic word 
                                                
35 Further understood, as a […] “‘taking part’ in something, a participation that more 
closely resembles what takes place, for example, in the believer who is faced with a 
religious message than it does the relationship between subject and object that plays 
itself out in the natural sciences.” In Gadamer’s “Hermeneutic Access to the 
Beginning.” In The Beginning of Philosophy. New York: Continuum, 1998, pp. 30-31. 
36 Gadamer, Hans-Georg. “Man and Language.” In Philosophical Hermeneutics, 
translated and edited by David E. Linge. Berkeley:  University of California Press, 
1976. pp. 64-65. 
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opens us to the world in a special way. The poetic word concerns the profound task 
involving the search for language (e.g., Mandelstam, Celan), while language “hides.”37  
              Language, in Gadamer’s view, concerns thinking, “realized not in statements 
but as conversation [...]”38 The decisive question then is how we play with the word, 
where, “the word is meant not as a statement but as something existing in itself” (as in, 
for example, the poetic word).  Such words, Gadamer argues, are words that can truly 
speak. What makes a word truly a word, a word that speaks?  He describes this as “a 
telling [sagend, saying] word.”39 But what does a word tell that a concept does not, and 
what does the word concept mean, since a concept is a word? What hinders in the 
sociological way of speaking is the absence of poet’s way of releasing meaning into the 
concept. Speaking of the poets, Gadamer says, they “[…] are the ones who make use of 
the flexibility of the linguistic gamut beyond rules, beyond conventions, and who know 
how to bring the unsaid to speak within the possibilities that language itself offers.”40          
                Speech is a conversation with ourselves that has already begun as a 
conversation with another. Our inner conversations repeatedly give voice to the word. 
Out of these words we find that truth and certainty develop in the dialectics of speech; 
in this way, truth, first and foremost, concerns how the word stands and the way one 
                                                
37 Schmidt, Dennis, J. Lyrical and Ethical Subjects: Essays on the Periphery of the 
Word, Freedom, and History. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. p. 
115. 
38 Gadamer, Hans-Georg.“Boundaries of Language,” in Language and Linguisticality in 
Gadamer’s Hermeneutics. Edited by Lawrence K. Smith. New York: Lexington Books, 
2000. p. 16. 
39 Gadamer, “On the Truth of the Word,” in The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of the 
Later Writings, p. 137. 
40 Gadamer, “Boundaries of Language,” pp. 12-13. 
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can stand by it.41 The poet’s word is linguistically mediated in a world where we 
generate spaces for speech out of the unity of sense and sound. Concepts are words that 
still concern the living voice, because concepts occur in talking, saying, thinking, 
commentating, and speaking. Concepts, then, are not simply generated out of the 
spontaneity of human subjectivity, nor are they installed in talk by way of 
methodological detachment, rather they occur in our attempt to converse with one 
another, in a conversation that is created out of the logic of question and answer, 
“because I ask myself as I would ask another, and I speak to myself as another would 
speak to me.”42  
               Our ability to play with language, apparent in both the child and the poet, 
indicates an unending process that shows us that “a thinking conversation cannot 
simply be made in statements.”43  Truth in language becomes possible when the word is 
presided over not by a detached question, or “findings,” given precedence by science, 
but by the word in which truth happens. At issue is truth saying, not method – 
methodological speech. 
              Dennis Schmidt reminds us “we have lost something of the capacity to open 
ourselves to the real force of language especially at the moment of its greatest 
concentration, in the poem.”44 The poetic power of speech becomes a focal point for 
understanding linguistic estrangement in human sciences, and, specifically, in 
                                                
41 “On the Truth of the Word,” p. 137. 
42 “Boundaries of Language.” p.16. 
43 Gadamer, “Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and Language,” in Language and 
Linguisticality in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, pp.40-41. 
44 Schmidt, Dennis, J. Lyrical and Ethical Subjects: Essays on the Periphery of the 
Word, Freedom, and History. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. p. 
30. 
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sociology. Zygmunt Bauman and Gianni Vattimo have respectively identified the way 
the human sciences mimic the struggle of modernity. Therefore, while the hermeneutic 
conception of poetic language speaks to the anarchic potential of speech and the word, 
the poetic word now becomes essential to grasping our relationship to critical thinking 
and modern social life because hermeneutics speaks simultaneously to the state of 
sociology and our experience of modern life. 
               We recall how Bauman spoke of sociology as obsessed with its own crisis 
while it also presents itself as a way of solving social crisis. Both modernity and the 
human sciences share the “crisis of the dissolution of metaphysics.”45 In Vattimo’s 
view: “[…] hermeneutics does not invent or discover but rather receives and struggles 
to respond to the decline of modern metaphysics and the Eurocentric view of the 
world.”46  
             My argument is that we are speakers first and foremost. Our lives and our 
world is the infinity of speech. We live in the possibility of being true (saying what is 
true) and in the possibilities of our self-understanding (of the truth of being). This truth 
mimics the truth of language. However, this ‘mystery’ is only a ‘mystery’ from the 
point of view of the norm of ‘science’. We recognize our speech when we are with 
others because we recognize others. Gadamer says the ontological priority of the 
hermeneutics of speech shows that the human sciences are in this universality of human 
communication. Our concern, then with the linguistic generation of theory, our having 
to know and to say, looks different to science. Knowledge built on the truth of speech is 
                                                
45 Vattimo, Gianni and Santiago Zabala. Hermeneutic Communism, From Heidegger to 
Marx.  New York: Columbia University Press, 2001. pp. 110-111. 
46 Ibid. pp. 96-97. 
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different to knowledge built on ‘science’. Knowledge is social, not an isolated dialogue 
from the values of speech. The event of truth occurs in our linguistic being with others. 
In other words, it occurs beyond ‘science’.  
 
The Rhetorical and Ethical Dimension of the Vocation of Theoria 
In this chapter, I focus on the rhetorical and ethical dimension of theory.  Why is theory 
rhetorical? When we speak, we bring something to understanding. We wish to establish 
why speech, which precedes all logos, defines theory in the human sciences. We learn 
from Plato that the vocation of theoria is rhetorical. When Gadamer revisits Plato, he 
draws our attention to this. Speaking is the space of mediation in which understanding 
happens; it is where “true being” and “being true” are in harmony. The expression of 
true knowledge requires the recognition of the practical value of understanding, in other 
words, our ability to speak to one another with understanding. Gadamer tells us that one 
who knows a techne, but does not understand it, would be impotent and alien to the 
authorship of their logoi, as we find at the core of Plato’s Apology. In natural speech, 
we find words to say what we want to say to each other. In this chapter, we conclude 
that Gadamer’s conception of saying and truth, emerging out of Heidegger’s thinking 
on being and speech, shows why theory is a claim about authentic speaking (dialectical 
ethics). The way we speak, our hermeneutic speech, our choice of responsibility 
regarding our rhetoric, is ethical. It defines the good as fundamental to the identity of 
the theorist. 
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 Hermeneutics, Dennis J. Schmidt says, is ultimately “an ethical struggle to put oneself 
in words.”47 Searching for the right word is a matter of understanding and this is 
fundamental to the hermeneutic performance of language. Gadamer says, “Life 
interprets itself.” Life itself has a hermeneutic structure.”48 Understanding, then, is the 
core of hermeneutics. There is an indissoluble connection between thinking and 
speaking, which, as Gadamer says, compels hermeneutics to become philosophy. 
Hermeneutics rests on this insight. “Hermeneutics is above all a practice, the art of 
understanding and of making something understood to someone else. It is the heart of 
all education that wants to teach how to philosophize. In it, what one has to exercise 
above all is the ear, the sensitivity for perceiving prior determinations, anticipations, 
and imprints that reside in concepts.”49 In other words, every thinker is a type of poet 
with an ear for the word. The thinker makes the word speak. 
               The human sciences, it follows, are the open task of better and better 
understanding, that resides in the finitude of every speaker. In other words, 
hermeneutics cannot be appropriated by science, adopted, or “used” in any way. 
Hermeneutics is language, or, to use a specific term that Gadamer adopts, it is 
linguisticality [Sprachlichkeit]; words come forth and happen in the universality of 
                                                
47 Schmidt, Dennis, J. Lyrical and Ethical Subjects: Essays on the Periphery of the 
Word, Freedom, and History. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. p. 
131. 
48 Truth and Method. [Second, Revised Edition] 2011. p. 226. 
49 Gadamer, Hans-Georg. “Reflections on My Philosophical Journey In The Philosophy 
of Hans-Georg Gadamer: The Library of Living Philosophers Volume XXIV, edited by 
Lewis Edwin Hahn. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1997. p. 17. 
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speech. Gadamer says language is extensive with the world; language is not something 
that is discrete to us. Thus he says: “Language in words is […] linguisticality.”50 
               Hermeneutics, we can see, concerns how we understand, and understanding 
constitutes the nature and scope of the human sciences. The most pertinent action of 
understanding is speech. Our struggle to speak, to put ourselves in words, anticipates 
the other and the bringing to presence our relation to being.  
              Schmidt addresses the performance of language.  The main point is that we 
cannot remove ourselves from the performance of language. He speaks of our fidelity,  
our attachment to speech in the way we perform thinking and words. He notes that by 
staying close to the performative saying of words and the way they work, we 
experience language itself.  Experiencing language in this way means we are less likely 
to be dislocated from our place in understanding.  The importance of this is that in 
understanding we “understand ourselves as ethical subjects”.51 As we communicate, 
and communicate ideas, Gadamer says, we are not simply communicating concepts but 
we are, equally, communicating ourselves as ethical and lyrical subjects. 
               Schmidt sees a shift in our understanding of the question of the relation of the 
poetic word and politics today. He notes that Plato and Gadamer both pose the question 
of the poetic and the political as the relation between the possibilities of language and 
political actions. Our relationship between writing and speaking now becomes central 
to the struggle in the human sciences since it concerns how we theorize our selfhood 
(“moral bearing”) and work toward our lyrical creation (“poetics”) of theory. 
                                                
50 Gadamer and Grondin, “A Look Back over the Collected Works and Their Effective 
History,” in The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of the Later Writings, p. 420. 
51 Schmidt, Dennis, J. Lyrical and Ethical Subjects: Essays on the Periphery of the 
Word, Freedom, and History. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. p. 5. 
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Social Theory & the Question of Hermeneutic Truth 
We can now see that we are dealing with truth claims that can be characterized as both 
ethical and lyrical. Gerald Burns clarifies the “event” (of truth) this way: “Gadamer’s 
idea, derived already from his reading of the Platonic dialogues, is that the work of art 
is more of an event than it is an object, in which the main question to ask about the 
work is not “Is it Art?” or “What is it?” or even “How is it made?” but “How does it 
happen?”52 
               So what does truth mean in this context? Specifically, we have to ask what 
does “hermeneutic truth” mean? We ask this because truth, for example, in the human 
sciences, has developed within the horizon of science. Truth, in Gadamer’s view, is 
what happens when we understand, and understanding is a product of conversation. 
Truth of the word, meant in conversation, connects with the primitive sense of truth as 
aletheia (for the Greeks), the way of saying that makes something visible to us because 
it says something that is part of the living process of being understood.53  
                So truth, in this sense, is not about the statements that we make, in the 
detached vocabulary of science, but the way we have of making words assert 
themselves and the way they stand as true for us. Truth, in this way, is to be understood 
as an event of understanding and not a procedure.  
              Ultimately understanding, all understanding, is already given in self-
understanding. What we misunderstand in the human sciences, is that we cannot escape 
                                                
52 Bruns, Gerald L. “Ancients and Moderns: Gadamer’s Aesthetic Theory and the 
Poetry of Paul Celan.” In On the Anarchy of Poetry and Philosophy: A Guide for the 
Unruly. New York: Fordham University Press, 2006. p. 33-34. 
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our hermeneutic identity. What lies beyond all the methodology of the 
Geisteswissenschaften, says Gadamer, and beyond all epistemology, is the “unity of 
dialogue and dialectic that in a surprising manner link Hegel and Plato to one another”, 
because now “the mystery of the question, the motivating interest that precedes all 
knowledge and interpretation, took center stage.”54 
              Hermeneutics lies outside the worldview of science, and thus can challenge it 
and bring into question its own universal claims. Di Cesare writes: 
 
 Experience unifies perceptions and concepts into universality, which actually 
overshadows the universality of science. But it differs from the universality of 
science too: it is a universality at once open to and inseparable from 
experienced perceptions. This universality, which must be distinguished from 
the abstract, universal concept of science, shows the constitutive openness of 
experience, which is always changing and transformable.55 
 
              Understanding, therefore, is not to be mistaken as an alternative way to 
describe the methods of the human sciences, or as offering a method of understanding, 
rather, it is a question of appreciating how understanding occurs in them. What occurs 
in understanding, Gadamer reminds us, is the “event of truth.”  In this way, the 
underlying struggle of the human sciences now mimics Plato’s famous discussion of 
the ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy, as a concern with the language of 
sociology.          
               Heidegger exposed a key problem within the human (historical) sciences, in 
his lectures on ontology of human “facticity” (how being opens up and circumscribes 
the respective  “there” … namely, Dasein, and hermeneutics (that interprets the 
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Writings, p. 332. 
55 Di Cesare, Gadamer: A Philosophical Portrait, p. 104. 
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communicating of this “facticity”), is explicitly explored, and extended, at the core of 
Gadamer’s Truth and Method. 
              In this context Heidegger wrote that:  
 
Dilthey adopted Scheiermacher’s concept of hermeneutics, defining it as 
“‘the formulation of rules of understanding’” (technique of interpreting 
written words), but he supported it with an analysis of 
understanding…in the context of his research on the development of the 
human sciences. But it is precisely here that a disastrous limitation in 
disposition shows itself. The decisive epochs in the actual development 
of hermeneutics (patristic period and Luther) remained hidden from him, 
since he always investigated hermeneutics as a theme only to the extent 
that it displayed a tendency to what he himself considered to be its 
essential dimension – a methodology for the hermeneutical human 
sciences.56   
           
            Alvin Gouldner, Peter Berger, Alan Blum, C. W. Mills, Richard Brown and 
Zygmunt Bauman have all declared the ossification of language in the human sciences, 
a claim that parallels Gadamer’s specific hermeneutic challenge to the scientistic 
conceptual language of the human sciences. I will draw special attention to the writings 
of the social theorist Zygmunt Bauman.  Bauman’s work, especially following his 
publication, in 1978, of Hermeneutics and Social Science: Approaches to 
Understanding – a work that traces the significance of hermeneutics to critical theory in 
the human sciences – marks a turning point, as a profound reshaping in his style of 
thinking and writing provides a prolific body of shifting investigations and 
configurations of theory.57 The key, it seems, especially in Bauman’s later works, is his 
                                                
56 Heidegger, Martin. Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, translated by John van 
Buren. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999. p. 11. 
57 Peter Beilharz’s book, Zygmunt Bauman, Dialectic of Modernity. London: Sage 
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writing and style and its relationship to the pluralistic epistemological claims, and 
richly theoretical claims, he can make about social life.      
 
Poetics and Truth  
                 Speech concerns and simultaneously reveals a tension between our 
“membership in society and the sovereignty of investigation.”58 Consequently, 
Gadamer ask, “What brings together both methodological access to our world and the 
conditions of our social life?”59 The answer to this question lies in how words show 
truth’s presence, how we can hear truth in the word. This is why poetic speech matters. 
                  In Zbignew Herbert’s words, we read the “writing of the clouds” and remain 
faithful to “uncertain clarity.”60 Everything points away from a reductive truth to truth 
that resounds in words, words that are not containable as fixed concepts. W. H. Auden 
wrote: “One demands two things of a poem. First, it must be a well-made verbal object 
that does honor to the language in which it is written. Second, it must say something 
significant about a reality common to us all, put from a unique perspective. What the 
poet says has never been said before, once it has been said, his readers recognize its 
validity for themselves [my emphasis].”61 What we learn from the above is something 
                                                
58 Ibid. p. 311. 
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akin to what Gadamer recognizes as the power of the poetic word to speak 
communicatively with a community.   
                Poetry draws our attention to the way we have become technicians of our 
own lives, for it captures the very distinct way in which the nature of human 
understanding occurs in speech. Gadamer’s poetic path, differing from Heidegger’s, 
remains intimate with insights that place the figure of the poet at the center of 
philosophy.62 In his Autobiographical Reflections, Gadamer says that we are aware that 
conceptual explication is never exhausted by the poetic image. Speaking is not 
something that originally exists for us (subjectively) rather; it is something that happens 
in our relation to others. Truth, for example, is amplified by the power of the poetic 
word and our relation to others, for the poetic word concerns a sharing of expression 
and understanding that occurs in hermeneutic experience, as it were, before conceptual 
clarification; poetic diction, then, is not restricted by conceptual determinants.  
                 Heidegger’s interest in the poet Paul Celan, according to Gadamer, is tied to 
the fact that: “Celan too, was a poet of the most extreme Sprachenot [linguistic need] a 
situation which pressed him with the limit of an ultimate falling silent. Heidegger, also  
“wanted to overcome the thinking of metaphysics, and so he tried over and over to 
invert language, so to speak, for, language itself, to him, was the language of 
                                                
62 From, Gadamer, Hans-Georg. “On the Origins of Philosophical Hermeneutics.” In 
Hans-Georg Gadamer: Philosophical Apprenticeships. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985. 
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metaphysics.”63 Celan, according to Gadamer, wanted to find a counter language, a 
counterword, which concerns the way the poet seeks an authentic way of speaking that, 
for Gadamer, is about searching for the right word.  
                Everywhere the poet is present to us, yet in the classic story presented by 
Plato, the poet is recognized as an antagonist and a friend of knowledge. The intimacy 
between poet and thinker was especially visible in the Pre-Socratics. Pre-Socratics, 
such as Parmenides, or Empedocles, asserted philosophical ideas born within poetic 
diction. The origins of Greek sciences, then, took place in the free space of creative 
production, creative diction and open speech.64 Ever since Plato the poetic remains a 
part of philosophy, evident to any reader of Plato’s own language.65  Gadamer 
describes it this way, “The Platonic dialogue stands by itself, so much so that through 
its poetic mimesis, it could establish the dialectical character of the dialogue.”66  
               Theorists become aware of this yet, as Gadamer remarks, it “remains 
concealed [to us] under particular epistemological conditions of modernity.”67 The 
Greeks provide an “opposition to the constructivism of the modern sciences,” a 
distinction between “the intelligible world and the masterable world…” that play out at 
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both a linguistic and a personal level.68 Any linguistic practice that objectifies speech, 
positions us in a paradox since language is a non-objectifying phenomena, meaning that 
an “essential self-forgetfulness characterizes the performative character of  [all] 
speech.”69 
             Robert A. Nisbet's comment in his The Sociological Tradition, that all theory 
has “moral origins” and that all great sociologists, regardless of their scientific 
aspirations, “have never ceased to be artists,” resonates broadly across the human 
sciences. Why? It is a claim that theory is the language of art and the art of language, 
reminding us of the ethical and artistic nature of sociological theory.70  Once more the 
ethical and lyrical paradox of modern theory appears. Our concern, now, according to 
Gadamer, is to find a way of “leading [our] language, estranged from its native sense of 
saying something, back to the common way of saying things and to the communality 
that supports this way of saying.”71 
    
The Dialogue Between Ancient and Modern Theory 
                    Charles Taylor recalls how the great achievement of the seventeenth 
century scientific revolution was to develop “a language for nature that was purged of 
human meanings. This was a revolution, because the earlier scientific languages, 
largely influenced by Plato and Aristotle, were saturated with purpose-and-value-terms. 
These could only have traveled along with a good part of the way of life of the 
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civilizations that nourished them. But the new austere languages could be adopted 
elsewhere more easily.” He adds:  
 
We can see how different the situation is with the languages of ‘social 
science.’” These too have traveled, but very much as a result of the 
cultural influence of and cultural alignment with the West. Moreover 
they seem incapable of achieving the kind of universality we find in the 
natural sciences… [T]his difference in the fate of the two kinds of 
“science” is connected to the fact that the languages of the human 
sciences have always drawn for their intelligibility on our ordinary 
understanding of what it is to be a human agent, live in society, have 
moral convictions, aspire to happiness and so forth.72 
 
              Truth, for Gadamer, can appear in listening to the word of the other that occurs 
in dialogue. He challenges the legitimacy of the human sciences as “science” by 
illuminating the way the question of truth occurs in them, not from a scientific 
viewpoint but in the universality of the hermeneutic process of human understanding 
that resides in our experience of language and our finitude.  
             The estrangement of truth inheres in the methodology of the human sciences.73 
“Method,” for Gadamer, does not apply to what happens in the humans sciences, at 
least in its Cartesian conception, because there is no way one can stand as an 
objectifying observer as a privileged observing subject.  He writes: “Human beings 
cannot be observed from the secure viewpoint of a researcher.”74  Rather, we can only 
observe from within the “stream of tradition,” where we are “being conditioned,” and 
know the other and his views “on the basis of one’s own conditionality.”  Our 
                                                
72 Taylor, Charles. “Gadamer on the Human Sciences.” In The Cambridge Companion 
to Gadamer, edited by Robert J. Dostal, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
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73 Truth and Method. [Second, Revised Edition], p. 7. 
74 Gadamer, Hans-Georg. The Beginning of Philosophy, translated by Rob Coltman. 
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conditionality (social context, epoch, prejudices) concerns our experience of the world. 
In this way, we always live in a dialectic that places us both in history, and a “cultural 
tradition, i.e. philosophy,” but also in the dialectic of “moral questions.”75 
              Hermeneutics puts the priority on conversation as a sharing and participation 
that we encounter in language, hermeneutics, as we have seen, places universality 
beyond science. In the human sciences, we are compelled to “recognize that all 
understanding is interwoven with concepts and reject any theory that does not accept 
the intimate unity of word and subject matter.”76   
            Understanding happens in the “forgetfulness” of language itself (we forget 
grammar, structure, syntax), according to Gadamer. Language is always what we speak, 
and speaking is not the reflective state of the statement.  Our struggle to speak is where 
wanting to say and understanding coexist as a performative force, where we struggle to 
find ourselves in the words we speak; this is the event of language itself.  Di Cesare 
puts this well by saying that understanding “…is thought to be possible and is 
presupposed as a condition by speakers.”77       
             Speakers struggle not simply to communicate information but also to 
communicate who they are or are not. We are language. For Gadamer we belong to 
language in ways that cannot be accounted for in theory.  
              Broadly speaking, Gadamer, as Schmidt puts it, is not theorizing “about 
language.”78 He explains his Gadamerian perception this way:  
                                                
75 Ibid. p. 28. 
76 Ibid. p. 404. 
77 Di Cesare, Donatella Ester. Utopia of Understanding: Between Babel and Auschwitz. 
Albany: State University of New York, 2012. p. 154. 
78 Ibid. p. 3. 
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              Following the performance of language is not the same as theorizing about 
              language. Being attentive to the performance of the word does not mean  
              interpreting the meaning that is signified by any particular words. Such  
              interpretations only function as a sort of noise that distracts us from the silent  
              event of language speaking itself. Nor does it mean circumscribing the  
              possibilities of meaning outlined by any particular language, or even language  
              as such. Our intimacy with language is found in attending to the performance  
              of language. We follow this intimacy of the word once we become attentive to  
              how language offers something to be thought.79 
 
             Understanding in the human sciences, noted Heidegger, happens in the truth 
dimension of language. Without this truth dimension of language, we lose our sense of 
shared experience in the world. Which, as hermeneutics shows, lies outside of the logic 
of science. Gadamer adapts Heidegger’s existential image of understanding and places 
it into the context of shared understanding as language. “Dasein,” he writes, “… 
projects itself on its own potentiality, for being has always already ‘been.’”80 Since to 
understand implies one has already begun to understand, we are already in what we 
understand; this is already a shared experience, a sharing and participating.  
              Conceptual value, therefore, comes forth in thinking conversation that is never 
completely understood. It also comes from experience, the path from our perceptions to 
our conceptual efforts, while understanding is a struggle to bring forth a meaning that 
we wish to communicate. Heidegger saw that the hermeneutic circle concerns an 
ontologically positive significance of language, since existence understands itself. 
Heidegger calls this, Dasein. Gadamer takes Heidegger’s insight and emphasizes how 
understanding always involves understanding the other as well as oneself. 
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                The dominant touchstone of sociological reason – method – erases or silences 
truth’s appearing in the universal act of saying.81  Sociological speech naturally resists 
the very universality of hermeneutic speech with a special kind of alienated speech. 
Alienated in this way, the theorist cannot recover without seeing the crucial role of 
understanding the other in universality of speech. In Gadamer’s view, language is not 
an ideal system of signs, i.e. treating language as a kind of form, but rather is the very 
power of saying of words, their speculative essence that can and does express the right 
and the true. Nicholas Davey notes that the “dual claim” found in Gadamer concerning 
writing and speaking, that I am attaching to the question of the language of sociology, 
poses several problems that need to be addressed. For Gadamer the idea that we really 
understand the word when: 
            The vitality of the spoken word does not derive just from the singular power of  
             delivery but also from the power of that which comes to life in the speaking 
             word. Within such words a totality of meaning openly comes into play… In 
             this way, Gadamer’s remark shows that hermeneutic experience has at its core 
             the rigor of uninterrupted listening. What one hears is not just the spoken but  
             the way the spoken brings into presence what remains unsaid. Hermeneutic  
             listening is not a matter of acoustic responsiveness but of being able to discern 
             within what one listens to, that which asserts itself as truth. Gadamer suggests  
             that words which bring a meant content into language are themselves a 
              speculative event, for their truth comes forth in what is said in them.82 
 
              Understanding concerns the priority of speech, for speech is where 
understanding takes place and comes to presentation – it is the power of presentation. 
We see further that speech has its universal significance in this dimension of 
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language.83 Speech is where concepts form in living language, in the living tensions of 
language – in the spoken word – for what makes concepts possible is not, itself, a 
“concept,” (this determines the difference between a universal hermeneutics and a 
transcendental hermeneutics).84 Hermeneutics points us in the direction of a 
reconstruction of rationality, reliant on Gadamer’s careful reading of the Greeks, Hegel, 
and Heidegger, in terms of showing how we experience meaning in the language of 
speech and the hermeneutics of the voice.85 We have a world because we are 
primordially linguistic beings.86 Our primordial speaking, as we shall see, is an ethical 
life. Writing and texts convey the past to us. Not only this, but our words speak to us as 
the happening of history. Our words generate the intelligible before, and in contrast to 
any notion of concept formation found in “sciences.” We are already speaking as 
speaking beings as the concept is coming to birth. Even in our inner conversations we 
presuppose this other to whom we speak.87  
                                                
83 “The language that lives in speech – which comprehends all understanding, including 
that of the interpretation of texts – is so much bound up with thinking and interpretation 
that we have too little left if we ignore the actual content of what languages hand down 
to us and try to consider language only as form.” Truth and Method, p. 405. 
84 Karl-Otto Apel’s distinction between these two conceptions of hermeneutics is 
discussed later. Apel seeks to reconcile analytic and hermeneutic approaches in his 
work. 
85 See, for example, James Risser’s “The Voice of the Other in Gadamer’s 
Hermeneutics.” He writes: “Accordingly, it is not enough to say that in philosophical 
hermeneutics the experience of meaning is linguistic; one must immediately add to this 
the more specific claim that this experience of meaning takes shape in the language of 
speech, in living language, and as such hermeneutics is of the voice.” p. 389. In The 
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               Concepts, Gadamer says, “are only what they are in their functioning, and this 
functioning always rests on the natural logic of language.”88 Gadamer points to the 
intimacy of speaking and writing, and how the play of each is animated by 
conversation. He says: “In hermeneutics the orality of conversations allegedly takes 
precedence over the written form of the text. In truth there is no real opposition. What 
is written, has to be read, and so it too ‘stands under the voice.’”89 
              Speech is not a representational sign. Voice leaves us and enters us in an 
enigmatic encounter that Jean-Luc Nancy declares… In the context of sociological 
reason methodological thinking takes us into a position of the world of objective 
mastery, through an assumption of the value of the representational sign that is as a 
technical vision of our relationship to truth. What is set up within the human sciences is 
the legitimation of science as a type of “loss” of speech.  
               If you like, the human sciences take us away from the sign’s origin in living 
speech, and in Gadamer’s view, away from life. It thereby assumes a version of 
linguistic production that merely distances and subordinates the voice, and, 
significantly, the experience of language itself. The non-speculative view of scientific 
language now positions the theorist, as it were, in a paradox of his or her voicing. 
Gadamer has no real problems, broadly speaking, with scientific methods but rather 
that what occurs within the self-understanding of the human sciences, is a tension 
                                                                                                                                         
way of forming concepts that is different from the system of scientific concept 
formation.”  p. 433. 
88 Ibid. p. 93. 
89 Reply to James Risser, Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Philosophy of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, The Library of Living Philosophers Volume XXIV, edited by Lewis Edwin 
Hahn, Open Court, Chicago & La Salle, Illinois, 1997. p. 403. 
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between truth (aletheia) and logical form (as in method), a result of the subordination of 
the voice.  
            Sociological reason and the modern methodological ethos are not simply in 
opposition to truth. Rather, we fail to recognize what happens to truth in the 
methodological outlook. The human sciences face the problem of language when they 
ask how they create conceptual value.90 Heidegger identified how conceptual work 
came to “determine the epoch of modernity in the west [by displacing] experience with 
procedural processes,” underscoring the growing the priority of the statement.91   
Gadamer asks: What happens in a statement?92 He says that the:  
 
            “statement” as a [....] boundary was probably the fate of western civilization. 
             Following the extreme preference for the “apophasis,” the statement, our  
             civilization developed a corresponding logic. It is the classical logic of  
              judgment, the logic founded on the concept judgment. The preference for this  
             form of speaking, which represents only one possibility within the rich variety  
             of linguistic expression, implied a particulate abstraction that has proved  
             important for the development of doctrine systems, for example, the 
             monologue of science, whose standard model is Euclid’s system.93 
 
            What is a statement in this context? In general, the statement operates in 
advancing a conceptual vocabulary in abstraction from living speech that tries to, as it 
were, conceal the speaker. Statements, as found in the law, focus on the logically 
controllable. In this way, the logical statement compels speaking to fall silent; in many 
ways this echoes Plato’s Phaedrus concerning the priority of speaking over writing. 
Gadamer summarizes his position this way: 
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The statement can never say all that there is to say. We could also 
formulate this so: everything that constitutes for us a context for a 
thought initiates fundamental and unending process. From the 
hermeneutic standpoint I would say that no conversation ends before it 
has lead to a real agreement. Perhaps one should also add that because of 
this there is fundamentally no conversation that actually ends, since a 
real agreement, a complete and total agreement between two people 
would contradict the essence of their individuality. That we never, in 
truth, actually carry a conversation to its end and often do not come to 
an agreement are the limitations of our temporality, finitude, and bias. 
Metaphysics speaks of Aristotle’s God, who does not know any of this. 
The boundary of language is therefore in truth the boundary drawn by 
our temporality, by the discursivity of our talking, saying, thinking, 
communicating and speaking. Here the structure becomes quite explicit. 
It is called conversation, because it is question and answer, because I ask 
myself as I would ask another, and I speak to myself as another would 
speak to me. Augustine already referred to this way of putting it. 
Everybody is in conversation with himself. Even when he is in 
conversation with another, he has to remain in conversation with 
himself, if he thinks.”94 
 
             Gadamer tells us our encounter with language is not in statements but in 
conversation. Writing is not far from this experience of language. Writing to has its 
origins in speaking. In “On the Other Side of Writing,” Davey describes how, 
“Gadamer prioritizes the spoken word over the written word because the voice is able 
to de-scribe; it allows the written text to address us anew, as an other, as if from 
without.”95  Writing, theory, and conceptual work, if viewed from the point of view of 
the power of the spoken word, allows us to conclude, along with Gadamer, as he draws 
on Plato’s Seventh Letter, that “the meaning of all presentation fixed in writing is still 
supported by something else that is conveyed only in living conversation.”96 Davey 
notes that, “the spoken rendition of a text must aim at a singular, unifying interpretation 
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of the text but not (and this is of paramount importance) to the end of achieving a 
hermeneutic closure, but to the end of speculatively opening the text as to allow the 
unsaid within it to come forth. The words of Catherine Pickstock are in this context 
very sage: ‘genuine intellectual clarity is obtainable only when that which is “known” 
is allowed to remain open and mysterious: an attitude synonymous with a kind of 
reverence.”97 
             Our ability to speak, to speak to one another, even across cultures, says 
Gadamer, is revealed in “poetry, the lyrical poem, [which] is the best instance of the 
particularity and foreignness of language” that puts translation at the center of speech 
and language, reminding us of Heidegger’s remark that all speech is a translation.98  
             Our encounter with language is not about statements but about a conversation. 
Speech, Gadamer tells us, “implies pre-established words with general meanings, at the 
same time, a constant process of concept formation is going on, by means of which the 
life of language develops.”99 Speech (logos), concerns a limit and transcendence, an 
openness and concealedness, yet, as the Greeks understood, speech (logos) was also the 
self-forming of individuals for social life, a consequence of open debate and 
discussion.100 Gadamer says language is a constant process of concept formation. “The 
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articulation of words and things that each language performs in its own way, 
constituting a primary and natural way of forming concepts that is different from the 
system of scientific concept formation”.101 Speech, even if it recedes from a living 
authenticity, as in writing, which Plato contends?  
                Today when we ask the question what is the nature of theory, we repeat 
Plato’s question concerning the authenticity of speech and its relation to writing.102 In 
the background of all written texts is speaking. Gadamer considers our changed 
relationship to the spoken word, the way the sign is seen in concept formation, 
especially when treated as “self-evident” to us in the language of “unambiguous 
designation,” the scientific ideal that continues unchanged.”103 
               Plato’s Phaedrus contends that writing was a distortion of the spoken word. 
Gadamer understands that this discussion reveals how speech lies behind writing; when 
we write we are always returning to the nature of speech. The Greeks had a magical 
language, but a word for language did not exist; they used logos, words that are 
spoken. Gadamer observes: “With logos, precisely that upon which the inner 
forgetfulness of speech is essentially drawn is pushed into view – the world itself, 
which is evoked by speech, lifted into presence, and brought into articulation and 
                                                                                                                                         
through language's constitutive structuring of our being in the world. Speaking remains 
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communicative participation. In speaking about things, the things are there; it is in 
speech and speaking with one another that the world and the experiential world of 
human beings constructs itself and not in the objectification that (vis-à-vis the 
communicative transmission of the insights of one person to the insight of another) 
bases itself on objectivity and purports to be knowledge for everyone.”104 
 
The Beautiful as Exemplary of what lies Beyond the Concept 
 
Gadamer’s discussion in Truth and Method, and the later work, The Relevance of the 
Beautiful, points to the shift away from art, as such, to the question of beauty as 
something that is communicated “independently of the concept.”105 In Truth and 
Method, Gadamer asked what is the relationship of the beautiful to language? He took 
art as a starting point for Truth and Method, to show the wide compass of hermeneutics 
and to place it within the universal meaning of Sprachlichkeit – linguisticality. Further, 
this universal meaning of Sprachlichkeit connects with his concern to show how, by 
using the concept of the beautiful, he could “substantiate the universality of 
hermeneutics.”106 
               Truth and Method alerts us to why the experience of language lies outside the 
modernist frame. When we understand art we do not control it or dominate it. Schmidt 
reminds us that “remembering ancient thought helps us to see more clearly that in the 
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beautiful and art we encounter a significance that goes beyond everything 
conceptual.”107 
              Truth in art is a transformative event of understanding and this experience of 
art always exceeds the concept. As we shall see, how we experience art is close to the 
nature of the experience of language. Gadamer says the beautiful is thinking ideas 
without concepts. In our encounter with art, therefore, we encounter something whose 
significance goes beyond everything conceptual.108 
 
Conclusion. 
           Alan Blum, remarkably, in his work Theorizing (1974), claims that sociology 
will speak truly when it can convert its speech. What did he mean by this claim that 
sociology had to “convert” its speech?  The introductory chapter provides an overview 
of his dialectics of speech – the speculative dialectics of the word – of our proximity to 
an encounter with the emergence of truth is dialogue. Was Blum also thinking of 
something similar to what we find in Gadamer’s remark when he wrote, “the meaning 
of the word method must change”?109 Each chapter considers these two questions in 
light of our outline of Gadamer’s hermeneutics of truth and theory. 
           Chapter 1, “The Rhetorical and Ethical Dimension of the Vocation of Theoria,” 
offers an account of why self-alienation happens in the self-objectification of speech 
and how this requires that we attend to the question of moral self-understanding and the 
authoring of theory. The authoring of theoria then concerns the question of self-hood, 
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or more specifically, the style of theory and how theory presupposes a hermeneutic 
identity based in shared conversation.  This chapter, therefore, pivots on the rhetorical 
nature of theoria and the question of language. We consider why, when we speak, we 
bring something to understanding; why, in other words, theory is rhetorical; why this 
has a non-metaphysical meaning; why speaking is the space of mediation in which 
understanding happens. To express true knowledge requires recognizing the practical 
value of understanding, our ability to speak with understanding.110 Gadamer tells us 
that one who knows a techne, but does not understand it, would be quite impotent, 
would be alien to the authorship of their logoi.111 
                 In chapter 2, “Social Theory & the Question of Hermeneutic Truth,” I 
discuss how we can discern an underlying theme, not always directly signified, found 
widely across the human sciences that contains one message: the human sciences are an 
activity that is close to art, ethics, lyricism and truth. A key question that is, as it were, 
suspended in the human sciences, is the question of truth.  First, we consider 
Gadamer’s guiding idea that truth is the art of saying, and the way in which he 
identifies the voice of the poet as one that is not built on an objective distancing, on 
conceptuality. Second, we consider how, especially in the human sciences, our 
displacement from the poet’s truth conceals our being in common with others, leading 
to an estranged knowing that takes the form of a weakened sense of the commonality of 
speaking with others, and that is ultimately felt as disenchantment.  We argue that it is 
possible to discern – across a series of social theorists, including Merton, Nisbet, 
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Brown, Berger, and especially Alvin Gouldner (The Coming Crisis of Sociology, Enter 
Plato) and the later work of Zygmunt Bauman (Liquid Modernity) – an underlying 
connection, an identification of the problem of theory as a consequence of a 
disconnection within the moral and lyrical dimensions of the speaking being as theorist.  
           Alvin Gouldner, C. W. Mills and Richard Brown were among those writers 
whose interrogation of the human sciences were actually excavating metaphysical 
assumptions while addressing the problems of social theory. Gouldner saw sociology as 
a social-political problem, not a scientific problem. This is evident when he identified 
what he called their “goodness and potency” (the place of moral self-discovery and 
self-formation) that he felt had been compromised. He spoke of an ethical approach 
concerning  (1) the imaginative participation in communication and, (2) the moral 
meaning of our linguistic actions in the human sciences.112 Our participation in the world 
of questions and problems could not be reached effectively or conveyed effectively 
with the meaning of method as objectification. Gadamer spoke of the meaning of 
method found in the Greeks. He wrote, regarding this image of method in this way: 
“[T]his meaning of ‘method’ as going along with presupposes that we already find 
ourselves in the middle of the game and can occupy no neutral standpoint – even if we 
strive very hard for objectivity and put our prejudices at risk.”113  Richard Harvey 
Brown would identify sociology in moral terms saying that objectifying discourse 
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disempowers ordinary citizens.114 The human sciences must consider themselves along 
a dimension that heightens their moral self-understanding.115  
             In chapter 3, “Poetics and Truth,” my approach is to discuss why the poet’s 
word finds its fulfillment in a participatory conception of truth. In this thesis, this is the 
point at which I explicitly develop my interpretation of the human sciences and their 
poetics. Why is the poet an exemplar in Gadamer’s thinking, a thinking that considers 
the implications of pure language and truth saying? Gadamer’s reflections on the poet 
Paul Celan, in many ways echo Heidegger’s reflection on this poet and the importance 
of poetry to the elucidation of Dasein, but as we shall see they differ on a key point, 
which is central also to his challenge to the modernist conception of the poem as 
“monological.” Celan claims in his famous Meridian speech that a poem, the purest 
form of language, exists “in the mystery of an encounter (im Geheimnis der 
Begegnung).” In this way he contradicts Heidegger’s views on poetic speech.116 In fact, 
both Celan and Gadamer contradict this key point of Heidegger’s legacy concerning 
our encounter with the mystery of language itself as monological. In this chapter 
Gadamer’s short study, “Who Am I and Who Are You” [1973], prompts our discussion 
alongside Gadamer’s earlier discussion, “Plato and the Poets” [1934], of the dialogical 
nature of the poetic utterance.  These essays deal at length with the question of escaping 
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the suspicion of the word, the aesthetic seductiveness of the word, and the degrading of 
the word (sophistry).  
              I will argue, following Gadamer’s reflections on the poet, that truth is the art of 
saying.117 Truth is dialogical. Poetic speaking is not about any scientific truth of 
“interpretation,” rather a poem’s truth derives from living speech, our dialogical 
encounter with each other in the play of words, moving in an unbroken circularity 
between the individual and the general.  I will further argue at length that it is 
Gadamer’s emphasis on speech and theory that is key to understanding the problem of 
theory. We comprehend, but not within methodological validity as in the sciences, 
because “the facts which they [the human sciences] thematize are mediated to a large 
extent by speech.”118 
             In chapter 4 of the thesis, “The Dialogue Between Ancient and Modern 
Theory,” I argue that it is the Ancient Greek concept of theoria that offers a critique of 
the human sciences. Although Truth and Method only faintly shows the impact of 
Greek theory, since this work was mostly concerned with developing a hermeneutic 
theory, it becomes evident that an important understanding of theory concerns 
Gadamer’s reflections on Greek theoria. Gadamer, as Donatella Di Cesare notes, 
thought of his studies on Greek thought “as the best and most original part of this 
philosophical activity.”119 And, indeed, this is true in many ways. Hence, it is 
Gadamer’s recovery of ancient theoria that is explored in this chapter. The limit of 
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modern theory is not only key for Gadamer but, I argue, we find an emphasis on the 
Greeks in such theorists as Alan Blum, especially in his book, Theorizing, and also in 
Alvin Gouldner’s writings, especially Enter Plato.  
            Di Cesare sheds further light on Gadamer’s focus on Greek theoria and modern 
theory by suggesting, “Both are bound up with each other through the circularity of 
understanding. Reading Greek philosophy represents a challenge, since it calls into 
question modern customs and prejudices. Hermeneutics accepts this challenge and lets 
itself be led by the Greeks in a circular openness of an infinite dialogue. The actuality 
of Greek philosophy becomes hermeneutic itself, understood as the philosophical 
reappraisal of the dialogue with the Greeks because, despite the breaks and 
interruptions, continuity persists.”120 Thus, Gadamer's famous phrase that says that an 
encounter with the Greeks is an “encounter with ourselves” becomes the theme of this 
chapter.121 
              In Chapter 5, “Theory and Beauty,” I take up Gadamer’s description of beauty 
to illuminate theory. Beauty and the recovery of truth go hand in hand. Beauty and truth 
offer a way of discussing the concept of self-validation. Beauty is not a copy nor is it a 
representation of something. Gadamer writes the beautiful is the “most important 
ontological function” because beauty mediates “between idea and appearance.”122 
Beauty, then, is ontological. “Beauty of itself, presents itself,” which means “that it’s 
being is such that it makes itself immediately evident.”123 Hence, “[t]hrough the 
analogical function of the beautiful, which Plato has described in unforgettable terms, a 
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121 Gadamer, The Beginning of Knowledge, p. 119. 
122 Ibid. p. 476. 
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structural characteristic of the being of the beautiful becomes visible, and with it an 
element of the structure of being in general.”124 
              Beauty concerns a bringing forth that can grasp the evidentness of truth. Such 
evidentness, as we find in beauty, also belongs, as Gadamer notes, to the tradition of 
rhetoric.125 Beauty becomes the measure of theory. By reminding us that concepts 
require the living event of speech, of language, to occur. Beauty, along with the sense 
of the word, the rightness of the assertion, shows commonality and mutual 
understanding. Both the image and word share a something that is non-circumventable; 
they both represent through themselves, like beauty. Beauty shows something is there; 
it is not this or that thing, but rather a showing that something happens. This special 
way of showing concerns the human sciences for it is something that is achieved 
beyond method (and conceptual speech). Such a happening is what Gadamer calls the 
“there” that is not nothing. This points back to Parmenides, and the conception that: 
“Thinking is only in the being of the there.” “In the ‘there’ it is uttered, and through this 
the being of the thought is ‘there’. That is what Parmenides intended.”126  
             In Chapter 6 we return to our key theme. Why do we claim that theory is closer 
to poetics than science? We focus on one social theorist, at this point in our journey, to 
find our answer. Zygmunt Bauman is a compelling and dominant figure in the 
sociological world. What we can detect in his work is a striving to show how modernity 
impacts lives as well as how it also impacts the question of the human sciences. 
                                                
124 Ibid. p. 479. 
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126 Gadamer, “Thinking and Poetizing in Heidegger and in Holderlin’s Andenken,” p. 
150. 
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            Significantly, Bauman concludes Liquid Modernity (2000), with the section 
“Afterthoughts: On Writing and Writing Sociology.” Here he discusses his own attitude 
toward writing. Peter Beilhartz describes that Bauman’s style of theorizing over the 
years is characterized by a shift in both voice and style more than theoretical 
consistency.127 Bauman’s authoring style of analysis reflects the changing social impact 
of modernity. Therefore it is also a critique of the authoring of theory in the human 
sciences. Hence he asks about his own writerliness that concerns his own conceptual 
versatility seen as simultaneously a response to social life and the changing role of the 
social theorist. By transforming theory into a deep meditation, by displaying both the 
lyrical and ethical power of his voice, he invites his readers to participate in his 
conceptual dialogue, his living dialogue and conceptual expression, that informs and 
guides us to share in his theoretical understanding. In this way his work affirms the 
lyrical in sociological thinking. 
              We can see that Bauman’s love of literature and writers directly shape his 
approach to social theorizing, which allows him to convincingly register new social 
realities, to address with urgency social and political affairs, and to become a more 
effective theorist. In this section, I have shown that it is the impact of hermeneutic 
universality on the universality of theory that overcomes the metaphysical limitations 
imposed by the scientific viewpoint. Bauman’s theorizing, therefore, de-emphasizes the 
‘metaphysical’, and, instead emphasizes the ‘rhetorical ethics’ of our theoretical 
speech. This re-conceptualization of the human sciences concerns, specifically, the 
power of truth of the word, not by way of the logical concept of judgment, but by way 
                                                
127 Beilharz, Peter. “Following the Human Condition.” In Dialectic of Modernity. 
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of what can be communicated in the commonality of mutual understanding, where the 
word displays its unrestricted power to speak.  The role of the voice in the word never 
brings itself to a fixed form; the word always remains an opening onto the world, 
conceptually and emotionally, and it remains in the unthinkable finitude of our being. 
               Bauman shows how the logoi of theory, exists for us in a true tension of our 
self-discovery as theoretical beings (our theoretical lives, our living in theoria) in terms 
of the ethical and lyrical dimension of discovery, of authoring ourselves. We see this, 
especially, in his Postmodern Ethics (1993), which, as Peter Beilharz notes, displays 
why Bauman’s sociology is “properly the realm of the other. But this will not relieve 
me of the responsibility to look inward, nor can it resolve the pain of existential 
solitude. One can tell about one’s existence, but cannot share it. Being with others does 
not relieve us of existential singularity.”128 
             My concluding argument concerns this claim: When Gadamer writes:  “We 
should doubt the human sciences current self-understanding, because they do not fully 
recognize what the mode of truth is in their whole procedure,” 129 he makes clear that 
the whole procedure of the human sciences is not about method but about whom we are 
as human beings.  Once understood, the human sciences have no longer to hide their 
work behind technical structures of discourse, since this only misdirects them and the 
public away from the question of truth. To conclude, I will develop some of the 
ramifications of Gadamer’s approach to the question of truth, in the following chapters.  
 
 
                                                
128 Beilharz, “Following the Human Condition,” p. 149. 
129 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], p. 100. 
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Chapter 1.       
       
The Rhetorical and Ethical Dimension of the Vocation of Theoria 
 
             We learn from Plato that the vocation of theoria is rhetorical. In this chapter we 
consider why when we speak we bring something to understanding: why theory is 
rhetorical. Speaking is the space of mediation in which understanding happens. To 
express true knowledge requires recognizing the practical value of understanding, our 
ability to speak with understanding.130 Gadamer tells us that one who knows a techne, 
but does not understand it, would be quite impotent, would be alien to the authorship of 
their logoi.131 Natural speech is where we find words to say what we want to say to 
others. 
             Di Cesare captures Gadamer’s conception of speaking by drawing an important 
contrast to Wittgenstein and Heidegger. She writes: 
For Wittgenstein, the perspectives of the speakers dominate. On the basis of the 
grammar of the game, and speaking is “part of the activity” in which a remnant 
of subjectivity emerges. In Gadamer’s view, the speaker’s perspective is 
overcome by the common perspective of the language game. However, this 
does not result in a hypostasis of language. In this way, Gadamer’s position 
should also be distinguished from Heidegger’s since, for Gadamer. It is not 
language that speaks; it is rather the speakers. Whereas for Wittgenstein the 
subject retains mastery, for Heidgger it is language. Gadamer’s position 
between the two reflects the “medial” character of play, which cats light on the 
active process, which is nonetheless undergone, of dialogue.132 
 
                                                
130 Gadamer, “Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task,” p. 119. 
131 Gadamer, “Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task,” p. 119. 
132 Di Cesare, Gadamer: A Philosophical Portrait, p. 165. 
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Our relation to the art of speaking concerns true knowledge epitomized by the Platonic 
dialogue, Phaedrus, as Gadamer reminds us: 
Phaedrus was dedicated to the task of endowing rhetoric with a more profound 
meaning and of allowing it a share of philosophical thus is was asked there 
exactly what facet of rhetoric was techne. The perspective laid open in the 
Phaedrus were also at root of Aristotelian Rhetoric, which presents more a 
philosophy of human life as determined by speech than a technical doctrine 
about the art of speaking.133 
 
The human sciences seek an innocent (neutral) technical speech, deeply concerned with 
the authoring of scientific speech that follows in the legacy of modern science yet has 
forgotten the truths that lie in this ancient heritage. But what is neutral speech? There is 
none, i.e. there is no innocent methodological speech, for there is no transparency in 
human life, only better and better understanding, the ongoing dialogue we have with 
ourselves and others. Truth cannot be fixed in any set of propositions. Any claim to a 
neutral understanding would be a contradiction of genuine understanding. 
Understanding makes its own claim to validity determined by the endless dialogue of 
the soul in speech. Speaking itself shares universality with understanding and 
interpreting. Gadamer says that “One can talk about everything, and everything one 
says has to be able to be understood.”134 As speaking beings we are ethically bound by 
the non-transparency of speech.  
             One never fully says what they want to say, for saying is always hermeneutic – 
a hermeneutic event. But one’s saying is also released by the event of understanding. 
The Greek imperative in philosophy concerns seeing theory as a process of life-
formation (ethical self-transformation), as a matter of one’s relation to their temporal 
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being, reflected in speech, in its rhetorical dimension that shapes the vocation of 
theoria. The logi Sokratikoi (Socrates dialogues) tell us that the Greeks did not treat 
theory as disenchantment. Plato’s writings, following Socrates’ death, provided a 
picture of the dialogue as conversations with others. As one encounters the Greeks135 
the question of the disenchantment of the word in modern theory is strikes one. 
Concept formation, in this regard, is seen as a transformation that occurs in the 
metaphorics of everyday speech, that when put into a “scientific viewpoint” succumbs 
to a linguistic misunderstanding about the nature of theoria. Consequently, the paradox 
theoria is the way “science itself is in conflict with our human consciousness of 
value.”136 
                Ulrich Beck argues, in the age of scientism (Risk Society, 2000), the 
alienation plays out in terms of the question of the good (vital values). Seemingly, the 
human sciences carry a crisis that manifests itself as a recurring and repeated question 
about its own self-identity, especially in relationship to language and the language of 
science that has been carried over from the Greeks. Gadamer reminds us that the good 
(the human good) lies in dialogue, for dialogue is, as he puts it, the “dynamis of the 
good,” held together by the structure of our speech.137 It is remarkable, he writes:  
 
how this “guiding of the soul” combined with highly theoretical 
expositions of the principles of dialectic. Socrates – in his typically 
secretive, oracular way – supports his arguments with appeals to obscure 
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136 "Theory, Technology and Practice", in, The Enigma of Health, Hans-Georg 
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sources of knowledge and even vague dreams. Plainly he makes no 
claim that what he says is authoritative. Rather, he sets the listener free 
once again to recognize himself in what is said. In this way, Socrates 
does indeed get his partner to enter into the dialectical movement 
voluntarily.138 
 
                We are all grounded in the leap into the logi, when we first enter the 
transcendental gaze of philosophy. We are at a threshold; we discover ourselves in the 
living event of thinking. But when the gesture of the logical ethos moves toward the 
formalization speech that has ramifications beyond doing good science. Today, the 
formalization of speaking creates the transcendental space of speech (that is formally 
“abstract”), but in no way dialectical, as in the utterances of actual speech, but in a 
scientific modeling of speech. Consequently, the need to reframe this ideal of scientific 
speech occurs because the problems of science and modernity continue to exist at a 
personal level of our theory-speech. This is why theory-speech and literary-speech (i.e. 
the Platonic dialogues), for some, provide a model that links knowledge and character 
(historically found in the figure of Socrates), by linking prose style to theory, to 
challenge a modernistic understanding of theory. 
             Plato holds before us the Greek sense of living speech, found in the 
enchantment of the question, preceding, as it were, any dialectic of interpretation, 
because understanding is an event found in the priority of the question,139 represented 
in the figure of Socrates, where “thought [remains] in close proximity to the linguistic 
world-experience as a whole,”140as we participate in the enchantment of the question. 
                                                
138 Ibid. p. 109.  
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140 Gadamer, Hans-Georg. “The Philosophical Foundations of the Twentieth Century.” 
In Philosophical Hermeneutics. Stanford: University of California Press, 1976. The 
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 59 
              The logic of science absorbs truth into itself; it is this theme, evident in 
Heidegger’s thinking that becomes a key to Gadamer’s own project. Once the logi is 
transformed into methodic thinking, it translates itself into the priority of the truth of 
objects, over the truth of saying. Therefore, we now recreate ourselves [in scientific 
thinking], not on the event of truth in living speech, but in an estranged speech that 
cancels, or, distances the event of theory, found in the finitude of our lives and the 
infinity of our speech.  
              Truth is the continuous semeosis of speech – the inner infinity of speech – that 
embodies us in its event.  Truth, then, is how we live in [and inhabit] language: 
therefore, our living interpretation (truth as event), remains in contrast to scientific 
distancing, our control and our anonymous domination by the dogmatism of concepts. 
Truth and theoria have, as we know, a distinct meaning for the Greeks. And, as 
Gadamer shows, it is the phenomenon of language that holds us back and exemplifies 
our finitude. Greek thinking therefore resists the bad infinity of the “endlessly 
progressive” stance of modern thought.141  
            Gadamer says, "All thinking is confined to language, as a limit as well as a 
possibility. This experience is in every interpretation that is itself linguistic in 
character.”142 Language is similar in conception to the spirit, “that transcends 
                                                                                                                                         
of concepts and the ‘urge to system.’ “Thanks to this resistance they were able to 
conceive the phenomena that dominate our quarrel with our own tradition, such as the 
self and self-consciousness, that thus also the entire realm of ethical and political being, 
without falling into the dilemma of modern subjectivism.” p. 128.  
141 Gadamer, Hans-Georg. “On the Philosophic Element in the Sciences and the 
Scientific Character of Philosophy.” In The Age of Reason. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
MIT Press, 2001. p. 16. 
142 Gadamer, “The Philosophical Foundations of the Twentieth Century,” p. 127. 
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subjectivity.”143 Thought, then, its transcendental gesture lies in the Pre-Socratic 
opening of poetic-logic – such as we find in the mythic and poetic speech of 
Parmenides.  
            Plato’s concern is with making speeches (with the art of speaking) and it is 
speaking that underlies understanding. For example, an interpreter who, for example, 
only reproduced words and sentences would alienate “the conversation’s intelligibility” 
where conversation naturally lives.144 Put simply, the intelligibility of the concept is not 
a matter of the science of language but of living language. An interpreter reproduces 
not what is said in exact terms but “what the other person wants to say and said in that 
he left much unsaid.”145 What the interpreter is doing, is possible, because of “the inner 
infinity that belongs to all common understanding.”146 Speech is, for Gadamer, a self-
forgetting that also characterizes its very virtuality.   
 
Why Speech Defines the Human Sciences 
                Life is articulating life in speech. Speech involves a self-reflection that 
clarifies the relation we have to ourselves as individuals and to our lives. Life interprets 
life in the hermeneutic structure of speech. Truth, guided by the ethos of scientific 
practice, a self-certifying act, is an act that estranges truth and dislocates the theorist 
from the way life articulates itself in speech. 
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              Speech is hermeneutic phenomena and its universal significance,147 thus there 
is no strong distinction between scientific speaking and non-scientific speaking, since 
each concerns rhetoric.148 Gadamer, by drawing deeply on both the Greeks and 
Heidegger149 reaches this central idea: spoken words are the origin of concepts.150  
              In this way, social theory is not simply an acquisition of methodological 
rhetoric. 151  Rather it resides in something that precedes method. Our natural concept 
formation, when locked into a vision of language as objectifiable, blocks a proper 
understanding of how words form concepts through their productive ambiguity.152  
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rhetoric of a later time will call it.” p.111. 
 62 
             Our natural attitude to the language of concept formation, our conversation, 
happens when we refine our thoughts, not limit or block them. As hermeneutic subjects 
we can see ourselves taken up by our words, exemplified by the ancient alliance 
between rhetoric and poetics – that means, in both the unity and multiplicity of the 
meaning capacity of words, that is not covered by logic.153  By bringing Plato and 
hermeneutics together Gadamer shows how conversation – dialogue – weaves human 
speech in theory.  One proceeds to human understanding, as Risser notes, by way of 
dialogical inquiry.154 Gadamer’s point is that the way we proceed to understanding is 
not through logical demonstration. In the human sciences, language is not merely a path 
to the verification, or falsifiabilty of statements: but rather a path to knowing ourselves 
as a sharing with others where we are already taken up in the movement of thought. 
The scientific view of speech only conceals this real speculative and dialectical 
movement of language, of the play of the word, the natural formation of concepts, in 
alienating effects.  
             “The truth of speech,” Gadamer says, “exists in the adequacy of speech to the 
thing i.e., as adequation of the presentation through speech to the presented thing.”155 
Conceptuality and truth, therefore happen in speech that proves valid, a logos of speech 
that makes something discernable to us in the very intelligibility of what is being said, 
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where the words being spoken live up to themselves, and are not simply arbitrary, and, 
not simply empty.156 Authentic speech, we may recall, is the concern of the rhetorician, 
according to Socrates. Socrates’ defense of living speech and its relationship to writing 
rested on the question of authentically speaking to others. The intimacy of valid speech 
spoken to another is compared with written speech that is speaking to everyone.  In 
some measure, we could say, the question becomes for theory not how scientific it can 
be but how it communicates with its audience. Also, how self-knowledge, self-
understanding, play a role in this as a vehicle for avoiding self-alienation in speech. The 
dialectic of the dialogues is then presented as a form in which writing and speech 
merge more meaningfully to convey ideas.157  
             When we move from word to concept we are not simply predicating our 
statements but opening ourselves to the speculative way words form concepts – into 
concepts that can then speak to us. Gadamer does not establish a theory of the 
foundations of the human sciences but rather shows how [hermeneutic] speech, the 
inner infinity of speech, is located  – paradoxically – in the human sciences. The human 
sciences generate their own self-estrangement, as they infinitely re-arrange their 
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and Other Essays. Edited by Robert Bernasconi. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986. p. 139. 
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possible.”  p. 1. This point corresponds to aspects of this work inspired by Gadamer 
that pays attention to the alienating effects of the human sciences and the possibilities 
of social knowledge, or the claims of social theory, that historically permeates them. 
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rhetorical self-conception as a “science;” this, broadly speaking, Gadamer calls their 
methodological alienation. Thus their logic, as they aspire to be “scientific” leads to 
their ambivalence about Truth; for their self-certifying manner estranges this truth, and 
inhibits theory as they lose their hermeneutic efficacy of speech. 
              Theory involves the giveness of the interior dialogue of the soul with itself. 
Our interior dialogue puts words into our mouths, offering us, simultaneously, a way 
forward beyond the alienation of speech.158  Our living enchantment with thinking 
recalls the Greeks; it is a Socratic enchantment, where we are always hermeneutically 
spoken. Mary P. Nichols describes, for example, how Plato [Gorgias] links the soul 
and rhetoric: “following his reference to virtue as a goal of rhetoric, Socrates observes 
that one cannot know the nature of the soul without also knowing the nature of the 
whole.”159  
              Speech, word, living conversation, carries us along a path toward ourselves as 
a care of the soul, how we work on ourselves in society with others, even if we misuse 
our speech. Jan Patocka argues, following Plato that the care of the soul takes place in 
conversation.160 Conversation is where our souls act, and are acted upon, in speeches 
where “manifesting and showing are always a showing to someone.”161 Speech ties us 
together and reminds us of this bond, the wholeness that precedes and connects us. 
Such wholeness is the manifesting of something where we understand the whole stamp 
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of a thing for the thing itself “… the sense for being.”162 A fragment presupposes this 
sense of the whole, a subject presupposes a unity in difference, and this unity of 
difference is speech. Therefore, as Patocka puts it, to work through the work of oneself 
happens in society, “in a society with others, because in the end no one will escape this 
situation.” To which he adds, “And then there is that third thing, the relation to one’s 
own temporal and eternal being, to one’s own body, to one’s own bodily existence and 
to what awaits us all – that is, to death.”163 Our conversation of the soul is with itself 
and with others, and this is where the care of the soul happens; it happens with others. 
Nichols also affirmed this point when she says, echoing Socrates: “Speeches connect 
souls together.”164  
            A word is multiplicity and unity [one and many]; in our dialectical relationship 
to words we express ourselves. The human sciences, therefore, are closer to this quality 
of the metaphoricity of the word, thus connecting our natural concept formation, and 
our theorizing, back to living language.  Once one seeks to transcend living language 
with a “scientific vocabulary” [words], one steps into a world encoded by an implicit 
alienation of speech.165 
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            Gadamer asks: are we not dealing, when it comes to the human sciences, with 
an alienated understanding?166  He speaks of our alienated understanding, or self-
estrangement, linked to a suspicion of language, leading to the suppression of the 
dialectic of the spoken word.167 A consequence is the alienation of speech (and the 
alienation of truth).168 A scientific self-representation of what theory and the theorist 
are, establishes a discontinuity between knowledge and ethics, theorist and community, 
built as it were, on a dual consciousness between a studious “objectivity” and the 
personal values held by a theorist.169  
                Language lives as “the single word, whose virtuality opens for us the infinity 
of discourse, of speaking with another, of the freedom of ‘expressing oneself’ and 
‘letting oneself be expressed’.”170 Gadamer argues language is “something ‘non-
objective’ and intangible, whose objectification in a text is always the occasion that 
“determines its non-objectivity.”171 Gadamer’s concern is not to explain the 
foundations of the human sciences but rather show why the reflexive nature of speaking 
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(as a conversation of the soul with others and itself) is the founding model that defines 
the human sciences. In this view, language is the priority of the spoken word and the 
proximity of language and truth. We can express everything in words and can try to 
come to agreement about things.172 When we objectify language we can lose touch with 
ourselves. 
               Poiesis and poietes indicate for the Greeks a very specific sense of poetic 
creation. Gadamer’s emphasis on the hermeneutic character of poetic speech has drawn 
on this to show a complex impact. He seeks to show how the poem reveals a 
fundamental aspect of language in the question of the truth of the word, but also how 
this understanding of the poetic provides insight into the power of language, and thus, 
the language of theory.  
              Gadamer addresses the priority of the poet in revealing truth: “we have to 
concern ourselves, as philosophers, with the voice of poetry, and to be near to poetry 
and the arts generally, as was already emphasized by Schelling in German Idealism. 
This I have done throughout my life. The volume of my collected works which is at the 
printers right now [GW9 (1993)] contains nothing but interpretations of poetry.”173 
               A poet’s voice, it is argued, lies in proximity to concept formation, and, 
ultimately, indicates why theory has a special relationship to poetic speech. For both 
have the capacity to bring being into language in the unhiddeness of the assertion.174 
We are reminded that for Gadamer, as with the Greeks, their attitude to the word is 
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Edited by Richard E. Palmer, New Haven: Yale University, 2001. pp.110-111. 
174 Gadamer, Hans-Georg. “What is Truth?” In Hermeneutics and Truth. Edited by 
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different to a modern view of the word. The peculiar uniqueness of the poetic word 
indicates a capacity for the word to stand for itself. Words are non-verifiable, but not 
false. As Gadamer says “To speak of truth in poetry is to ask how the poetic word finds 
fulfillment precisely by refusing external verification of any kind.”175  
 
Saying and Understanding. 
              The virtuality of speaking words, (lingusticality) poses the not-yet-said that 
always remains in the background of what we say, and the not-yet-understood always 
lies in the background of understanding.176 Then we are looking specifically at 
language not as a “set of a pre-given meanings but [as] a ‘coming to language’ from a 
constant reserve into an event in which meaning announces itself.”177 Quoting 
Gadamer, “Hermeneutics is this: knowing how much of the un-said remains in what is 
said.”178 We do not simply apply concepts to all sorts of things, but in Gadamer’s view, 
they remain speculative concepts (the way the finite word points to the infinite) that  
“come forward in the movement of thought springing from the spirit of language and 
the power of intuition.”179  
                                                
175 Gadamer, Hans-Georg. “On the Contribution of Poetry to Truth.” In The Relevance 
of the Beautiful and Other Essays. Edited by, Robert Bernasconi. Translated by Nicolas 
Walker. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986. pp. 110-111. 
176 Di Cesare, Donatella Ester, Utopia of Understanding, pp.7-8. Linguistcality 
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177 Gadamer, “On the Contribution of Poetry to Truth,” p. 66. 
178 Quotation appears in Di Cesare’s book, and has been “modified” from the original 
interview. See, Di Cesare, Utopia of Understanding, p. 25. 
179 Ibid. pp. 66-68. 
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              How does the priority of poetic speaking in language apply to concept 
formation, as well as theory, and, how might they be illuminated by this insight?180 We 
belong to the experience of language, but self-estrangement and alienation occurs, 
especially in the human sciences, when the emphasis on method, with its suspicion of 
ordinary language, dominates the way we reveal things. What is clear is that 
hermeneutic experience, rooted in the dialogue, changes our perception of our 
knowing-self and our conception of the concept as a living word. 
              The human sciences exist, in this way, in an animated and engaged 
conversation that works descriptively and creatively with concepts. For Gadamer, the 
human sciences stand on the language we speak, which is the “pre-given content of all 
subsequent logical analysis.”181 Thus, understanding, social consciousness, and truth, 
are all dialogical actions.  Hermeneutics, seemingly offers a theory of truth and 
understanding that impacts the self-understanding of the human sciences. We can now 
consider how we concretize theory in the movement of thought, not by thinking against 
language (as an obstacle) but rather by thinking with it.182 
               If theory shares this power of language, it is similar to the mimetic qualities 
found in poetic speech, then our ability to make things manifest to one another, in 
speech and in theory, presents something that can be known because of what is 
communicated.  Speech, like the poem, or the literary work, and theory, in some 
measure exist in what is communicated by them. Truth is common to each. Truth is not 
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imposed. The true is not an idea or a concept that comes afterwards, but is something 
that speech opens before us in the way we communicate ideas and share them. 
Consequently, the participatory nature of theory, and the event-like nature of theory, 
resides in the hermeneutic perception of ontology of speech that is never purely 
abstract. Gadamer had learnt from Heidegger, of the hermeneutic facticity of speech. 
Speech, then, imparts being. 
                Speech (as conversation) puts a limit on any sovereign self-possession 
(subjectivism), or claims of transparency (neutrality) while opening us up to the very 
possibilities of what we are as conversational beings.183 Methodological thinking 
blocks self-recognition by blocking our sense of the participatory whole, that is not 
objectifiable. Between speakers something remains irreducible, which is the structure 
of hermeneutic experience in its continuously communicative forms, not to be confused 
with the multiplicity of interpretations (relativism). It involves recognizing the capacity 
of language to open us to the sharing in the true, the beautiful, and the good, in genuine 
speech.  
                Truth, for Gadamer, cannot be a pre-given thing (definition), because truth is 
announced with others in our participation in speech (in dialogue as the priority of the 
question), which means we cannot simply institutionally or procedurally define truth; 
truth occurs in the play of understanding. In fact, there is no way to close truth down 
into a definition. Truth is not imposed. 
                                                
183 In “The Scope of Hermeneutical Reflection”, and following Heidegger, Gadamer 
establishes that understanding mobilizes a moment of the loss of self meaning that the 
occurrence of understanding cannot be grasped as a simple activity of consciousness 
that understands: “but is itself a mode of the event of being.”. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 
Philosophical Hermeneutics. Edited and translated by David E. Linge. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1976. p. 50. 
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              Theory is the purest connection there is between true being and being true.184 
The human sciences rest on this. With our “supposed knowledge” and their “real 
knowledge” this is what is always at stake.185 Modern theory compels us to embrace the 
estrangement of being (being-as-saying) and truth (where the word as word speaks), 
since methodos is where the question of truth is already decided within this paradigm 
and its assumptions. All of which compels the thinker into a procedural theorizing-self 
who has difficulty in adequately recognizing the immanence of truth within language.  
            Truth, in Gadamer’s view, is the temporalizing of Dasein, that makes possible 
the letting be of entities in speech, not understood as a logic or method, but, as a 
recurring self-discovery of being that occurs in speech. Being is there in the language 
we speak. It is in accepting language as an event (a speech event) that we understand 
that we are constantly in the process of concept formation. The Pre-Socratics opened 
this question to us in a remarkable way (as in the birth of philosophical speech), as with 
Parmenides. The virtuality of speech that precedes all logos, thus, allows us a different 
context for understanding the crisis of theory. In which we no longer thinking about 
closed language games, or meta-theory, but finding the right tools (style of writing) for 
making theory work. Because, as Gadamer says, the experience of meaning takes place 
in our understanding that is wholly and universally verbal. What is held in check by 
methodos, or our analytical tools,186 our putting together of a series of interrelated 
propositions upon which we build theory, or putting together logically interrelated 
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theoretical propositions, is the speculative potentiality of how we live in genuine 
dialogue. Here the truth of the word requires no such constitutive systematic structure 
to express itself as theory. What is rescinded, in fact, in this outlook, is the dimension 
of human reality that hermeneutics opens us to, and thus their paradox, which the 
human sciences remain rooted in.  
The human sciences (Geisteswissenchaften) so obviously understand 
themselves by analogy to the natural sciences that the idealist echo implied in 
the idea of Geist fades into the background.187 
 
We argue that speech articulates us; it is our being in the world. Once the ethicality and 
authenticity of the theorist’s speech is compromised, so is the identity of the theorist. 
When we recognize that all speaking is rhetorical, we can overcome the limits of 
modern speech tied to the suppression of the rhetorical dimension of language. We 
have explored the relationship between such speech and self-alienation in the human 
sciences. Identifying how theorizing in the human sciences is internally linked to the 
adoption of a non-rhetorical horizon limits the conceptual power of those sciences. By 
placing rhetoric at the center of his work, Gadamer shows that our concern regarding 
the alienating effects of modern theory is due to the inadequate way we would ethically 
and lyrically restrict the process of theorizing. 
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Chapter 2. 
 
 
   
Social Theory and its Relationship to the Question of Hermeneutic Truth. 
 
 
In this chapter I claim that Gadamer sees the human sciences as rooted in the power of 
language’s access to truth. Here, we bring the question of truth into proximity with the 
human sciences. We explain why, in his view, truth is illuminated by art and poetry. In 
Truth of the Work of Art, among other texts, Gadamer makes clear that truth happens 
in linguistic encounters and encounters with art. What he means is that we know things 
since we are bound by being and language in the power of the word. The encounters we 
have, in speaking theory, have nothing to do with an “object” or things that we get to 
know through “objective cognition”. Rather, when we look at art and poetry we can 
envisage how truth in the nature of theory and concept formation is not the result of 
method. Gadamer’s arguments on the nature of art and poetry help to reveal the place 
of truth in the nature of theory and concept formation.  To know truth is to know that 
truth occurs without a concept. Once we recognize this, we know that we are not 
suspending ourselves in the objectivist illusion or the naturalization of theory.  
We perform theory in light of our ethicality of speaking and through our lyrical 
sensibility.  
             We return to Alvin Gouldner and C. W. Mills to show how the notion of truth 
was already at play in their work.  I argue that social theory, in contrast to any scientific 
pre-conception, is a relationship, if not a living embodiment of the verbalization of 
truth. The claim is that there is a closer relationship between lyrical and ethical 
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expression in social theory, in contrast to a scientific conception of speech, because 
theory itself is a form of speech that cannot be understood as methodological. Truth 
matters to the human sciences because they are a discipline of questioning and 
inquiring that involves our self-formation, both as non-alien souls and as speakers. 
             What I intend to show, broadly, is why the problem of theorizing modern life is 
remedied or corrected by understanding Gadamer’s main theme: the location of truth in 
the authoring of the social theorist. But before I do this I want to further flesh out my 
argument as to why the human sciences had, by seemingly avoiding the question of 
truth, actually located and identified it. Let’s begin by considering some example of 
how social scientists, as early as the 1950s, were reflecting on their practices before we 
turn to the key theme of this chapter: the extension of the question of truth to the 
human sciences. 
             In 1952, C. Wright Mills wrote a paper for his students entitled, “On 
Intellectual Craftsmanship,” that was subsequently published as an appendix to his 
famous book, The Sociological Imagination. Mills expresses his commitment to the 
sociological project in terms of writing and research practices; his aim is to support the 
creation of good sociologists and good social analysts. Underlying his concern, 
however, is an effort to grasp how theory (and method) has, in fact, become a hindrance 
to the discipline.  In various ways, we find sociologists addressing this problem. In this 
section we consider who they were and their arguments. 
             In doing so, we argue that the underlying theme, although not always directly 
signified by these writers, nevertheless upon closer observation, concerns making a 
claim that the human sciences are an activity that is closer to art, ethics, lyricism and 
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truth. A key question, therefore, has been suspended in the human sciences: this was 
the question of truth.  How do they recognize their truth? Gadamer’s insight that we are 
neither to be subsumed under an ontology or a metaphysics, rather we reside in an “in-
between”, in the space that is the life of language itself, the space of truth, that involves 
recognizing the very instability of hermeneutical openness, that makes conceptual 
expression possible without ossification, it presupposes an ontology that is not simply 
an ontology, and a metaphysics that is not simply a metaphysics.  It presupposes the 
place of truth in the human sciences. Underlying the human sciences, therefore, is a 
tension in the fact that life interprets itself, gives voice, and orients us to life. The 
human sciences have sought, naturally in quite different ways, to re-capture this 
condition in their work. This is where we discover the hermeneutic condition found in 
the human sciences, alluded to with such words as: art, rhetoric humanism and ethics, 
as we shall see.188 
               The truth comes into view and is simultaneously posed by the human 
sciences. That accounts for Gadamer’s injunction: truth is not method. The so-called 
“crisis” of the human sciences concerns our relation to the truth-bearing aspects of our 
saying, the interplay of poetic and political speech, that is quite other than the 
detachment and rigor that is imposed with the term method. Hence, we can hear this in 
Mills’ way of stating the problem: “Social scientists make up a rationale and a ritual for 
the alienation inherent in most human observation and intellectual work today. They 
                                                
188 Di Cesare reminds us in Gadamer’s view of language there is no “language of 
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have developed several stereotypical ways of writing, which do away with full 
experience by keeping them detached throughout their operation. It is as if they are 
deadly afraid to take the chance of modifying themselves in the process of their 
work.”189 
            Mills’ address to mainstream sociology of the late 1950s and early 1960s was to 
say that they were linguistically bound by institutional restraints and that this 
consequently restricted the sociological word and open conversation. He writes: “In 
brief, ‘methods’ are simply ways of asking and answering questions, with some 
assurance that the answers are more or less durable. ‘Theory’ is simply paying close 
attention to the words one uses, especially their degree of generality and their inter-
relations. What method and theory properly amount to is clarity of conception and 
ingenuity of procedure, and most important, in sociology just now, the release rather 
then the restriction of the sociological imagination.”190 Mills does not confront the 
question the way Gadamer does, but it remains clear that the generation of concepts as 
alienating is due to the absence of the linguistic orientation to truth. Mills’ key 
expression, the sociological imagination encapsulates the problem at the core of the 
discipline. Mills does not think that sociologists need to be imaginative; rather, he is 
identifying a language trap in the social sciences that alienates the theorist. Let us look 
at another version of the story, this time we turn to Peter L. Berger. 
               In Adventures of an Accidental Sociologist: How to Explain the World Without 
Becoming a Bore (2011), a summary of his career, Berger explains why Sociology has 
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become equated with boredom.191 Again, we see that if a sociologist draws back into a 
system of thought, into an alienated position, then and something akin to boredom 
happens. The solution, according to Berger is to understand what “good sociology” is. 
He writes that sociology “has a kinship with good novels, from which one can learn a 
lot about society.”192 Boredom occurs through the disenchantment that abounds in the 
language of sociology. What is common to Mills and Berger is the language of 
sociology and linguistic disenchantment. What happens is that what is forgotten, as 
Dennis Schmidt says, is that language is in the first place an enactment of who we are.  
Let us look at one further approach to the linguistic disenchantment of the human 
sciences. 
           Robert Nisbet, in The Sociological Tradition (1966) claims that; “great 
sociologists never ceased to be moral philosophers,”193 (with what he calls “moral 
aspiration”) and, second, that the “central ideas of sociology” result from an “intuitive 
and artistic frame of thought.”194 Berger and Nisbet both identify a linguistic 
disenchantment, a world of disassociated concepts, that can be corrected by attending to 
the relevance of art and ethics: specifically, when we speak and write the language of 
theory.  Emile Durkhiem is intelligible, for example, because of the way he is an artist. 
He further points out that figures like Tonnies, Weber, and Simmel, “...were not 
working with finite and ordered problems in front of them. Each was, with deep 
intuition, with profound imaginative grasp, reacting to the world around them, even as 
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does an artist, and also, like a artist, objectifying internal and only partly conscious, 
states of mind.” 195  
              Berger repeats Nisbet’s earlier claim.196 Theorizing remains the site of a 
struggle over formulating and reformulating the Enlightenment project. Berger, for 
example, wrote:  
I had called my approach to sociology “humanistic”. I would now question 
whether this was felicitous adjective, though I would not quarrel with the 
basic intention. I had intended two meanings: One was to stress the 
contribution of sociology to a humane society [my emphasis], based on its 
debunking of the myths legitimating cruelty and oppression. I suppose that 
this came out of the Enlightenment tradition. But more relevant was the 
second meaning, sociology as one of the humanities (or 
Geisteswissenschaften), closely related to history and philosophy but also to 
the intuitions of the literary imagination.197 
 
             Nisbet, and Berger do not, strictly speaking, question method (or the 
philosophical roots of formal theory) nor do they question theory and its form of 
validity as argument, but they do reference their proximity both to “literature” and 
“philosophy,” pointing to the question of an ethics of speech and to the rhetorical 
structure of conceptual analysis.  
            Brown, Mills and Gouldner all add to this picture during a critical period of 
self-questioning in the 1960s. Brown asked for example: “what recourse is there for the 
social thinker who knows himself to be made in signs, who sees society as a collective 
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syntax, and yet who fears to speak for the love and despair of language?”198 Unhooked 
for the realm of ethical and linguistic dimension of their practice, the alienated social 
scientist is caught in a conflict between scientific language and commonsense language, 
implicitly seeing the task of philosophy and the task of science as different.199  For 
Gadamer as we know, the answer to these problems lies in extending the question of 
truth to the humans sciences. The scientific performance of our utterances, the doing of 
science, distances and estranges us from the truth of language. 
              Richard Brown says, “The use of scientific methodology does not permit the 
social scientist to avoid rhetorical discourse. Instead, the scientist’s lack of self-
consciousness about the assumptions and limits of such a method of logic results in 
using a naive and immoral rhetoric.  This is the rhetoric of antirhetoric, a pretence that 
truth claims can have an absolute foundation.”200  
             In The Social Construction of Reality, (1996), Peter L. Berger and Thomas 
Luckmann claim: “The objectivity of the social world means that it confronts man as 
something outside himself.  The decisive question is whether he still retains the 
awareness that, however “objectivated”, the social world was made by men – and, 
therefore, can be remade by them.”201 This theme runs through The Scared Canopy, 
resting on the thesis that the externalization of the world is our abiding experience. 
Oddly, this almost seems like a description of sociology; sociology describes a world 
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that sociology appears to sustain as not only a point of departure but as an actual 
contributor to. As we know, this also amounts to a treating of his internal dialogue as 
somehow insufficient, thereby limiting the very nature of the ethicality of speech 
through which the person speaks, both to themselves and others.  
               Berger and Luckmann convey this sense of the social as an alienated 
encounter, a subtle interplay between social and theoretical alienation: the “social,” as it 
were, in Bauman’s words, an “abstract text.”202 This paradox appears in Gouldner’s 
study, the problem of an alienated self-conception of the human sciences, that in turn 
involves a turning away from the self-forming reflexiveness of life.  Gouldner speaks of 
a “Reflexive Sociology” that “seeks to transform as well as to know the alien world 
outside the sociologist as well as the alien world inside him.”203 
           In these two assessments we see that something is blocked in our view of social 
life and that this emanates from within the language of the human sciences. 
           Recently, Zygmunt Bauman has recapitulated the question: “In the order of 
things construed by sociological discourse, the status of morality is awkward and 
ambiguous.”204  Because the social sciences put the sovereignty of society over the 
individual, it creates self-confidence in social theory that has important consequences 
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for the question of morality.205 Since the practice of sociology is deeply empowered by 
an implicit moral detachment: “Most common sociological practice does not seem to 
endow “being with others” (i.e. being with other human beings) with a special status or 
significance.”206 The question of theory, caught up in the journey of science, and in 
turn, the question of truth guided by “logic” (within a methodological frame) managed, 
in part, to avoid its own metaphysical foundations. That explains why, “Most 
sociological narratives do without reference to morality.”207 But, as Gadamer wants to 
show, the theorist cannot be detached from speech because it is our speech that compels 
our moral existence. 
               Nisbet, we should note, described Simmel as having the mind of the “artist-
essayist”, remarking how his work had “wonderful tension between the aesthetically 
concrete and the philosophically general that always lies in greatness.”208 This longing 
for theory to extend itself means it is more than the way of knowing of science but a 
way of knowing oneself.  Berger – a veteran of describing the self-understanding of the 
human sciences – makes light of the dilemma of the alienating limits of scientific 
speech by concluding: “I don’t think I would say, ‘I am a Sociologist.’”209  
                We can now see why sociologists like, Philip Selznick, for example, sought 
to place the human sciences within an image of humanism or art, placing the human 
sciences, once again, on the borderline with the “literary”, as we found in Richard 
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Brown’s work. In Selznick’s view, social theory is an “integrative pursuit,” committed 
to both “explanation” and the “evaluation” of social phenomena that emphasizes the 
“literary” mode of social thought.210  
                Merton’s project, his “sociology of semantics,” concerns a conception of 
language and sociology as much as it does a concern with the language of science.211 
Sociology, for Merton is a science. For example, he opposes C.W. Mills’ ideas 
expressed in The Sociological Imagination. Merton remained a classical figure, holding 
that sociology is scientific, while interested in the relationship of the social sciences to 
public understanding and rhetoric. In Merton’s, The Travels and Adventures of 
Serendipity: A Study in Sociological Semantics and the Sociology of Science (2004), 
one is struck by his view of language, which presupposes that words and concepts are 
semi-autonomous entities that can be examined from a “sociological viewpoint,” 
“sociology of semantics”.212  
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seem deceptively impressive, and, true or false, this charge itself vindicates the sheer 
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              Peter Simonson says Merton’s On the Shoulders of Giants was “in basic ways 
a hermeneutical project.” Merton’s focus on the sociology of science “brought 
sociology to the humanistic borderlands between rhetoric and the poetic, calling 
attention to its own artifice in the process.”213 Merton’s distinction of a “systematics of 
sociological theory” communicates that science occurs in a special use of language, one 
that is clearly different to ordinary language. His early work, Social Conflict over 
Sociological Work, showed how these linguistic differences were more to do with the 
allocation of intellectual resources among different kinds of sociological work. 
“…Since the battle is public, it becomes a battle for status more nearly than a search for 
truth.”214  
              Merton’s work was deeply connected with rhetoric in the sciences.215 Thus 
Merton had acute sensitivity to the question of sociology and prose style.216 Merton’s, 
On the Shoulder’s of Giants (2000), according to Simonson, is “saturated with irony 
and word play,” that “brought sociology to the humanistic borderlands between 
rhetoric and poetics, calling attention to its own artifice in the process [my emphasis] 
                                                                                                                                         
importance to words in the social sciences. The humanist who is seeking to interpret 
human experience often uses new words or phrases to repress ‘old truths.’ Where the 
social scientist is accused of using jargon, the humanist is accused or precocity.” From 
Merton, Robert K and Elinor Barber. The Travels and Adventures of Serendipity: A 
Study in Sociological Semantics and the Sociology of Science. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004. p. 67. 
213 Simonson, Peter. “Merton’s Sociology of Rhetoric.” In Robert K. Merton: Sociology 
of Science and Sociology as Science. Edited by Craig Calhoun, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2010. p. 235.   
214 Ibid. p.214. 
215 Simonson, “Merton’s Sociology of Rhetoric,” pp. 214-252. 
216 Ibid. p. 215. “His [Merton’s] writing was famously described in a 1961 New Yorker 
profile as being crafted “too well for a sociologist,” a story that also remarked on his 
facility with “metaphor and other literary devices” – so rarely used in sociology as to be 
called Mertonism’s by some of his associates.” (Hunt 1964:62, 44).”  
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that worked as a sociological counterpart to literary and philosophical approaches to 
language.” Simonson further suggests that Merton’s study “was a well-wrought 
modernist text.”217 Merton achieved his sociological ends, contributing to the sociology 
of science, by remaining in close proximity to a modernist text, Simonson noting that 
its experimentalism was based on Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy.218  
                 With Merton, and others, we see a complex working around hermeneutic 
issues and language use in sociology. Apart from evident differences we can recognize 
that there exists a common problematic that is being composed around a set of 
interrelated themes in their work: of which the most fundamental is the question of 
concept formation in the human sciences, where concepts are formed imaginatively and 
evaluatively, and concern, simultaneously, the way we manifest ourselves as 
theorists.219 
              Bauman has remarked that the theorist is in a “battlefield,”220 because the 
theorist is struggling to find an adequate way to think and write for their task. Gadamer 
shows us that these concerns with style and idiom for concept formation is, in fact, a 
matter of how we experience ourselves in language, the very root of our intellectual 
                                                
217 Ibid. p. 235.  
218 Ibid. p. 235. 
219 Such arguments share something of the pragmatist approach, found in the work of 
Richard Rorty, including, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, where he reads philosophy 
and literature in a similar way to critique epistemological and metaphysical 
foundationalism. See, his discussion in, Bernstein, Richard J. “Rorty’s Deep 
Humanism.” In The Pragmatic Turn. London: Polity, 2010. 
220 “... we wage a struggle to find the new and adequate ways of thinking of, about, and 
for the world we live in, and our lives within it.”  Bauman, Zygmunt. Does Ethics Have 
Any Chance In A World of Consumers? Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 2008. p. 1. 
221 Bauman, Zygmunt. “Afterthoughts: On Writing and Writing Sociology.” In Liquid 
Modernity. London: Polity, 2000. pp. 202-203. 
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reflexivity, as an essential togetherness that theory presupposes as well as a moral self-
understanding. Bauman, thereby asks the key question that brings him into proximity 
with Gadamer’s reflections: What, if anything, does the poet’s vocation have to do with 
the sociologist’s calling?221   
              Paul Taylor links C. W. Mills with Zygmunt Bauman: “What distinguishes 
Bauman and Mills from their less imaginative counterparts is their willingness to 
engage with the problems of theorizing the lived experience of “liquid modernity’s” 
uncertain flux rather than succumb to the dominant social science tendency to hide its 
disciplinary insecurity behind a wall of falsely confident empirical methods.  Over-
emphasizing the science aspect of the term social science, the field risks aping scientific 
rigor and correctness at the expense of social ambiguity and truth while refusing to 
consider Arendt's texture of reality: “methodological inhibition stands parallel to the 
fetishism of the concept” (Mills 2000 [1959]: 50).”222 
                In The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, for example, we can see Alvin 
Gouldner is concerned with the language of theory. Bauman speaks of the language of 
sociology as contributing to a loss of humanity. When the self is theorized, orientated 
outwardly, to the object, the “object” now stands over us. Significantly this is at the 
cost of our self-transformative self-understanding (truth); we cannot give a true account 
of theory (knowledge) as an act between rationality and responsibility. 
                                                
222 See, Paul Taylor’s essay, “Totalitarian Bureaucracy and Bauman’s Sociological 
Imagination,” In Bauman’s Challenge: Sociological Issues for the 21st Century. Edited 
by Mark Davis and Keith Tester. London: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2010. pp. 153-155. 
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                Gadamer questions: “and we can ask, after the summary above, are we not 
dealing, when it comes to the human sciences, with an alienated understanding?”223  He 
speaks of our alienated understanding, or self-estrangement, linked to a suspicion of 
language, leading to the suppression of the dialectic of the spoken word.224 A 
consequence is the alienation of speech (and the alienation of truth).225 A ‘scientific’ 
self-representation of what theory and the theorist are establishes a discontinuity 
between knowledge and ethics, theorist and community; built as it were, on a dual 
consciousness, between a studious “objectivity” and the personal values held by a 
theorist.226  
             How do the words of sociology, their conversations, and their communicative 
performances communicate and connect with the lives of ordinary men and women? 
Our conversation about social life, Bauman noted, is a site of struggle, a site of 
disenfranchisement, which according to Berger, has plagued sociology with a dual 
problem: methodological fetishism and ideological propaganda.227 In this way, the 
human sciences’ loss of conversational power concerns how we make a conversation 
                                                
223 Gadamer, “The Scope and Function of Hermeneutic Reflection,” p. 27. 
224 Gadamer writes, “Modernity is charcterised by a universal, critical reservation about 
the world picture of language and the enticing power of language.” See, Gadamer, 
“Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and Language,” p. 40. 
225 See, for example, Blumenberg’s early work on the metaphors of modernity that 
function on this prevailing assumption. Blumenberg, Hans. Paradigm for a 
Metaphorology, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010. 
226 Personified in Peter Berger’s thinking on the human sciences. Berger, for example, 
describes such a situation as a “dual citizenship”, The Adventures of an Accidental 
Sociologist, How Explain the World Without Becoming A Bore, Prometheus Books, 
2011. p. 206. 
227 Ibid. p. 8. 
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with ourselves and with the lives of ordinary men and women. All of which is visible 
and known to us since sociology embodies this crisis and carries it within itself.228  
 
Sociology and Philosophy 
                Philosophy’s roots point to the understanding of the eternal over the 
contingent. Gadamer’s vision of philosophy is Socratic, one that resides in the affinity 
of theory to our deeds. Philosophy, as with Heidegger, is also concerned with a 
dialogue with itself, as a beginning and a leap that continuously reassigns itself as an 
overcoming. It is at its core a philosophy of life.  In this regard, his view of a 
philosophical life differs from the modern vision of the philosopher. Philosophical 
hermeneutics points to the Greeks and emerges out of a relationship to them.  When 
Anthony Giddens, for example, speaks of the proximity of theory to philosophy229 he is 
not thinking of this affinity in the way that hermeneutics establishes it, but he does refer 
to some sort of a connection or affinity. We may also recall how Peter Winch had 
entitled his book on the question of how the human sciences conceived of themselves 
as, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (1958).230  
                                                
228 Earlier works, such as Gouldner’s The Coming Crisis of Sociology, sought to find a 
new view of theory, insightfully, he saw that “theory work begins with an effort to 
make sense of experience” and that this was connected to a “dissonance between an 
implied reality and certain values…” p. 484.  We shall discuss in greater detail how 
Gouldner’s response raises the problem as one of the scientific self-conception of 
theory within the human sciences. 
229  Giddens, Anthony. The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of 
Structuration. Stanford: University of California Press, 1986, and, Giddens, Anthony. 
The Consequences of Modernity, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990, where he 
speaks of the “cultural and epistemological overtones” of theory. 
230 Winch went to the core of the problem of the social sciences: their faulty relation to 
the natural sciences and their relation to philosophy. Winch understood that we do not 
stand outside concepts but that concepts are part of our being in the world. Drawing on 
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              Why is a discussion of philosophy essential to a discussion of the human 
sciences?  Hardly disguised in this dialogue is our metaphysical legacy. Winch, is 
guided by analytic philosophy and the ordinary language philosophy of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, and he understood the link of philosophy and the human sciences 
concerning the question of language. This implicitly brings Winch and Gadamer 
together.231  
             Winch speaks of “a binding proximity [of philosophy] to them [the human 
sciences] that separates it from the realm of the world view based strictly on subjective 
evidence.”232 Winch’s own interpretation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, as Karl-Otto 
Apel notes, concerns a strange antagonism between scientific methodology and 
philosophic method that, in Winch’s view, favored philosophic method. What this tells 
us is the way philosophy is seen as a counter balance against scientific methods, that 
scientific method cannot be the true form of sociology, because sociology is concerned 
                                                                                                                                         
Wittgenstein, Winch was to have a large impact on the discussion of the status of 
theory and the nature of the human sciences, the idea of what a social science is in 
relation to philosophy: “I now attempt a more detailed picture of the way in which the 
epistemological discussion of man’s understanding of reality throws light on the nature 
of human society and the social relations between men.” Winch, Peter. The Idea of a 
Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy. London: Routledge, p.24.  The world is 
made up of concepts, and the world we live in must be understood from within these 
horizons.  
231 Ibid. p.2. Philosophy must be on guard against the “extra–scientific pretensions” of 
science.” Thus his book is: “a war on two fronts: first as criticism of some prevalent 
contemporary ideas about the nature of philosophy; second, as criticism of some 
prevalent contemporary ideas about the nature of social studies,” meaning, in his eyes, 
that the study of society is philosophical in character. p.3.  Apel illuminates the 
connection this way: “I think Winch here approaches the concepts of “being-able-to-be-
in-the-world” and “understanding-oneself-in-the-situation” (which imply a priori forms 
of understanding) as they were originally explicated by Heidegger in Being and Time 
and have been used as fundamental concepts of a Philosophical Hermeneutic by H-G 
Gadamer. p. 35. 
232 Ibid. p. 1. 
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with “social forms of life,” therefore, as Apel adds, “Winch holds that sociology as a 
science of the forms of life is not an empirically generalizing science, but basically 
identical with philosophy as epistemology, both dealing with the ‘forms of 
understanding’.”233 Winch connects the work of the human sciences to questions of 
philosophy but still within an epistemological framework.  
               In other words, formulating the question of the human sciences around how 
we identify the content of social description and understanding (theory), is the concern 
with language. In the human sciences, there are variations of the encounter between 
philosophy and social science. Each position, though, presupposing different 
conceptions of what philosophy is.  For even Winch’s perception of Wittgenstein 
concerns, as Apel says, an interpretation “thinking with and against Wittgenstein.”234  
             For Gadamer, philosophy is different. Philosophy is rooted in 
phenomenological description of human experience [not analytic philosophy]: it 
concerns the path of experience. The human sciences’ linguistic and moral crisis  
(expressed by Berger, Nisbet, Brown, etc.,) lies then in their unquestioned metaphysical 
presupposition about language that leads toward an alienation of speech and an 
alienation of our moral being wherein we enact ourselves in living experience.  The 
human scientist is not simply “dealing with monological modes of speech of scientific 
sign systems, which are exhaustively determined by the research area being designated 
                                                
233 Apel, Karl-Otto. “Philosophy of Language and the Geisteswissenschaften,” In Karl-
Otto Apel, Selected Essays. Volume one: Towards a Transcendental Semiotics.  
Edited by Eduardo Mendieta. Humanities Press, 1994. p. 30. 
234 Ibid, p. 29. 
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in any given case.”235 Rather, their knowledge claims, their “theory products and theory 
performances”236 concern a search to find their [the human sciences’] right 
understanding with the public and themselves.237 In Gadamer’s view, right 
understanding is found in the truth of speech and, recognizing the true nature of how 
the human sciences create this understanding.238 
               Language orients us to the whole but only, as Gadamer notes, when “real 
conversation occurs and that means wherever the reciprocity of two speakers who have 
entered into a conversation circles the subject matter…”239 The Greeks, as Gadamer 
says, understood philosophy as a conversation, where “thinking is a process of 
understanding endless understanding.”240 Further, they saw philosophy in a 
comprehensive way, whereby, “the Greeks denoted every kind of theoretic 
                                                
235 Gadamer, “On the Philosophical Element in the Sciences and the Scientific 
Character of Philosophy,” p. 4. 
236 Gouldner’s terms used in The Coming Crisis of Sociology. 
237 The Platonic tone of Gadamer’s question, to use Seth Bernadette’s language, 
concerns the question of,  “whether the city of knowledge and the city of opinion can 
be joined together. They can be joined together, Socrates says, if the philosopher 
supplies their bond, for only the philosopher has the knowledge to discern the true 
natures of the citizens despite the falsehood that class structure of the city and the 
political education imposed on them.” Bernardete, Seth. Preface to The Tragedy and 
Comedy of Life: Plato’s Philebus.  Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009. xi. 
Bernardete reminds us, that the classical question of knowledge is tied to the role of the 
philosopher, to the practice of their art. This art as Gadamer says, (adopting the artistry 
of weaving) concerns bringing opposing faction into a unity [Statesman, 305e], and, as 
in the Philebus, that knowledge of the good life also comes about in the art of mixing, 
“which the individual in search of happiness ha to realize in concreto.”  Gadamer, 
“Hermeneutic as a Theoretical and Practical Task,” p. 122. 
238 To put the question this way helps us see that it is not a matter of how we merely use 
words, not merely the art of words, but the way we are an ethics of speech, pointing us 
back to the Platonic dialogues and their eternal question.   
239 Ibid. p. 4. 
240 Ibid. p. 5. 
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knowledge.” 241 Greek theory retains its identity by encompassing the unity upon which 
it begins against the living culture of differences.  In this way, it attaches itself to the 
good, the self-realization of the theorist, in this struggle.   
               Modern theory isolates us from the process of our “self-understanding” in 
concept formation.242 The very strangeness of which cannot be overcome but 
constitutes the hermeneutic condition of theory as one of a continuous dialogue with 
the other. The Greeks illuminated how speech was our relation to the whole – the desire 
to be “able to preserve a unity within the totality of what is.”243 Theory as science is 
resting on a unity of knowing but the unity of knowing resists objectification in a 
balancing tension. Theory implicitly, then, resists the language of science that is 
embodied in the struggle over theory in the human sciences reflecting a tension 
between science and philosophizing. Gadamer explains it this way, “Understanding of 
our life world as deposited in our language cannot be truly resolved by means of the 
possibilities available to science.”244 The human sciences, then, comes “to know itself 
to be in conflict with the self-awareness of science.”245  
              Our verbal experience of the world precedes and embraces everything 
including theory. But theory seeks to separate itself from experience, from being in 
error, and so as a science, it endlessly reproduces its truth in the reproduction of its 
objects, which includes itself as a “science.” The event of language (where speech and 
thought remain unified) is a natural part of the process of concept formation. The 
                                                
241 Ibid. p. 1. 
242 Gadamer, “Science and Philosophy,” in Reason and the Age of Science, p. 19. 
243 Ibid. p. 2. 
244 Ibid. p. 11. 
245 Ibid. p. 7. 
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structure of methodological logic246 estranges us from truth in contrast to our 
experience of meaning and the conceptual thinking that “takes place in understanding” 
[and] wherein the “whole process is verbal.”247 
            Gadamer claims that, “language is in the process of becoming and it is not a 
rule-governed apprehension of words, not a co-constructing of something within 
convention. No, the poetic word establishes meaning.”248 If this is the case, all world-
disclosing words arise as if poetically and creatively – it follows that the objectivism of 
speech is actually contrary to the process of the becoming of theory.249 Is this not why 
there are such figures in the history of sociology as Robert Merton?250 
  
The Extension of the Question of Truth to the Human Sciences 
 
               Heidegger’s presence is quite clear in Part 2 of Gadamer’s Truth and Method, 
“The Extension of the Question of Truth to Understanding in the Human Sciences,” 
where Gadamer takes up his concern with the nature of the epistemological problem of 
theory and its relationship to our living experience.251 Heidegger had provided 
                                                
246 Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 385-430. 
247 Ibid. p. 385. 
248 Gadamer, “On the Truth of the Word,” p. 151. 
249 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], p. 451. 
250  Evident in his work on sociological semantics. “While ‘sociological semantics’ is a 
label that nicely channeled Merton’s scientific aspirations, ‘the sociology of rhetoric’ 
indexes his persistent humanistic self, and casts his work as part of a longer historical 
conversation.” See, Simonson, Peter. “Merton’s Sociology of Rhetoric,”. In Robert K. 
Merton: Sociology of Science and Sociology as Science. Edited by Craig Calhoun. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2010. p. 217. 
251 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], p. 218-242. See also, 
“Dilthey’s Entanglement in the Aporias of Historicism”, and “From the 
Epistemological Problem of History to the Hermeneutic Foundation of the Human 
Sciences” pp. 218-242. 
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Gadamer with insight into the transcendental interpretation of understanding. For in 
Heidegger’s “existential analysis of Dasein” Gadamer found a new way of recognizing 
the human sciences.  Hermeneutics would show that the interpreter belongs to the 
object. Heidegger shows that, Dasein is understood as a thrown projection; our own 
being is understanding; Dasein’s understanding is also true of the act of understanding 
in the human sciences. Any human inquiry begins in a shared understanding that 
transcends each subject. Language then, as we shall see, is the articulation of Dasein’s 
disclosing, whereby it lets entities appear to us in the multiplicity of words and the 
power of the unity of the word found in dialogue.252 
             Gadamer knew from Heidegger that we become alive to being in the word. He 
knew too, that direct conversational tone, found in Ancient Greeks, links dialogue to 
the question of truth. A revealing description of Ancient Greek language and its power 
appears in The Beginnings of Philosophy: 
Greek in itself already offers speculative and philosophical possibilities of a 
particular kind. Here I wish to name only two. The first is well known, as one 
of the most fruitful properties of the Greek language (which, by the way, it has 
in common with the German language), namely, the use of the neuter, which 
allows it to present the intentional object of thought as the subject. Moreover, 
there are the studies of Bruno Snell and Karl Reinhardt, those great teachers 
with whom I had the good fortune to be closely associated. They have made 
clear how the concept already announces itself in this use of the neuter. Indeed, 
something is indicated in the use of the neuter that is found neither here nor 
there and yet is common to all things. In Greek poetry, just as in German 
poetry, the neuter signifies something omnipresent, an atmospheric presence. It 
has to do with the quality of a being, but a quality of the whole space, ‘being,’ 
in which all beings appear.253 
 
 
                                                
252 Ibid. p. 426. 
253 Gadamer, The Beginnings of Philosophy, p. 14. 
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             Hermeneutics shows us how we belong to one another in language and how, 
like our encounter with artwork, this is also a disclosing process of Being.254  The 
encounter with the poetic word provides this awareness to us. In Part 3 of Truth and 
Method, “The Ontological Shift of Hermeneutics Guided by Language,” Gadamer tells 
us that, Truth and Method concerns the linguistic character of understanding. He writes: 
“When I speak of a hermeneutical conversation with tradition, with what has come 
down to us, this is not just a metaphorical way of speaking, but an exact description of 
how the understanding of the tradition takes place; it is an understanding that takes 
place in the medium of language. Language is not a supplement to understanding.255 
Knowing in the human sciences cannot be correctly understood without grasping how, 
for us, we touch upon the continual event of language in understanding.  
Now the hermeneutic experience that we are endeavoring to think from the 
viewpoint of language as medium is not an experience of thinking in the same 
sense is this dialectic of the concept [Hegel], which seeks to free itself entirely 
from the power of language. Nonetheless, there is something resembling 
dialectic in hermeneutic experience: an activity of the thing itself, and action 
that, unlike the methodology of modern science, is a passion, an understanding, 
an event that happens to me”.256 
 
 
                                                
254 Ibid. p. 254. 
255 Gadamer, “Hermeneutics In Gadamer in Conversation, Reflections and 
Commentary. Edited by Richard E. Palmer. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001. 
p. 51. 
256 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], p. 460. These thoughts can 
be read alongside a significant essay by Gadamer on Hegel, that provides insight to 
how he draws upon Hegel’s insight in the Ancient Greek conception of philosophy as 
dialectic of the concept that exceeds any fixed conception of thinking found in the 
statement: Gadamer, Hans-Georg. “Dialectic of the Ancient Philosophers.” In  Hegel’s 
Dialectic, Five Hermeneutical Studies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979. Hegel 
moves the dialectic into the movement of thought, emphasizing the speculative 
dimension of our statements as valid formulations. 
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             Heidegger’s work, then, provided the foundation for Gadamer who says that: 
“The present work [Truth and Method] is devoted to this new aspect of the 
hermeneutical problem,”257 one that clearly, as we now see, was provided by 
Heidegger’s claim that understanding is the “original form of the realization of Dasein, 
which is [our] being-in-the-world.”258  
            “Understanding is Dasein’s mode of being” implies knowledge rests on this 
understanding of Being. Truth is the disclosing of the Da of Dasein, insofar as we 
discover that we know we are not looking for a methodological way to explain 
understanding. Rather Gadamer will argue that the disclosing function of truth is at the 
core of language and that language is the core of the hermeneutic experience.  
             Speech links self and object, not statements. In essence, this is the nature of 
language as language, where the power of words has the capacity of self-reference that 
shapes the objects of our concern. The truth of the word, therefore, cannot be grasped 
“by taking the ‘natural’ forms of linguistic communication as a staring point.”259 
Rather, we must look to conversation, not technical terms, to discover the nature of 
theory. In “The Ontological Shift Guided by Hermeneutics” in Truth and Method, 
Gadamer describes concept formation in this way: “conceptual interpretation is the 
realization of the hermeneutic experience itself.”260               
              Speculative concepts, our speculative sentences, our speculative words, have a 
self-referenciality, which, typically belongs to the poetic word.261  The poetic word 
                                                
257 Ibid. p. 259. 
258 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], p. 259. 
259 Ibid. p. 151. 
260 Ibid. p. 404. 
261 Ibid. p. 154. 
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shows the unity of the word that occurs in speech that is not simply slotting words into 
a pre-established arrangement, but resides in the whole context of the verbal nature, the 
ontological view that our being is language.262 
              The power of understanding does not lie in rules but in the nature of speaking. 
All language falls back into speech no matter in which way we are speaking (writing).  
All writing involves, then, a self-alienation that one overcomes with understanding. 
With writing one is overcoming and finding the word that shares the sense of what one 
is saying.  
             Truth lies in the potential of the word to say something (not just anything but 
something of eminence and force). This is not about seeking an external viewpoint 
(external reflection) about truth; rather it is about the very capacity of the word (and 
speech) to convey truth. Art and the artworks reveal our linguistic being.  Gadamer 
writes: 
As Heidegger has shown us that the truth of the artwork is not the speaking 
forth of the logos, but is rather a “that it is” and a “there” at the same time, 
which stands in the strife between disclosure and sheltering concealment. The 
question that has guided us here was how this looks especially in the art work 
of words, where the sheltering and protecting in the “construction of the art 
already presupposes its being-in-language and the in-dwelling of being in 
language.263 
 
Further: Truth is about something existing in itself, lifts and grants itself a claim to 
being [Seinsanspruch].264 
 
                                                
262 Ibid. p. 487. 
263 Gadamer, “On the Truth of the Word,” p. 154. 
264 Ibid. p. 134. 
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              The word, always, implies a collective meaning and a social relationship, a 
shared saying, which we can recognize in dialogue (conversation). This is because 
“man is not just himself at home in language, but rather Being [Sein] is there in the 
language that we speak with each other [my emphasis].”265   
               The way the word as word speaks is its poetic capacity, dialogue flows with 
the art of the word; thus, theory speaks to us in turn, due to this capacity. Theory can be 
grasped in its true meaning only on this basis of the truth of the word. The poetic word 
tells us this; the poetic word is the key to Gadamer’s thesis.266 
               Being comes forth as the word comes forth; for Gadamer, Being is not 
language, though, but rather Being can be grasped through language (being-as-saying) 
Thus, we are there in language with another as well as all that has yet to be said when 
we speak. The art of the word has, as it were, been squeezed by the logic of modernity, 
and the tradition of western thinking, as either rhetoric or poetics; thus adding to a 
sense of the loss of truth – the capacity for truth saying.  
             We do not reproduce truth methodologically; rather it is within the realm of 
dialogue with others, of the eminent ways that we can say things, that makes us more 
than mere non-participatory observers, and losing any keen sight and awareness of the 
community of speech that binds us together.267  
                                                
265 Ibid. p. 136.  
266 Ibid. p. 143. 
267 See, Gadamer, “Hermeneutics as a Theatrical and Practical Task,” p. 236. 
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            Ancient Greek thinking, Gadamer says, regardless of our choice, is a “self-
encounter.”268 The question of theory is a conversation with the Greek legacy. What is 
the nature of this encounter? We have given over our worldly knowing to the knowing 
of science, something the Greeks did not do. What we learn from the Greeks is that 
such thinking is thinking-with-an-other residing in our communicative commonality, a 
commonality that for Gadamer is language. And language, he reminds us, exists only in 
conversation. In this way, we shift our attention to the primordial structure of sharing 
and community found in conversation. In conversation, we see that there are no fixed 
objects to be overcome, no self-certainty to be built on us alone.269  
            Language cannot objectify itself. In other words, to put the question differently: 
we can never simply be an object (scientific object) to ourselves. In The Beginning of 
Knowledge, Gadamer offers a further account of how the Greeks inform us: 
What was in the beginning?  What does it mean to say something is? Is nothing 
something?  The posing of these questions is the beginning of Greek 
philosophy, and the basic answers are: physis (there-being-from-out-of itself in 
the ordering of the whole) and logos, (the insight into the insightfulness of this 
whole, including even the logos of human craftsmanship). But the way, the 
image of Greek philosophy in confrontation with modern science is fixed there 
almost like an antipode and not just as a precursor to and a discloser of the 
course of theoretical ability and mastery. It is the confrontation between the 
intelligible world and the masterable world that we become aware of the Greek 
thinking. 
 
            The Greek world recognized the inalienable language of non-objectifying truth. 
Gadamer points out the Greek did not have a word meaning language. Consequently, 
our unavoidable challenge, according to Gadamer, is to realign ourselves with this other 
                                                
268 Noticeably, similar to Heidegger’s idea that the “forgetfulness of Being is always 
accompanied by the presence of Being.” Gadamer, Hans-Georg. “Being Spirit and 
God.” In Heidegger’s Ways, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. p. 194. 
269 See, Gadamer, “The Greeks,” In Heidegger’s Ways, p.147. 
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half of truth. Methodos, broadly conceived, is our major challenge; method, therefore, 
is also the key to grasping Gadamer’s challenge to the self-alienation of the human 
sciences and the one-sided nature of modernity. The struggle over the identity of the 
human sciences is intertwined with the fate of modernity. Re-thinking what constitutes 
our ideals of knowing in modernity requires that we ask at what cost did the human 
realignment with technical knowledge set in place the challenge of its current alienating 
effects? 
              Plato’s Republic is the task, set before us of the logos and of the social and 
political fragility of democracy. A unity of our philosophical lives concerns the 
political fulfillment of the inner city, the scope of our self-formation. The sociologist’s 
alienation is the philosopher’s; both face the question of their mode of their being in the 
world, of understanding our forms of life and our being in the world. Finding such a 
balance, such a unity in oneself, involves us in dialogue with the other. It is not that 
philosophers will rule the state but that as philosophers (Gadamer claims Plato knew 
this) we learn to rule ourselves within an ethical framework based on our finitude and 
our practical grasp of the good (agathos).  
             Here, we approach the way the social sciences create an enclosure of 
experience, as part of their self-understanding as a science. Hermeneutics shows us why 
being open to experience, never closed, requires an un-dogmatic attitude to experience, 
requiring a new understanding, a paradigm shift away (not a new consciousness, but a 
sensitivity to experience) from the purely objectivist vision of truth that encloses us as 
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well as the human sciences. To do this we must ask what this understanding in truth 
is.270 
            The human sciences struggle over the objective possibilities of truth.  Gadamer 
is clear on this matter: “What method defines is precisely not truth.”.271 As a young 
man in 1923, Gadamer attended Heidegger’s lectures: 
The first course I attended in the year 1923 had the title “Ontology: The 
Hermeneutics of Facticity.” Like many academic titles, this too has an academic 
prehistory. I happen to know that Heidegger at that time had to give up the title 
he planned for us because an older colleague had announced something similar. 
Presumably Heidegger had actually helped himself by narrowing the meaning 
of “ontology” with the term “hermeneutics.”272  
 
            Gadamer later notes: “This is what facticity means: the concrete, factual 
existence of the human,”273 suggesting that it is in this conception that we find the 
situation of hermeneutics itself, that focuses on something that is not understandable 
[life].274  Understanding is projected toward sense (out of a sort of darkness), or self-
forgetfulness that characterizes all speech.  
             Heidegger’s1927 lectures anticipate aspects of Gadamer’s work. The human 
sciences if they correspond to the essential structure of our hermeneutic being, we all 
reside in a linguistic universality that exceeds us, then the human sciences have more in 
common with our universal conversation where the formation of the subject is open to 
truth.  Gadamer builds his hermeneutics on Heidegger’s work by raising the concept of 
understanding into the existential. Gadamer’s project translates Being into language – 
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Gadamer in Conversation, Reflections and Commentary, p. 55. 
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as a fundamental part of Truth and Method – where he announces: “the Being that can 
be understood is language.”275  
              Reflection is our belonging together as we make ourselves visible to others, 
and to ourselves through others. This makes Gadamer’s vision of human ontology 
deeply ethical in nature, but also shows that hermeneutics takes leave of ontology. 
Here, is the key concern for Gadamer: the distinction between methodological 
alienation and truth. Specifically, this concern is with the way we think about language, 
because, as he says, language is one of the most compelling phenomena (alongside art) 
of “non-objectivity insofar as [an] essential self-forgetfulness characterizes the 
performative character of speech.”276  Being is not to be seen as language. Rather, 
Gadamer, treats language, as Di Cesare, notes as “a-metaphysical dimension” that is 
our living experience of language that occurs before any metaphysical utterance.277 
             Gadamer treats theory, we should note, in light of this view of language that he 
also sees as residing on a Greek foundation. Gianni Vattimo summarizes this story. He 
writes:  
According to Gadamer, the Greek concept of the rationality of nature and the 
Hegelian concept of presence of reason intersect in this concept of language as 
the living logos. To which he correctly adds, theoria “is not primarily a 
formalized conceptual construct that entails an objectifying split between 
subject and object.278  
 
                                                
275 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], xxxi. 
276 Gadamer, “Greek Philosophy and Modern Thought,” in The Beginnings of 
Knowledge, pp. 124-125. 
277 Di Cesare, Utopia of Understanding, pp. 12-13. 
278 Gianni Vattimo’s essay, “Truth and Rhetoric in Hermeneutic Ontology,” in The End 
of Modernity (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991) emphasizes how 
Gadamer focuses on the question of the “nexus of between language and ethos.” p. 133. 
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              The space of theoria lies in our dialogic self, which is rooted in conversation. 
Speech surpasses the technical function of language.279 This idea flows into the very 
unity of concerns found in Gadamer’s writings, revealed further by his work that 
explores the implications of the Pre-Socratics, Plato, and the poets. 
              Speaking of Plato’s unwritten doctrine as a linguistic shift into the logic of 
discourse that does not lose sight of the poetic,280 he reads also Parmenides, for 
example, not as a contradictory text that struggles between two aspirations: between 
myth and truth-speech, doxa, and knowledge of being. Rather, Logos – Being as 
dialogue (Being as infinite interpretation) – is supported by Gadamer’s reading of the 
theme of the participation of ideas (the One and the Many, of Ancient thought) as “the 
genuine basis of the Platonic dialectic.”281  
              Gadamer writes: “what this doctrine actually describes, I contend, is the 
felicitous experience of the advancing insight, the euporia which the Philebus says 
(15c) happens to the person who proceeds along the proper path to the solution of the 
problem of the One and the Many – the way of discourse which reveals the thing being 
discussed.”282 
             For Gadamer, the teaching of philosophy was always, as in Plato, a question 
and answer schema. Theory, like philosophy, is the response to a question as well as to 
                                                
279 Gadamer writes: “Speaking remains tied to language as a whole, the hermeneutic 
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the posing of a question: what Gadamer calls the questionableness of the question. We 
ask questions because we understand questionableness. As Gadamer says, “To 
understand the questionableness of something is already to be questioning.”283 
Importantly, questioning is irreducible to a method because “there is no method for 
learning how to ask questions.”284  
               In "The Hermeneutic Priority of the Question" section of Truth and Method, 
Gadamer claims, “The literary form of the [Platonic] dialogue places language and 
concept back within the original movement of the conversation. This protects all words 
from dogmatic abuse.”285 
            We are given to the openness of our questioning. In our struggle with truth and 
falsehood, our will to know, Gadamer says, “…and in our-being-with-one-another is 
the peculiarity of the human being.”286  Questions are fundamental to our way of life 
for the question is visible in its connection with the universality of the Whole.  We live 
in a type of opposition between the infinity of being and what is that since the dawn of 
thinking motivates the logos, something that is beyond me but which I still reach 
towards. 
               The sociologist’s calling is not being at home in their calling, for it occurs as a 
form of alienation that intimidates. The art of practicing the question is what really 
matters. Not our methods. The logic of the question, the back and forth movement of 
question and answer, the dialectic of question and answer is an indeterminate condition. 
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“Discourse that is intended to reveal something requires that that thing be broken open 
by the question.”287 
               “We seek conversation not only in order to understand the other person better. 
Rather we need it because our own concepts threaten to become to rigid, and also 
because when we say something, we want the other person to understand what we are 
thinking.”288  Conversation is not only primary to us, but conversation also resists the 
methodological fixity of concepts and the monological structure of discourse. The 
question is coterminous with understanding. A question is genuine in its encounter, for 
everything, speech, text, art must be understood as an answer. In this regard, he says: 
“The close relationship between questioning and understanding is what gives the 
hermeneutic experience its true dimension.”289 
               The priority of the question is already the self-reflexivity of the subject within 
a form of life that is also form of language.  It is always the openness to the question 
that links our not knowing and knowing together. That opens us out into what we can 
ponder and find in the unexplored. There is simply no method that can produce 
questioning, or a question. Truth concerns our way of existing in this condition of 
questioning. By raising the question of questioning, Gadamer asserts that we all inhabit 
the question, and further that, “Every true question requires this openness.”290 
Questioning is not only our being possessed by being but our path, our openness, 
toward truth and freedom. It is the birth of philosophy; it is, as Carlo Sini says, how we 
overcome alienation with the enchantment of the question.   Like Gadamer: “to insist 
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on a question is to understand a difficult notion; that one must inhabit the question, its 
peculiar enchantment, without overcoming or wanting to overcome it in the answer.”291  
             Gadamer, like Sini, shows that the overcoming of the alienation of theory 
involves an enchantment that returns us to the ideals of Ancient philosophy, with a 
philosophical attitude that is now lost to us. The Greeks knew that what we can say and 
say beyond ourselves arises in every utterance. This can be illuminated, to use the 
classical terms, by reference to Plato, and how dialectical speech is one as it is a 
many.292 Speech contains both. “Speech is participation (methexis – being-with) thus 
seeing logos as expressing the being-with of one eidos and another eidos”.293 Logos 
concerns an inalienable if contradictory tension in the very movement of thought, 
revealed and concealed by the inner structure of speech and subject matter.  
 
Art and Truth in Relation to the Human Sciences 
                Gadamer tells us that the special truth claims of art can show us the way that 
truth claims are made in the human sciences. Art and the human sciences is the key to 
his inquiry into truth and theory: 
 It may have come as a surprise to many readers that part 1 of my 1960 work, 
Truth and Method, does not take as its object of study the human sciences and 
humanities [Geisteswissenschaften] in the totality of their various disciplines, 
although the appearance of the term “hermeneutics” in the book’s subtitle might 
lead one to expect this – but rather art – art itself. In making art my starting 
point, I was, in truth, responding to the experience I had in my teaching, 
namely, that my real interest in the Geisteswissenschaften was not in their 
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charter as sciences [Wissenschaften], but rather in how they dealt with art – art 
in all its realms: literature, the visual art, architecture, and music. For I believe 
that the arts taken as a whole, quietly govern the metaphysical heritage of the 
western tradition. And the Geisteswissenschaften stand in particularly close and 
interactive relationship with receptivity and sensitivity to art.294 
 
             Art is a unique manifestation of the experience of truth. There is a dimension to 
art that is not about a cultural product that we can pick up and put down. Art is not 
simply a philosophical problem that we can work on through theory and 
conceptualization.295 Truth is not about laying everything bare but in recognizing the 
event like nature of the movement of truth, as something that comes forth [Da].296 
Heidegger saw that art and language shared this capacity. What takes place in art and 
speech is truth. To capture this unique manifestation of human life – truth is itself as an 
event – we are challenged to reconsider the one-sided conception of science and its 
methodological primacy because science is also driven linguistically. 
                Art is only encountered, says Gadamer, in a form that resists pure 
conceptualization. Why? Because, at its core, art is a manifestation, an address, 
addressing us as a Thou, which lies outside conceptual schemes. In this way, it is like 
the way speech manifests itself in an address to the other. Heidegger’s understanding of 
the ontological significance of art is a key for Gadamer. The Origin of the Work of Art 
is pivotal to Gadamer’s project. Gadamer tells us that Heidegger is not using 
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poeticizing phrases to embellish the barren language of concepts; rather the goal is 
twofold, to reveal the origins of concepts and press for breaking the logic of language 
contained in western thinking.  
 Heidegger identifies how sharing in the event of truth happens in art. The 
World is the referential totality of Dasein’s projections; it is the preliminary horizon of 
Dasein’s concern. Art’s truth, Heidegger argues, is the living opposition between 
revealment and concealment; where truth resists any attempt to be made into an object 
(objectification) of what it stands for. Art stands forth, then, as the event of truth that 
can neither be seized subjectively, nor objectively. In other words, art is “the standing-
in-itself of the work [that] at the same time betokens the standing-in-itself of beings in 
general.”297  
             Art stands alone for the creator and the beholder. Gadamer describes this as a 
very tangible event of Da. We understand from this that we are not primordially master 
of our Dasein but that we are a self-interpretation set within a horizon that, like the 
work of art, is in the midst of revealment and concealment. We known things because 
we are an event of Being itself, where we are among beings in the limits of where we 
are. The depth of meaning presented in the artwork, in Heidegger’s terms, is a conflict 
between world and earth, “emergence and sheltering.”298   
               This opens the way, according to Gadamer, for understanding how something 
can be there for us (Da) in both art and linguistic encounters that has nothing to do with 
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the object that we get to know through objective cognition.299 Thus, we have the 
priority of the poetic as an illustration of Being and language that binds us. Thought is 
authenticated in language. In Rilke’s poems an all-calculating mode of thinking, 
scientific thinking for example, involves the loss of things within modernity, while 
things can still be brought forth as true and preserved in art. 
             The poem and thinking are not the same but they share something; they share 
the coming into common of all language. There is no intentional control over truth. 
Rather, we are laid open to truth. This is the precondition of Dasein’s existence; to 
know is to know that truth occurs without any philosophical concept. Gadamer 
discusses this in his essay The Truth of the Work of Art.  Art is the locus of public truth 
while not possessing any given objective meaning. 
            Heidegger vividly described language as the “most primordial poetry of 
Being.”300 He did not say that being is language in the way Gadamer does, but he did 
prepare the way for this extension and development of his own thinking. This 
conception paved the way for Gadamer’s view on art, language and truth, in terms of 
the speculative aspect of our speaking. Art’s capacity to release us into the very Being 
of play, in its various forms, is also the truth of linguistic understanding.  
              Art is neither subjective, nor contained in fixed concepts, nor is it possible to 
pre-establish what our open encounter with truth will be when we experience it, yet we 
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know that it is a capacity of art and truth to address it to us. Our verbal lives and our 
existence reside in a linguistic tension imposed by our metaphysical heritage.                 
              Art and language involve total mediation, as the art of the word itself shows. 
Art shares this capacity with the experience of language. In this way, art shows the 
limits of consciousness in the way it brings forth truth. Second, art shows us that truth 
is shared and communicated beyond a purely subjective outlook.               
             Poetic texts are a special way language reveals itself, visible to us when they 
push grammar and the formal dimensions of discourse into relief (for example in 
Mallarme’s poems). Gadamer argues that poetry, like Mallarme’s, represents a limit 
case that shows this and that also can be interpreted as actually complementing aspects 
of Hegel’s speculative logic, because it pushes the grammar of predication to the 
breaking point.301 Both the speculative instance of speech and poetic language reveal 
how language can still secure reality. The poem “requires nothing beyond its own 
utterance to secure the reality of language.”302   
             Language participates in the “truth of the universal” 303 not because it can be 
objectified but because language puts to work Being itself in beings. Hermeneutics 
presents Dasein as being and becoming in the manner of understanding itself in 
language, as a self-movement of free play (and constant interpretation does not impair 
the demands of truth in the work of art, for example), therefore, it is not about how we 
use language to fix a representation, rather, like the power of language itself,  art both 
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presents and is a presentation (a self-showing) at the same time.  In this way, we can 
see that the search for truth is dialogical and becomes manifest in the dialogue that 
constitutes Being with beings.   
               Poetics gives a philosophical priority to the concept of speech. Poetry, the 
strange other to our mono-logical culture (confounding truth and its logical image), is a 
stranger to us, yet it still presses upon us to see the unpoetic aspect of this world.  
Furthermore, we should note that neither Apel, nor Habermas see poetry this way. 
Poetry remains, for them, a danger to rationality (since they are resisting what they see 
as the dangerous history, and interconnection of Heidegger with the spirit of 
nationalism), not ameliorative of linguistic understanding.  
              In Celan’s poetry, for example, the poem addresses us as something that is 
always being understood, while remaining obscure and at the limit of speaking the 
ethical word. The poetic word, exemplary of all speech, has the capacity to show or 
make present to us, to make recognizable, something in the world. As Gadamer says, 
the poem can, without predication, participate in the “truth of the universal.”304   
               In his 1987 lecture Thinking and Poetizing in Heidegger and in Holderlin’s 
“Andenken” Gadamer says that “the path of the West, which is also the path leading to 
science, has forced upon us a separation and a never completely achievable unity of 
poetizing and thinking.” The poet aims for the truth of what is said that involves “the 
unconcealment of what is and which comes to stand in speaking.”305 Poetics and 
thinking share a linguistic need to make things (verbally) present. As Gadamer says: 
                                                
304 Gadamer, “The Relevance of the Beautiful,” in The Relevance of the Beautiful and 
Other Essays, p. 120. 
305 Gadamer, “Thinking and Poetizing in Heidegger and in Holderlin’s Andenken, 
p.149. 
 111 
“Not only the poetic word but also the word of thinking can have a quite other 
‘presence’ than words in ordinary situations have.”306 
                Speculative speech concerns overcoming the self-alienation of modern 
abstract language, specifically, however, it concerns the alienation of metaphysical 
speech (methodological alienation) as it comes to be embodied in the speech patterns 
of the human sciences. Consequently, if we approach this question in terms of how we 
experience language, we can better grasp our own capacity for critical consciousness as 
theory. Gadamer is not a sociologist, and no one will succeed in making him into one. 
At heart Gadamer is a philosopher. His concern is with how we experience language 
and, consequently, as I have pointed out, how our linguistic affiliation actually shapes 
our theoretical understanding, especially in our scientific world of the past century. 
             Our linguistic need to bring things before one another (objects of 
understanding), resides in the movement of thought (in the expressive and speculative 
dimension of our disclosing). This motion bears witness to the way we construct truth 
(and ourselves) in speech. Motion holds us in being; where motion occurs we are a 
question in our being (the Da of Dasein). This kind of motion occurs when we want to 
say something, which is the space of breath where our life process itself allows new 
perceptions to occur.  
            The speaking subject sets in motion the act of enunciation, in the for-having of 
interpretation (we already are happening in language), that contrasts to a doing that 
requires a certification of thought, one that seeks to cancel what seems to be a 
distraction created in the for-having of language. It does so by assuming a complete 
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subject and knowledge in its methodological practices. Hermeneutic experience, by 
contrast, puts the subject, oneself, in question. We are beings that belong only through 
hermeneutic experience. We break down “resistance in our selves” in the expressivity 
of our speech to better understand.  When we struggle to make someone understand 
what we are thinking, we are reaching toward a better understanding of ourselves 
because at this time we bring something to presence in the openness of the question. 
               Gadamer says: “To be sure his pedagogical poem was written in Homeric 
hexameter, and it was not without a certain poetic power, as the preserved poem 
proves. [In this poem we discover there still are no ‘concepts’.] Nevertheless, 
something like the creation of a concept is encountered for the first time in these 
verses.”307 The intimacy between theory and speech is revealed in the early pre-
Socratic texts that also informed Plato and Greek thought, and especially informs 
Gadamer’s work. This discussion informs a further argument on the question of 
language and ritual that he develops in this particular later work. 
               In Who are You, Who am I? speaking is, poetically, a matter of who speaks? 
Speaking makes a claim to question, to state the mystery of the question. We speak in a 
special way; we speak without attempting to find a definitive answer to our questions. 
We are suspended in questions; this is what matters.  As noted, Socrates’ task was to 
teach thinkers how to embrace questions, in other words, how to embody thinking as an 
ethical participation in the world of living language. It was also his concern to address 
the authenticity of speech in contrast to a simulation of speaking as found among the 
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sophists; yet it also involved the matter of trusting writing, even painting, that remains 
silent regarding its specific voice. 
              The human sciences appear to misunderstand their theoretical nature, the 
nature of what constitutes that of giving–of-an-account. Giving an account – especially 
theoretical account – is not an objectifying reflection that makes understanding capable 
of being mastered by means of methodology.308 Gadamer says: “word is the highest 
form in which mankind can shape its world and its fate,”309 meaning that everything 
that makes us human, resides in the first place, in the practical movement of speaking 
word and truth in our conversation and dialogue. 
              The objectivist naturalization of all the forms of logos must be answered by 
merging an ontological hermeneutics with Platonic dialectical criticism. 
              These logics of utterance rest upon our pre-comprehension that conversation is 
always a process of reaching a shared understanding of something, of bringing that 
something forward between participating speakers, even when we err or fail. Because, 
in a necessary manner, this is the very living part of all speech, resting on the ongoing 
untranslatable nature of the word that in no way impairs truth but in fact releases it into 
our hands.  
               Dialogue, then, is not only the way we self-locate in the world (being at 
home), that has no necessary stable relationship to our world, but in our ability to self-
question and constitute ourselves in a non-transparent and dynamic relationship to our 
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speech and the good.  What is dynamic is that we are not indifferent to our dialogue, 
our self-interpreting and re-interpreting of our saying.   
             Truth is not veritas, (as Heidegger pointed out) but something that is practiced 
in speech; we retain an ethical distinction in all genuine dialogue that remains 
incumbent on us.  Gadamer wants to make it clear that what separates the human 
sciences from technical understanding (methodos), is that they expressly ask one key 
question: the question of the good.310 
               Theory, then, as a mode of conversation, a dialogue, an argument or poem; is 
never purely a formalization of speech, rather, it is a space of freedom where we make 
things visible to others in a non-dogmatic dialectical practice that remains for us, a 
continual battle (with ourselves) to avoid empty and alienated speech. To avoid, as it 
were, sophistry.  At this point we see the opening to ethics that is always involved in 
speech (speaking with others) where the linearization of our voice, found in our time, 
demands an ethical solution as we seek to dialogue with others, as we seek to avoid the 
estranged self that is reproduced in formalized speech. 
             Gadamer says it is in “precisely the forgetfulness of language” (in speech) that 
we can discover the forgetting of the formal elements of discourse.311   He writes, 
“precisely the forgetfulness of language is a forgetting of the formal elements in which 
the discourse or text is enclosed”312 We are always, in speech, exceeding, like the poet, 
“the codified meaning-context of what is said.”313 
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               We have seen that (1) the truth of the word, for Gadamer, makes a special 
claim for the poet.  Further, that (2) this claim involves recognizing its importance in 
confronting an unpoetic world. Finally, that (3) the truth of the word is discovered in 
our speaking.  Encountering truth necessarily involves encountering speaking. Speech 
then is the essence of our being in truth. As a counter response to the alienation of the 
world, the poet makes a statement about the unpoetic aspect of our world.314 
                Poetic words, by weaving writing and tradition (as in mythic and poetic 
speech), display to us this authentic power of truth “only in being said,”315 something 
that is carried out and performed by our words.  
              The Greeks, beginning with the work Parmenides (Parmenides of Elena) as 
well as the Pre-Socratics, released thinking into philosophy as a critical struggle with 
the fluctuation of the universal sameness of words. No matter what we see, and are 
aware of, seeing and awareness is given to expression in the very paradox of language 
that comes down to us as the legacy of the Greek birth of the logos. 
              Words mirror the problem of the One and Many in Ancient debate.  
Understanding, Gadamer says, is “the very dialectic of the One and the Many which 
establishes the finite limits of human discourses and insight – and our fruitful situation 
halfway between single and multiple meaning, clarity and ambiguity.”316 Verbal 
interpretation is the form, says Gadamer, of all interpretation.317 To be fundamentally 
penetrated by words, then, means we are always hermeneutical beings that bring forth 
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the capacity for us to be theorists (theoretical beings). Gerald Bruns notes that Gadamer 
approaches a combination of themes, and specifically the poem, to emphasize the 
rhetorical nature of speech. 318 
                 Having lost trust in speech and truth, we have turned to veritas (as Heidegger 
claims) thus seeking pure objects of certainty. We are unable to return to ourselves in 
the dialectic of speaking (the art of speaking for Plato). Truth is a shared experience in 
language because:  (1) we do not control history, (2) nor do we control consciousness in 
a transparent way.  Rather, these two “limits” reveal to us that we do not know 
ourselves fully, nor could we, since the very movement of our understanding is a 
consequence of our non-conceptual existences, our education in the self, and our ways 
of speaking and thinking that rest on our pre-understanding of being. In summary, truth 
is not a matter of methodological understanding.  
              Gadamer shifts attention away from epistemological participation to 
ontological participation in language; theory actually manifests the tension of these two 
dimensions and therefore cannot be, strictly speaking, a form of analytic work. Truth 
does not reside in validity but in the authentic performance of genuine speech. The 
human sciences uneasily occupy the scientific landscape, but, Gadamer reminds us that: 
“What the tool of method does not achieve must – and really can – be achieved by a 
discipline of questioning and inquiring, a discipline that guarantees truth.”319  
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                 Learning is to do something for oneself, to avoid self-alienation. Paideia is a 
practice in which we apprehend ourselves. Plato’s literary sophistication in the 
Republic (and all his dialogues) implies a claim that the word, epitomized by the life of 
Socrates as a true dialectician, addresses how we are located in our modes of utterances 
as we ask of ourselves not only who we are but also recognize ourselves in what we 
say.  
                “All forgetfulness of self in imitation fulfils itself, therefore, in alienation.”320 
Therefore, the speaker forgets, or in losing his own dialogue with the soul cannot 
guards against sophist. Gadamer says that the word speaks to us, that it brings 
something to be there (the truth of the word) that can say something; it also allows us 
be friends to ourselves understood here as the “good in its self” that Plato spoke of.   
               The estrangement truth, then, is that moment when we mistake who we are 
(self-forgetfulness of self), since we have chosen as our self-encounter (a speech) that 
has already commenced with a structure that wants to avoid the actual productive 
ambiguity of speech (in methodos – the logos of objectivity). Consequently, the theorist 
feels that he loses his ability to question deeply, entering a condition of self-sophistic 
alienation within formalized speech (as we know, Gadamer describes this as 
methodological alienation). 
              If, however, we see ourselves in the play of ideas, not in separating them in a 
purification of thought, but in questioning the dialectics of Socratic speech, we can 
remain beings who are always interpreting speech as logos.  
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             Hermeneutics concerns the fundamental self-understanding of the logic of 
speech; it offers a metaphysical solution to the problem of the human sciences insofar 
as they are caught in the paradox of their own legacy. “When we speak to one another,” 
says Gadamer, “we do so not so much transmit well-defined facts, as place our own 
aspirations and knowledge into a broader and richer horizon through dialogue with the 
other.” 321  We expose ourselves, precisely as moral beings, to the truth of being that 
lies in the very responsibility of the words we put in our mouths. Such a context is what 
we all presuppose: the natural working of language that affords us access to truth. 
            Truth and Method concludes: “Scientific methods do not guarantee truth. This is 
especially so of the human sciences, but this does not mean a diminution of their 
scientific quality, but, on the contrary, the justification of the claim to a special humane 
significance that they have always made.”322  
            My intention in this chapter has been to show the significance of theory and 
truth with a specific reference to the human sciences and sociology. Focusing on the 
question of “validity” when it comes to what we say when we make theory, I explored 
the question of “factual validity” in the discussion of Karl-Otto Apel’s work. Following 
Gadamer, I argue that the metaphysical notion of “facts" should be supplanted with the 
conception of “hermeneutic facts” where meaning, the way we can confirm theory 
utterances, requires the shared dialogue and the truth making event of speech. Truth is 
not an external definition of our utterances that makes them simply a matter of being 
either true or false. Metaphysical conceptions, as such, merely forestalls discussion and 
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truth. Truth places these utterances in the sphere of dialogue of coming to an 
understanding. We have established the importance of truth for the human sciences. 
The power of speech as truth-giving further shows why the paradox of social theory 
was understood as alienating to the theorist and conflicting with the ethical demands of 
his task. 
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Chapter 3. 
 
 
 
Poetics and Truth 
 
 
 
There is no first word as there is no last word.323 
 
The reception and interpretation of poetry seems to imply a dialogical relationship of a 
unique kind.324 
 
 
 My claim in this chapter is that poetry, described by Gadamer as “the poetic 
word”, fulfills speech.  I argue that it is the poetic word, alongside the Platonic 
conception of theoria as speech (conversation) that implies a realization of the way 
conceptual logic exists outside procedural rules. Poetry is exemplary in the way the 
music of words involve us in being at home in the world. Our being at home is linked 
to the power the right word to say what we want to convey. Poesies concern this truth. 
Plato portrays Socrates, and his own writing, as both prose and poetry.  
              In this chapter we address the nature of the poetic word. As we know the truth 
of the word is a central theme of Gadamer’s understanding of understanding that is seen 
as the event of truth.  Gadamer’s discussion on Paul Celan, in his famous essay “Who 
Am I and Who Are You” [1973] and his early discussion of Plato, in “Plato and the 
Poets” [1934] are focal points in this chapter.  Both essays discuss figures that are, as 
we will see, concerned with the question of escaping the suspicion of the word  
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(aesthetic seductiveness) and a degrading of the word (sophistry), yet seek to find a 
way to speak with seriousness and beauty (dialogue). 
               Susan Howe, the poet, once said that every word was once a poem. She 
speaks to the infinity of the word. Understanding involves the “inner infinity of 
answering words which are all – and therefore none – ‘suitable’ [angemessen, 
appropriate, adequate].325 The poetic word stands, as it were, without context, yet 
remains intelligible [it speaks]; like Dasein, it emerges – a becoming [being there]. 
With Heidegger, we are shown that the authentic word is “determined from the 
direction of Being as the word in which truth happens.”326 How can the poetic word 
stand for itself and also invite dialogue?  Celan, as Gadamer shows, is the poet of the 
seemingly mute dialogue. How is it that the poetic word invites community and shared 
knowing, since for Gadamer the poem presents us with the purity of language as a 
fundamental dialogic encounter.  Veronique M. Foti comments that poetic-diction, in 
contrast to the language of objectification, “reinstates the possibility of human dwelling 
and community through an articulation of the temporality and topology of the 
Other.”327 
              A poem is not simply to be understood as simply a dialogue, it is a unique 
encounter with the word that prompts the creation of an intelligible dialogue. What the 
poetic word does is it stands still; we take the poem at its word. Gerald Bruns, 
attempting to characterize this quality of the poem, says: “The poem does not address 
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us as cognitive subjects seeking conceptual clarification and control – on the contrary, 
it seems to be in the nature of the poetry to take us out of the relation of knowing.”328 
What defines this hermeneutic space of dialogue and word?  Di Cesare has formulated 
it concisely when she writes: “For philosophical hermeneutics there is already a place 
where one can live with the other and the other of the other. That place is poetry. But 
how could dialogue harmonize with the singularity of the poem? In his encounter with 
Celan, perhaps the most important poet on his path of thinking, Gadamer came to the 
idea of the dialogue of the poem.”329  
               The poem is a universal witnessing. The poetic word stands for itself; in 
contrast to the way the word stands as a concept. Our concern is to show why the poetic 
word can shed a light on our relation to language and to conceptual thinking (theory), a 
theme that we know has deeply concerned Heidegger in his writings. Modern poetry, 
for Gadamer, is very important, because it takes up the corresponding modernist claim 
in art: “What is it?”330 What does a poem say? What does art say? Gadamer is at home 
with the radical thesis of the modern poem, with what he calls our “lyric modernity” (as 
Bruns states it), the idea that the poem is made of words, not merely of images and 
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meanings.331 With a poem or artwork, we do not simply enter the realm of a disengaged 
contemplation, rather, its truth only happens in our encounter with it appearing. In a 
sense, it could be argued that the poetic word is always heard anew, while the poetic 
word can pass into the said (become intelligible). Yet, with the concept we try to 
control the poetic aspect of our encounter with the word as it emerges from natural 
speech.  
                  Richard Palmer notes that the truth of the word in poetry is a central theme 
in Gadamer’s hermeneutics,332 while Dieter Misgeld describes Gadamer’s attachment 
to the poet as showing the importance to seeing truth in an intellectual disposition “that 
gives the last word to the poet and poetry, especially a poet who never was on the side 
of power” – namely Paul Celan.333  Here we have two themes, Gadamer’s reflection on 
the power of the poetic word, and Gadamer’s specific interest in the work of the poet 
Paul Celan. 
 
Gadamer on Paul Celan: “Who Am I and Who Are You?” 
              Gadamer’s familiarity with poets is widely recognized, and, as we have seen 
his dialogue with poetry continues an important part of his thinking. He has written on 
Holderlin, Mandelstam, and Celan, among others. Yet, in Celan we find a special 
reading of the question of hermeneutics. Celan helps us to understand the complex 
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relation of philosophy to poetry; we only have to recall that Celan had a complex 
relationship with the writings of Heidegger. Gadamer says that his interest in Celan is 
because of how the linguistically unfamiliar (the poetic word) strikes us as significant; 
“that is why I have written about Celan, one of the most inaccessible poets of the world 
literature.”334  
                For Gadamer, poetry is a special utterance that demonstrates how meaning is 
conveyed in words by being passed entirely into what is said (in words) that is 
embodied purely in that saying (in the poem). Poetry, then, “name[s] language itself” 
and draws our attention to the way there is a priority given to truth in what the poem 
says. The poet’s voice becomes “one of the fundamental metaphors of the modern age 
the poet’s activity as a paradigm of human existence itself.”335 
               Who Speaks? The poet keeps the question open to the intimacy where You 
and I find a genuine language for the distance and intimacy that resides between us.336  
What is lost in alienation can be recovered where there is no subject but a sharing. 
Badiou describes the twentieth century was witness to the “profound mutation of the 
question of the We. What holds us together without, as he says, going astray into the 
domination of false communities?337 What indeed did speak? 
               Poetic speaking is both a self-forgetful activity and a question. The question, 
we recall, is a key to dialogue.  Poetic speaking asks questions while forgetting itself.  
The subject dissolves into the word. The poems of Celan seemingly speak to this 
                                                
334 Gadamer, Hans-Georg. “Writing and the Living Voice.” In Hans-Georg Gadamer 
on Education, Poetry, and History: Applied Hermeneutics. Edited by Dieter Misgeld 
and Graeme Nicholson. Albany: State University of New York, 1992. p. 70. 
335 Gadamer, “Who Am I and Who Are You? Gadamer and Celan,  p.86. 
336  Ibid. p. 88. 
337 Baidou, Alain. “Anabasis.” In The Century. London: Polity, 2007. p. 96. 
 125 
power, breaking away from any sense of context. They are understood but do not yield 
to interpretation; they are a coming to conversation, they are neither given by a 
“subject” nor received by a “subject”, but is there any context in which they are 
readable?  For Gadamer we must listen, for in them we face the unspeakable (as well as 
the limits of intelligibility); they are a concrete struggle with the very (im)possibility of 
conversation that can addresses us. Gadamer says where there is speech there is a unity 
of sense too. Even in the most ‘fragmentary’ text, such as Celan’s poems, something 
holds open the possibility of speaking (and of hearing).  The poetic word fulfills itself – 
we can hear it. The poem prompts us to the possibility of dialogue and interpretation. 
And it does so because it asks the question: Who am I and Who are You? 
With Celan’s poems, Gadamer says, all scholarly research, and theoretical procedures, 
that “appeal to authoritorial intention give way to what Gadamer calls,  “listening” – 
attentiveness to each word of the poem and a search for ways in which the words may 
be said to come together or interact as a unity despite their fragmentary 
arrangements.”338 
               Herein lies the strange relationship between the philosophic and the poetic 
word. The poet cannot account, know or justify himself in an epistemological way (in 
this way poetry is a “not-knowing,” “not metaphysical”), but as Heidegger says, it is 
always a saying where we receive awareness of what it is that comes from the word, 
because both philosopher and poet are in the word. Truth telling, the poet’s saying, is 
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an unprotected saying. There is a complex rhetorical and ethical undertaking occurring 
even in their seeming philosophical indifference to the word.339 
             The poet, as Plato understood, raises the question of what language is common 
to everyone.  A form of speech that is true for one another lies at the heart of Plato’s 
contestation with the poet. This concerns Plato’s own discourse, a striving to balance 
the poet and the intellectual in his own work. In a manner of speaking it concerns the 
management of poetic ecstasy. The poet forgets himself in his flights of fantasy, the 
philosopher does not want to absorb the reader this way, but nonetheless, he too will 
seek a speech that may be described as a dialogical poetry. What the poet signifies 
remains open to indeterminacy, not simply of the interpretation, but the understanding 
itself.   
             Paul Celan and Martin Heidegger’s dialogue, as we know, is one important 
dialogue between poet and philosopher in the twentieth century.340 Gadamer’s own 
writings on the poet, opened up by Heidegger’s writings, are focused on Celan. For 
Gadamer, the poem is language and community, it implies living with others, as well as 
living with oneself, and that natural language concerns the ambiguity and questioning 
of life. Therefore, the poem is a model of the way language resists instrumental and 
linguistic alienation. Gadamer, like Heidegger, treats poetic thinking as a point of 
resistance to “the subjection of common language to metaphysics and technology.”341 
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Gadamer, therefore, says that we all have the same linguistic experience that the poet 
has in a most exemplary way.342  
              The poet’s power of the word, poetic saying, cannot be the subjectivity of the 
poet nor simply the poet’s own word.  Gadamer says that Plato’s objection to the poet’s 
speech concerned “the contemporary morality and education (the pedagogical claims of 
the poet) which had established itself upon the basis of a poetic formulation of the older 
morality and which, in adhering to aging moral forms, found itself defenseless against 
arbitrary perversions of those forms brought on by the spirit of sophism.”343  
             Poetry, Gadamer observes, “dissolves all prior factors of linguistic formation 
and construction,”344 and thus, announces the founding power of the truth of the 
word.345 The word is not simply to be understood as a semantic particle; rather, the 
word is a subtle conversation, a living conversation that resists absolute appropriation 
and fixation. Gadamer said, “a word only becomes a word when it breaks into 
communicative usage.”346 For: “In words we are at home. In words there is a kind of 
guarantee for what they say. These things are especially clear in the poetic use of 
language.”347  
               The human sciences build up interrelated statements, to constitute the ideal of 
theory, one that aims “to produce accurate generalizations” and in doing so to avoid 
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prejudice.348  The problem of the alienation of language, that is an alienation that takes 
shape in the language of the human sciences, resides in how we see our relation to 
speaking.349  
 
Poetry and the Truth of the Word 
            “It seems to me,” Gadamer wrote, “that poetic language  (the poetic word) 
enjoys a particular and unique relationship to truth.”350 The implication is that the truth 
of our words will happen the closer we are to the lyric form of the sentence, and is 
lessened by any adoption of words in technical statements arranged as the form of 
theory, as scientific speaking. It turns upon the logic of abstraction and its place in the 
realm of the human sciences.  Gadamer points out how this resides in the work of 
Aristotle especially, with the syllogism, for example, and concerns how we understand 
this achievement of abstraction against the application to the world of scientific 
utterances. What is significant is that these statements “refer to assertion that is 
theoretical in the sense that it abstracts itself from everything that is not expressly 
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said.”351 The statement is not the only way to speak, speaking as theory, implies that 
there is more to theory than what encloses itself in the idea: “Only that which the 
statement itself reveals through it being said constitutes the object of analysis and the 
foundation of logical consequentiality.”352  
               The poetic word, alongside the lyric word, avails itself of a specific autonomy, 
the finitude of the word, as does speech, which excludes predication. In this regard, 
language is not objectifiable, and the poets show this to us. This takes place in a 
historical context; J. M. Baker characterizes it in this way: “it is not just that the 
discourse of science, or Wissenschaft, comes into its own with modernity, but that the 
language of art, for which lyric poetry is paradigmatic, also comes into its own for the 
first time.”353 Baker sees Gadamer’s view as a post-Hegelian shift in the meaning of art, 
a shift from “reflective art to the art of reflection,” especially witnessed in the lyric 
poem in modernity.354  
              Gadamer asks, in his Philosophy and Poetry, “How do the words of the poet 
and the language of the concept relate to one another?”355 We may also recall 
Heidegger’s remark: “The commencement of Western Thinking in the Greeks was 
prepared by poetry.” and his argument introduces a symmetry between the Greeks and 
today by saying that poetizing is “now necessary as a sign of the completion of Western 
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metaphysics.”356 The lyric prose of the modern era supplies a picture of the power of 
the poetic word and an indication of the way language [lingusticality] lays a claim to a 
validity that is self-standing and does not rest on the proposition. This is why, as 
Gadamer says, Plato by leaving “behind his artistic, dialogical poems instead of just 
some pedagogical writings or lectures, means something.”357 Because spoken language, 
as Gadamer affirms, says something more than a mere fixed conceptuality.  
              Richard Baker, who has devoted a text to Gadamer’s relation to the lyric word, 
notes regarding the new autonomous place of the poetic word, (as in modernist 
poetics). He quotes Reiner Wiehl’s thesis which says, “that the common speculative 
thread in poetry and dialectical thought is the concept of action: ‘The lyric is the 
presentation of the Pierce speech act, not the presentation of an action in the form of a 
speech act’ [TM 575].”358 
              Accordingly, Baker says we are drawn back to the problems of classical 
metaphysics.359 Quoting Gadamer, Baker says, “that a real person utters or has said to 
him (or her) is not that grammatical element in the linguistic analysis of a sentence, for 
one can demonstrate in concrete phenomena involved in learning a language how 
secondary the word is compared to the linguistic melody of a sentence.”360  
              In speech something goes beyond the logic of our propositions. Gadamer says, 
there can be no proposition “that is purely and simply true.” The validity of our 
statements, especially, those we describe as theoretical utterances, also concern 
                                                
356 Heidegger, Introduction to Philosophy – Thinking and Poetizing, p. 13. 
357 Gadamer, “Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and Language,” in Language and 
Linguisticality in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, p. 39. 
358 Baker, “Lyric as Paradigm,” In The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer, p. 154. 
359 Ibid. p. 456. 
360 Ibid. pp. 104-105. 
 131 
more.361 The poet helps us understand how we become participants in the meaning of a 
theoretical utterance, since the poem is, in Gadamer’s view, a preeminent instance of 
the word’s capacity for completeness.362 Baker says, the question of how we verbally 
experience the world is prior to everything; it is addressed to recognizing something as 
existing.363  
            Vattimo says that hermeneutics, in the context of twentieth century art, asks 
how we occupy art (understand it) by entering into a dialogue with it.364 Vattimo speaks 
of how art’s proximity to the word has always existed, but has taken on a new 
significance during the twentieth century – the “century of poetics” – describing this 
time as one in which there is a “new relationship between the various arts […] and the 
word.” 365  
 
Gadamer on Plato’s Philosophic Poetry 
                Plato’s literary way – his philosophic poetry – is seen in his dialogues; they 
exemplify what Plato understands by the exercise of doing philosophy.  Gadamer 
describes this seeming paradox. While rejecting poetry from the realm of Ideas and the 
Good, Plato “at the same time adopted poetry himself as a story teller of mythical tales 
who knew how to combine in an inimitable fashion the festive with the ironical, the 
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remoteness of legend with the clarity of thought.366 Plato, in Gadamer’s view, does not 
simply suppress rhetoric, but presents the ethical challenge of knowledge in terms of 
the nature of living dialogue, along with Socrates (the man who speaks to truth telling) 
as lying at the very center of the dialogues.  
            The modern concept of truth replaces this instability of truth with methodic 
refinement. What Gadamer shows us is that Plato’s discussion of the poet, for example, 
is positioned in a history of developing poetic forms, and how these forms matter, even 
in light of his critique of the sophistic poet. Plato’s literary dialogues stand by example 
in contesting the poet, by seeking a “truly philosophic poetry” that allows its own 
mimetic patterns, to avoid the alienating character (self-estrangement and alienation), 
which is a consequence of a specific forgetting of oneself and truth as the word. 
            Gadamer says that Plato secures the mimetic aspect of his dialogues with the 
“levity of a jocular play.” 367 Plato’s philosophy finds its meaning beyond what is 
expressly stated, since it allows meanings to take effect for the reader in the form of 
dialogue. The commonality we find is the making things “that [are] present for me and 
for you”, or, to put it another way, to show us what is truly there.368 In this way, there is 
a distinct connection between Gadamer’s early ideas and later discussion of how the 
truth of the poetic word speaks to us. Speaking, making things present, expanding our 
understanding, and conversation, all rest on this commonality; in fact, they make 
commonality possible. 
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             Gadamer shows, in his dialogue with Plato, why Truth and Idea are displayed 
as compelling to us. In our political being we are always seeking to be harmonious, and 
this harmony lies in the very the risk of our speech, as the risk of not living up to itself. 
Drawing on Hegel, Gadamer argues that the concept and the poetic word involve an 
infinite divisibility, which is not merely arbitrary, but resides in the power of the word 
(concept) to resist mere “externalization” and stand as true in it.369  
             The human sciences are born as the paradox of their practices, because if man 
is only an object of sociology, something on the way to a better future, then sociology 
is founded on the critical exclusion of man’s truth.  Sociology sets forth our hope in the 
intelligibility of the world, produced through social knowledge, a task for the future of 
man, but what takes place is an estranging of man from truth.  
  
 Gadamer on Plato and the Poets 
Controversy swirls around Gadamer’s essay “Plato and the Poets,” specifically because 
of his “relationship” to National Socialism, with some defending him and some 
accusing him of complicity. Plato is important to Gadamer. Jean Grondin states: “Given 
Gadamer’s predilection for poetry, Plato’s banishment of the poets (in the Republic) 
must have presented a real challenge.”370 Gadamer says that the true poetry is to be 
found in the dialogues themselves; which we know provides an image of the critical 
[dialogue] and the beautiful.371 
                                                
369 Ibid. p. 138. 
370 Grondin, Hans-Georg Gadamer: A Biography, p. 166. 
371 Grondin further discusses the controversy quoting Gadamer: “About thirty years ago 
the present problem became known in a distorted form when the National Socialists, for 
political purposes of their own, tried to criticize the formalism of a purely aesthetic 
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            Plato’s critique of the poet, in short, is a critique of the existing Greek paideia 
where the sophists and the poets, who call upon Homer, speak to a forgetfulness of self, 
a verbal universe of self-estrangement, brought on by the spirit of sophism. Gadamer 
states: “Although Plato does not specifically say so, this critique of the art of poetry 
implies a break with the entire tradition of education which had always presented the 
moral truths of any given time using models taken from the heroes of Homer’s 
world.”372 
             Plato treats moral awareness as “the city of words,” an inner harmony of the 
soul that falls into a self-forgetfulness. Here a false self-appropriation can occur, a mere 
“imitation,” of the soul’s work, where one gives oneself an alien character [identity]. 
Gadamer shows that Plato’s concern was that the sophist and poet would merge and 
lead one to forget oneself in self-forgetfulness (of the good).  
                 It is at this point that we begin to understand fully Gadamer’s philosophical 
engagement with the human sciences in its full significance. 
                  Inauthentic speech [alien speech] prevails when it generates a self-alienation 
in all other forms of speaking. This is especially visible in speech that addresses the 
poetic truth of the world. Gadamer insists, as a deeply Platonic thinker, that we 
challenge the sophistic perversion of truth. He writes that:  
                                                                                                                                         
culture by talking about an art tied to the people, a way of speaking which, despite all 
the misuse of which it is capable, still undeniably points to something real. Inquisitors 
might take pleasure in this: in 1966 Gadamer acknowledges that the Nazi critique 
points ‘to something real’ and concurs with one motif in his critique of aesthetic 
consciousness. In 1966 he could do this, however, because he was inwardly certain of 
the distance between the Nazi Weltanschauung and his own philosophical project.” p. 
169. 
372 Gadamer, “Plato and the Poets,” Dialogue and Dialectic, p. 61. 
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The real object of Plato’s criticism is not degenerate forms of 
contemporary art and the perception of the older order, classical poetry 
which contemporary taste in art had defined. Rather it is the 
contemporary morality and moral education which had established itself 
upon the bases of the poetic formulations of the older morality and 
which, in adhering to aging moral forms, found itself defenseless against 
the arbitrary perversions of those forms brought on by the spirit of 
sophism.373 
 
             In Plato and the Poets, Gadamer discusses why the Platonic accusation against 
the poets (art and poetry), is a political struggle in relation to Homer, whom Plato felt 
would restrict the possibility of achieving rational political discourse in a political 
community if it was dominated by a poetry that Plato thought to be inauthentic (e.g. 
Homer). Gadamer therefore ties Plato’s critique of the poets to Plato’s critique of the 
Sophists.  
“Homer’s poetry turns out to be the mere pretence of knowledge which dazzles 
us.” 374 Again, we find Gadamer’s attachments to Heidegger in his concern with the 
question of the genuine form of speech, and the genuine poet. 
              Plato’s argument against the poet “is made in opposition to the entire political 
and intellectual culture of his time. And made in the conviction that philosophy alone 
has the capacity to save the state.”375 The rivalry between poet and philosopher 
described in Plato’s Republic has to be seen in light of the fact that it is made by a 
thinker who “cast[s] a poetic spell that has enthralled mankind for thousands of 
years.”376  
Andrew Fuyarchuk explains: 
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By emphasizing the dialectical structure of Being in Plato’s philosophy 
and the literary aspects of the dialogues, Gadamer seeks to undermine 
the Altertumswissenschft tradition assuming Plato to an objective 
science. Given the structure of dialogue, no definitive doctrine can be 
established: it is simply contrary to the give and take of a conversation, 
animated by a question, to put forward a definitive idea about what 
something is. Every answer is another question. The literary form of 
Plato’s work dovetails with Gadamer’s reading of Plato’s open-ended 
dialectic in that any pretence toward objective doctrine is an abstraction 
from the poetry in which the meaning of a particular being is 
embedded.377 
 
             Plato was ambivalent about Homer as a mythologist, but not as a poet.  Plato 
had a deep reverence and love for such poetry. The Greeks understood that the poetic 
word was the space of speech in which thinking is born in a form that will assert its 
authority over the poetic. 
                When the poet used inauthentic speech in political life and education, he 
contributed to an empty speech and the decline of ideas. Gadamer shows that Plato is 
not precisely condemning the poet’s word in the Republic, but is asserting what can 
happen to the word that is, as in the jargon language of objective pretense, organized 
falsely and in an inauthentic way. The poet’s word still carries the capacity, from within 
itself, to shape or speak from a given ethos.378 Gadamer's attention is on how the poet is 
treated as sophist in Plato, and in his careful reading of the way poetic discourse is 
simultaneously recovered through, what appears at many times, to be a malevolent 
treatment of Homer. 379  
                 Socrates' language contrasts with the Homeric world of morality and 
education, where in the world of Plato, “old age legend being supposedly rescued from 
oblivion is not a resurrected ancient myth at all but a Socratic truth which rises up 
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before us before it recedes again.” In other words, the poetic world of the Platonic is a 
struggle to overcome the self-forgetfulness of the poetic word, but Plato’s practices, his 
dialogues, are close to the tradition of poetry.380 Plato’s myths are not an interpretation 
of the world of myth, says Gadamer, but interpretations that reside in the logos of his 
work, Plato’s dialogical poetry.381 
              For Gadamer, the lyric is the paradigm of modernity, because the poem 
remains a “remembrance of language.” Poetic thinking, in contrast to what it had been 
for the Greeks, has in fact, become distant to us.382 Bruns notes that the power of the 
poetic word happens in a culture that forgets the poem.383 Bruns notes: “Poetry is the 
original critique of the subject, one might say the original critique of reason. Plato knew 
as much.”384  
                We must ask: what does Plato have to tell us today?  This question conveys 
nuances about Gadamer’s overall vision of modernity, concerning how we listen to the 
past and ourselves through language. When we listen carefully to Plato’s concerns we 
may hear our own concerns, especially since we are the heirs of the Greek tradition. For 
Plato, the Attic tradition of Homer and the great tragedians, are grounded political life; 
                                                
380 Ibid. p. 67. Plato’s critique of poetry, a critique which culminates in his rejection of 
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thus poetry overwhelmed, in this sense, political thinking, challenging the emergence of 
philosophy because of the “dangerous ambiguity” of its language.  
               Gadamer draws our attention to the peculiar political power of the modern 
poet and the poet’s word, to the paradigm of our lyric modernism, where the poem 
“grows more and more distant,” if we resist its “self-event intelligibility,” or, as 
Badiou’s has said, where poetry does not “easily suffer the demand for clarity, the 
passive audience, or the simple message.”385 Nonetheless, according to Gadamer, even 
under this pressure the poetic artwork shifts our attention to the power of language, 
which is still, in light of this resistance, as powerful today, since the poetic word shows 
us the “self-standing” and “conceptually inexhaustible”386 quality of the truth and the 
word.              
                Gadamer asked what justified the severity and hostility of Plato’s attitude to 
Homer, and poetry per se.  Plato’s critique of poetry or a critique of myth (narrative) 
aspects of the Greek language387 might be expected from an “unmusical rationalist but 
not from a man whose work itself is nourished from poetic sources and who casts a 
spell which has enthralled making for thousands of years.”388 Indeed, this seeming 
tension is critical because it tells us something about the “extraordinary strangeness of 
Plato’s criticism,” something that remains, in fact, seemingly contradictory.389  
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 139 
                Since the poet cannot justify his utterances the poet cannot give valid 
answers, but, Gadamer says that “their works might contain a valid answer” 
nonetheless. In saying this, he reminds us that Socrates’ philosophy wanted to 
circumvent poetry, but it cannot, and as much as the poets might try to circumvent 
Socratic philosophy, they cannot either. So something remains of the poet’s “rhapsodic 
existence,” even after the harsh verdict of philosophy.  Gadamer identifies in Plato the 
struggle concerning our political being and speech; he sees it in terms of the need to 
assert the good by reconciling ourselves into unity through our love of knowledge. In 
other words, the paideia incorporated both poet and thinker, how each may or may not 
bring about a reconciliation one builds not on skill but out of the just word; both poet 
and thinker must not deceive or be deceived: “the true poetic singing of human life 
must always proclaim the truth that the just man alone is happy.”390 Thus, “Plato’s 
paideia is meant […] as a counterweight to the centrifugal pull of those forces of the 
sophist enlightenment being exerted upon the state.  
            Alain Badiou, for example, breaks with hermeneutic ontology, but remains, a 
“Platonist” (“Plato says that there is something other than bodies and language. There 
are truths...”391), so is Gadamer (“Are we not all Platonists?”).  Both are considering 
how truth stands in the Idea [the relationship of the word to the concept], but Badiou 
rejects that the poetic word can to be linked to this. He rejects the legacy of Heidegger, 
the poem as sign of our times.  Nevertheless, what Gadamer and Badiou do share is a 
primary belief in the capacity of philosophy in its original sense, that Badiou describes 
                                                
390 Ibid. p. 58. 
391 In Bosteels, Bruno. "Dialogue with Alain Badiou," (Appendix Two: “Beyond 
Formalization”). In Badiou and Politics. Durham: Duke University Press, 2011. p. 341. 
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as his “Platonic gesture” to connect, “being, the subject, and truth;” to reaffirm the 
connection and offer an alternative to the poet’s claim on the word.   
            Gadamer says it is a mistake to “presuppose Plato as the metaphysician of the 
doctrine of ideas and then demonstrate that his critique flows logically from his basic 
ontological assumptions.”392 Plato must be put into context to reveal the choice that he 
makes, and why his arguments against the poets exist in the way they do in the 
Republic. For Gadamer, Plato’s critique is not a fragmentary picture, one contextless 
argument set against another, but an understanding that his overall concern was to shift 
Greek culture away from “attic education” and the “political and intellectual culture of 
the time.”393  
                Gadamer writes: “Plato’s purification of traditional poetry can be understood 
only in relationship to the purpose of the whole of this pragmatic constitution of the 
Republic.”  The point is not to take his argument literally as proposing something, 
which is actually immodest and unrealistic. What needs to be seen, says Gadamer, is 
the specific pedagogical effect of the poet, the efficacy of the poet, that, in the poem 
“something is expressed which reflects the ethical spirit prevailing in the 
community.”394 Plato’s critique, Gadamer adds, “betrays a moralistic bias of an 
intellectual purist.”395 
               In The Shattering of the Poetic Word Vattimo notes, because of Heidegger’s 
work, Gadamer takes an original step, being:  
              the first to call attention to the status of ‘la poésie pure’ as an example 
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              or model for understanding the essence of poetic works, insofar as language in  
              pure poetry (from Symbolism to various hermetic experiments of the twentieth  
              century avant garde artistic movements) attains an essential condition, thus  
              recovering the originary function of naming which is precisely the essence of 
              poetry. 396 
 
 Gadamer recovers the birth of the word and philosophy in the Pre-Socratics and Plato.  
              Poetry, reminds us of a unity that can speaks to us, between poet and listener, 
artwork and spectator, that is neither simply a speaking ego nor simply an abstraction 
of ourselves. One cannot possess a poem, like a work of art, but a poem appropriates 
us into itself; we do not reduce the poem to something else. What it says is there in its 
presence.  
              Gadamer’s book, Who am I and Who Are You? (included in the English 
version of, Gadamer on Celan) takes up this theme. Paul Celan, is exemplary of the 
power of the word, of the unsaid that speaks within the possibilities that language itself 
offers.397 A conversation – the virtuality of speech – involves the forms we bring to 
speech as we bring forth the “correct word,” recognizing that we never absolutely attain 
such a goal. Our conceptual building work (such as theory, as another form building) 
lives in the tension of our encounter with the unfamiliar (alienation and distance) 
between ourselves, and what we aspire to achieve, that will have a true effect and not 
be merely self-alienating and sophistic. 
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                 Bruns writes: “The importance of Paul Celan to Gadamer’s thinking is that 
Celan’s writings situate the radical thesis explicitly within the context of the main 
question of philosophical hermeneutics: What is it to be addressed?”398 
                  Bruns reminds us that, “Poetry is, again, the unforgetting of language, in 
which we are reminded, first of all, that language is not a formal system; it is what 
philosophers call natural language – but perhaps one should use the older philological 
expression, living language: language whose mode of existence is the event, a language 
of Erfahrung [the experience of something] that lives through or undergoes the 
experiences of all those who speak it and hear it, and which is therefore never self-
identical but always on the way [unterwegs] – 
what is it called, your country 
behind the mountain, behind the year? 
I know what it is called. 
Like the winter’s tale, it’s called the summer tale, 
your mother’s threeyearland, 
          that’s what it was, 
what is it, 
It wanders everywhere, like 
language.399 
 
 
                  Our starting point, Gadamer writes, “is that the verbally constituted 
experience of the world expresses not what is present-at-hand, that which is calculated 
or measured, but what exists that man recognizes as existent and significant.”400 
Language is the medium where the question of our being as original belonging 
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recognizes itself and meets the world. In the poems of Celan the power of the poetic 
faces its own estrangement. 
  
Talk, Poetry, Word 
                First, claims and Definitions: 
                To put it simply, as we have shown, our discussion is about talk.  Our grasp 
of theoria, I argue, is born in talk. Plato’s dialogues, as multifaceted as they are, remain 
an exploration of the power of speech. The dialogues are abundant with speech 
[speeches and conversations]; the action of each dialogue, then, is talk. They convert 
conversations into dialogues.   The dialogues carry, for the most part, proper names.         
                Traditionally, the Greeks saw dialogue as a priority that was equal to or 
greater than seeing. Our verbal communication, in its generosity and its ethical 
possibility, is necessary to the knowing of the world. This rests on recognizing how 
truth resides in the way we speak.  We cannot neutralize this scene of speech in theory 
production in any way. Gadamer argues that the objectification of theory creates, as it 
were, a false scene of speech and consequently of theory.  
              How is theory a part of our living discussion? We are always responding to 
historical events and to art, and we have to see that this always involves us in dialogue 
“a Gesprach, hence it is a matter of listening and responding, and, above all, of 
interpreting or mediating the world or of the event with one’s own world.”401  Plato’s 
Seventh Letter shows us how philosophy emerges from dialogue, how, in living 
together we share in conversation and the speaking of thing as we nourish the soul into 
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a harmony of art of the whole, not through objective expression but through living 
expression. 
               We do not stand outside our experience of the world  (and the word) nor do 
we stand outside ourselves as a speaker. To put it simply, we seek to nourish our lives 
in speech, as we see in the figure of Socrates, where knowing oneself frees us of false 
knowledge. In Gadamer’s Platonic outlook, we take place in our speech insofar as: (1) 
the world is a conversation in which we all participate, (2) all understanding is 
interpretation, (3) all verbal exchange is a hermeneutic phenomena, and (4) 
hermeneutic phenomena is a special instance of the relationship between thinking and 
speaking. Ultimately, we speak, converse, and dialogue through the dialectics of 
speech, to nourish our selves. 
              We can recognize that we are not outside of truth as communicative theoretical 
beings (our being-in-the-world preexists the operation of speech); but we can conceal, 
nevertheless, what Gadamer describes as the “other half of truth” inscribed in the 
historically shaped and binding power of metaphysics.  
              Such a paradox of the “other half of truth” opens onto the ethical space of 
speech, captured by Gadamer’s expression:  dialectical ethics [genuine dialogue, 
conceptual thinking, etc. as revealed in Plato’s dialogues] which illustrates to the 
modern mind a loss that has accompanied, by contrast, what he calls “the rational 
construction of an artificial language.” Artificial language, thereby, transforms truth 
and belonging as well as the genuine identity of theory in shared conversation. 
               Our relationship to truth, concerns the recovery of the truth claim of art. We 
learn: (1) art carries its meaning over to the reader because it asks of us a question (it 
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does not explicate a concept), further, (2) we do not see through art to a hidden 
intended meaning (with selected conceptual tools that could make it transparent to us), 
rather, (3) art appropriates us into the matter itself; we enter truth as an event 
(Ereignis) involving us in the tensions of knowing, being, distance and intimacy.   
               Art’s power to stand alone, its self-presentation, is not the result of some 
mystical objectivity but a dialogue; art is an activity in which one must participate in 
order to interpret it, a relationship that is prompted by the way one encounters art’s 
communicability. 
             Truth lies in the putting of something into words not in constructing methods; 
truth and method then is not to be understood as a gap to be healed, rather it shows us 
that we cannot address truth in the human sciences by believing we can step outside of 
what Gadamer calls the binding force of tradition. We belong to what we say in the 
living quality of the word (the happening event of word and truth); we tend to conceal 
this metaphysical root to thinking as we adopt an intellectualist view of method, in 
other words, we withdraw from our very mediation of truth in speech.  
                 Thinking is first a universal phenomenon that is verbal in nature. Gadamer 
claims, “Verbal form and traditionary content cannot be separated in the hermeneutic 
experience.” Consequently we belong to what we say [being saying]); this provides a 
basis for Gadamer’s project to meditate on the conceptual limits and possibilities of the 
human sciences.  
                 Gadamer says that everything that constitutes everyday speech can recur in 
the poetic word.402  The poetic word then is especially important to showing the 
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“speculative totality” of the word. Poetics is the most compelling phenomenon of the 
non-objectivity of language “insofar as an essential self-forgetfulness characterizes the 
performative character of speech,” but it “also proves to be a special case of meaning 
that has dissolved into and been embodied in the utterance” 403 that underlies the 
dynamic movement of concepts. The poem reminds us of the power of linguistic 
mediation, how our encounter with others in words illuminates the logic of the concept. 
The concept unfolds, therefore in our shared dialogues (as we theorize). 
                We own and do not own speech; in this paradox our lives are shaped. It is 
where the world and I always meet, where our original belonging together and the 
common path lies in truth and falsehood. Truth is the speculative encounter we have 
with language, which becomes a fundamental self-encounter. Self-attestation is 
inherent to our utterances about what is; conversation as theory is, therefore, always a 
matter of self-attestation (contrary to pure linguistic constructions) for it positions the 
truth of words in the vocalization of our own life-project – as the unity of expression 
and truth. Critics who fail to grasp this aspect of Gadamer’s poetics (and how it would 
impact the human sciences) do not understand the ethical paradox that is presented 
here. Gadamer says we need to “establish a new relationship to the concepts used,” 
specifically, when addressing truth in the human sciences. We note: (1) there is a gap 
between membership in society and the sovereignty of investigation (embodied, for 
example, in the methodological approach in the human sciences), and (2), this gap can 
only be bridged, in theory that does its work for the social sciences as thematized and 
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mediated by speech.  A new relationship to the concept is called upon in the human 
sciences. 
             Speech is the productive ambiguity of our metaphysical heritage (that in some 
ways we can see within Parmenides poetic and philosophic text) and, as we shall see, is 
at the heart of philosophy and has subsequently transferred itself into the heart of the 
human sciences. The human sciences, therefore, represent this paradox.  Speech is 
passing into the space where we intend to say something, and it, at the same time, 
moves us into a space where we understand ourselves; but this movement is also one 
where we give up something of our self. Poetic saying (as well as poetic texts) allows 
us to recognize: it is from language as a medium that our whole experience of the 
world, and especially hermeneutic experience, unfolds.  In summary: hermeneutics 
retrieves poetics in response to our modernity; consequently, hermeneutics retrieves 
theory from alienation.  
              Vattimo puts this succinctly by saying “if there were no commonality between 
[…] two interlocutors, or between the observer and the artwork (and in general between 
reader and any kind of text), dialogue would not even begin.” Vattimo argues the art 
work and the word always anticipate each other, for “a work is “understood” when it 
has de facto penetrated into our consciousness, when we are able to talk about it at least 
with ourselves, and when we assign to it (or recognize in it) a meaning.” 404  
              What can the relationship of poetics to the human sciences be? Poetics, the 
relationship between spoken and written word and the “languages of various arts”, as 
Vattimo puts it. Understanding and communication are no longer accidental 
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occurrences, he further notes, but have become more important: art is in need of the 
word.405 We return to Gadamer’s question: What makes a poet? Poets do not simply 
speak better, rather the poet translates the word into the yet to be said of conversation, 
in a communal partnership with language and the way the world opens up to us in the 
word. The question of the truth of speech is bound up with the poet’s saying. The 
paradox of truth happens in this alignment and tension between the claims of art 
(poetry) and the claims of theory.  In each instance, therefore we have to take into 
account how they both appropriate us, how we exist in a proximity to the word. 
                 In The Beginnings of Knowledge Gadamer reminds us:  
 
 [...] the concepts of objectivity and object are so alien to the immediate 
understanding in which human beings seek to make themselves at home 
in a world that, characteristically the Greek did not have terms for them.  
They did not speak of a “thing”. The Greek word that they were in the 
habit of using in this whole area is the word pragma, which, as foreign 
words go, is not entirely foreign to us and which refers to that within 
which we are entangled in the praxis of living; thus it refers not to that 
which stands over against us or opposed to us as something to be 
overcome, but rather to that within which we move and that with which 
we have to do.  This is an orientation that is marginalized by the modern 
global mastery that is structured by science and technology that 
grounds.406 
              
                The poet’s voice enlightens us to this truth that rests on a fixed proposition, 
while showing that the poem is equivalent to an ethical encounter. Heidegger said a 
poem is not metaphysics, meaning poetic words resist metaphysical thinking. Poetry, 
therefore, is an injunction to conceptual speech, a response to the ossification of the 
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word.  Poetic truth, then, challenges our understanding of what we might call scientific 
commonality.  
               First, it shows that our relation to each other is the result of how we occupy 
language as speakers. Second, it shows that our conceptual speech known as theory is 
indiscernible from what we learn from the poet’s experience of language. Theory, 
however, is not poetry. Sociology and poetry seemingly move in opposite directions. 
What Gadamer shows is that theory shares the communicative potential of poetry that 
places a limit on the tendency of modern theory toward self-objectification and the 
dehumanizing consequences of this. Words are a type of eidos. We enter the word 
because it brings forth meaning without an explicit interpretation. It brings us forth, but 
we cannot do this in un-moveable speech. Gadamer writes: “the unity of the word that 
explicates itself in the multiplicity of words manifests something that is not covered by 
the structure of logic and that brings out the character of language as event: the process 
of concept formation.” 
              Gerald Bruns tells us that it is poetry that changes our relationship to language 
as a whole. He further notes: “Poetry is an event – Gadamer calls it a ‘speculative 
event’ – in which language interrupts our attempts to reduce it conceptually and 
instrumentally; it takes itself out of our hands.” 407 In this juxtaposition of question lies 
the difficulty of the language of science and the human sciences but also a key to 
modernity. For the destiny of language converges and merges with the destiny of 
modernity in what Lacoue-Labrathe describes how the destiny of modernity imposes an 
“unknowing imperative” that requires being able to confront “what it is necessary to 
                                                
407 Bruns, “An Introduction to Gadamer’s Poetics,” in Gadamer and Celan, p. 7. 
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say, of  which, strictly speaking, we know nothing”. 408 This unknowing imperative is 
recognizing how we stand inside and outside western metaphysics just as the human 
sciences do. “We ourselves are the ones (thanks to the lasting effects of Plato’s artful 
dialogical compositions) who find ourselves addressed and who are called upon to 
account for what we are saying.”409 To put it in a simple formula, life is poetic, and the 
poem bears witness to this that we live in truth before we live in ‘science’. 
Baker reminds us, “When two people understand each other, this does not mean that 
one person ‘understands’ the other,” but means openness to others that invite us to a 
type of self-recognition.” A poetic of recognition. Further: “I must accept some things 
that are against me, even though no one else forces me to do so.” This saying is not a 
methodological saying. Poetic saying alerts us to the nature of the way we present 
something in speech as life.  “What poetry presents [das Dargestellte] and its 
presentation [die Darstellung] are the same.”410 Speaking is both a listening to and a 
saying that occurs in language. This cannot be thought of as an external or a controlled 
way. Our speculative achievement in the spoken word brings forth something because 
we intend it in our saying. 
                The expressive beauty of the Greek language (and is not Gadamer’s work 
guided by an assumption about the priority of the beautiful utterance?) concerns sharing 
with one another in conversation. Poetics and rhetoric are partners that hold open “the 
                                                
408 Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. Heidegger and the Politics of Poetry. Translated by Jeff 
Fort. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2007. Translators Introduction, p. xvi. 
409 Gadamer, Dialogue and Dialectic.  
410 Baker, “Lyric as Paradigm,” In The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer, p. 152. 
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possibility for developing philosophical concepts (recall Parmenides of Elea).”411 
Language is always intending concepts, but this is not a consequence of the language of 
modern science.  Sprachlichkiet [linguisticality], Gadamer describes as: “The way the 
voice is articulated as a speaking voice  - perhaps even when one reads without making 
any sound – suggests that writtenness [Schriftlichkeit], even that of the alphabet, is an 
articulation with a high level of complexity. The voice that the writer or reader “hears” 
as he or she writes or reads clearly attains a far higher level of articulation that could 
any possible writteness.”412 
                Hermeneutics, in effect, offers us an understanding for the de-objectification 
of theory, or at least, recognizing the tension between abstraction and the spoken word.  
We are present to others and ourselves in our speech – in the very way we speak.    
Language is speech as self-understanding as well as a reflection on language itself. In 
this unity lies the hermeneutic act of accounting for what is spoken by us to others. 
Inherent in the very telos of human speech is reaching toward understanding. This is 
neither the result of an objectification of speech, nor the transparency of the subject. 
“How so?” we ask.                   
             Our words, like the poet’s, resonate the whole of language and in so doing 
speak to a completeness of saying that is possible; where everything can be called forth 
as a movement between our finitude and infinity of the word. Furthermore, “what 
comes out of the word that speaks to us is not so much a single element of meaning in 
the world, but rather it is the presence of the whole, built and shared, through 
                                                
411 Gadamer, “Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and Language,” in Language and 
Linguisticality in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, p. 21. 
412 Gadamer, “Hermeneutics Tracking the Trace [On Derrida],”The Gadamer Reader, A 
Bouquet of the Later Writings, p. 389. 
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language.” Language binds and separates us, but interpreting is our belonging to one 
another.      
 
Celan and Hermeneutics 
             Celan stirs up the struggle that lies at the very center of hermeneutics; this 
struggle is to care for the achievement and understanding we communicate with the 
word.413 The truth of the word, as it were, is a caring for the other and caring for the 
word. One allows the right word to come forth; the other is for an ethics of 
communication. As Gadamer says, this care cannot be rule governed. We cannot fully 
account for language if we see it as an instrument. Gadamer in his exploration of the 
nature of theory is not simply a post-metaphysical quest, but an unearthing of the limits 
of the metaphysical desire for a foundation to our conceptuality. 
              Every poem, like art, calls to us for a responsible answer – a dialogue. Just as 
in friendship we dialogue with someone. Celan described his poems as dialogues in his 
Bremen Speech, dialogues that, nonetheless, reside in their difficulty or obscurity where 
the reader must face the question of reading and understanding (of their reinvented 
affiliation to the person or text). In The Meridian Speech he speaks of a distance or 
strangeness that constitutes all poetic communication, a communication that resides in 
the dialogue to encounter someone.  
                                                
413 Derrida remarks on the double struggle with language that the poems of Celan 
evoke, speaking of the death of language, specifically of the German language under 
Nazism, and another death that cannot not happen. The poet then acts as a witness who 
constitutes a kind of resurrection of the word: “the poet is someone who is permanently 
involved with a language that is dying and which he resurrects” to living experience. 
Derrida, Jacques. “Paul Celan and Language.” In Paul Celan: Selections. Edited by 
Pierre Joris. Stanford: University of California Press, 2005. p. 203. 
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               Celan’s poems provide “the scene of reading […] what the poem itself gives 
to be read,”414 Involving an address to oneself that calls for us to listen to what it has to 
say. This self-address may or may not reach any addressee, let alone oneself, but a 
poem’s withdrawal of address, nevertheless, still remains an address of the word – the 
said and unsaid of the word. In this scene of reading, identified by Derrida as a key to 
Gadamer’s encounter with the poet, especially his encounter with Celan, the 
significance of the poetic is shown by Derrida as simultaneously access to oneself and 
access to the other.  Something prevails over what I am before I distance it, “Before 
being me, I carry the other. [...] I must keep myself in your reach, but I must also be in 
your grasp.”415 
               In Celan’s “muted words” are a metaphysical questioning, something that is 
reached without appropriating the idea. That is to say, a poem is an event that marks the 
ideality of the word of language. Celan’s poems reflect upon the word what makes 
them possible as they proceed. The poem is an instance of what it wants to say.  
               Theory, insofar as it implies both a self-address, (a conversation with 
ourselves) includes that part of the speculative ideality (Plato) that invites each of us 
into a sharing of the word (of truth) in us and before us, that is carried forward as an 
interminable conversation, whose space is an interior dialogue with the other.416 
               Thinking in concepts, therefore, is not alien to the ordinary use of language, 
especially not to the poet. But our encounters are with and through language, especially 
                                                
414 Derrida, Jacques. “Rams.” In Sovereignties in Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan. 
New York: Fordham University Press, 2004. p. 162. 
415 Ibid. p. 162. 
416 Ibid. p. 163. 
 154 
in the poem, “the experience of the ownness and the foreignness of language.”417 
Concepts are not just pure invention but are part of our living encounter with the words 
of our living language. Theory, seen from this point of view, is an activity that 
addresses and embodies its own articulation too. Theory is then neither reducible nor 
verifiable, for its truth is expressed in the words given to us by the theorist as they are 
set forth for us.  
                The performative side of theory is the rhetorical creation of our space for 
dialogue. All conceptual means must first stand the test of art.418 What light does this 
claim about art shed on our verbal lives and verbal agency? By the test of art Gadamer 
refers to the truth of art as a model. Dialogue is not simply a theatrical setting (the 
spontaneity of conversation) as revealed in the Platonic dialogues; but rather, as with 
poet and philosopher, it is the habitat of living speech as a speculative word – that has 
an affinity to truth.  Failure to see this leads only to the “hubris of concepts,” as 
Gadamer notes: 
In everyday language as well as in the so-called Geisteswissenschaften 
(“human sciences”), everything that increases speech’s rich variety of 
reference and extends its capacity for knowledge can turn into confusion 
when everything depends on univocal denotation. The metaphorical nature 
of language makes definition necessary and justifies the use of artificial 
terminology. This cannot be introduced by means that wholly determinate 
language allows, but only through natural speech. The comparative 
particularity of scientific languages as they disassociate themselves within 
the overall phenomenon of language always stand in tension with the 
totality that binds us all together into a human society, our ability to speak, 
to seek and find words to communicate.419  
 
                                                
417 Ibid. p. 138. 
418 Gadamer, “The Greeks, Our Teachers,” in Heidegger’s Ways, p. 100. 
419 Gadamer, “The Expressive Force of Language: On the Function of Rhetoric in 
Gaining Knowledge,” in Praise of Theory Speeches and Essays, pp. 133-134 
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            The theorist’s identity reveals a paradox in our one-sided modernity, shows how 
the self-alienating effects of modern theory, making things said fall into safe 
statements, make us adverse to the risks of speaking,420 thus we are led into alienated 
forms of linguistic execution; while, on the other hand, the poetic word tells us how 
making things said concerns our being: our being “open to being said.”421  
             Poetry reveals the power of the truth of the word as an ethics of speech 
occurring without alienation.  Speech involves producing the right understanding with 
the right words. Jacques Lacan describes this as the ethics of “well saying,” echoing the 
Greeks and their sense of the beautiful. Poetry clarifies the question of truth’s paradox, 
and that as finite beings, searching continuously for the genuine rhetorical mode of our 
being, not only as poet, but as a theorist too.422   
 I have shown, with reference to several key texts by Gadamer, including “On 
the Truth of the Word”, “Word and Poetry”, “Plato and the Poets”, “On the 
Contribution of Poetry to the Search for Truth”, “What is Truth”, “Philosophy and 
Poetry”, “The Expressive Force of Language”, and “On the Function of Rhetoric in 
Gaining Knowledge”, how poetry unveils the truth of the word. We are thus provided 
with a conception of how the speculative concept holds us, such that we are not only 
attentive to what is being said but we can hear what the word wants to say. We describe 
                                                
420 “Language is such that whatever particular meaning a word may possess, words do 
not have a single unchanging meaning; rather, they possess a fluctuating range  of 
meanings, and precisely this fluctuation constitutes the peculiar risk of speaking.” See, 
Gadamer, “Language and Understanding,” in The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of the 
Later Writings, p. 106. 
421 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], p. 376. 
422 Quoted by Alain Badiou in “Language, Thought, Poetry,” in Badiou: Theoretical 
Writings, p. 235. 
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this as the performative validity of the utterance, the truth event of the word that exists 
without external justification.  
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Chapter 4  
 
 
 
  The Dialogue Between Ancient and Modern Theory 
 
 
 
 “[The] difference between Greek theoria and modern science is based, in my opinion, 
on different orientations to the verbal experience of the world.”423 
 
“…the living voice in the field of language retains the first and the last word. It is the 
word found in speaking that must be found again in reading texts, if the text is to 
speak.”424 
 
                
             In this chapter I focus on Gadamer’s account of Ancient theoria. The Greek 
concept of theoria challenges the traditional ideal of theory as scientific. The scientific 
norm of knowing requires a point of view about knowledge that lays claim to a social 
world of “objects” that theory then recognizes and grasps. I argue in this chapter that 
theoria, as understood by Plato, is rooted in living language in the dialectical play of the 
word (conversation), we perform in our saying. Gadamer is a Platonist insofar as he 
believes conceptual work lies in speech. Again, by looking at Gadamer’s relation to 
Plato (via Hegel and Heidegger), we illuminate the enactment of how the making of 
theoretical utterances is an intelligibility that occurs from natural language. Not found 
in rules, it is where we understand that the speculative side of language concerns how 
we are at home by not placing ourselves into a self-exile of alienating speech where we 
no longer belong with one another (miteinander). A key text in this regard is Gadamer’s 
                                                
423 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], p. 451.  
424 Gadamer, “Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and Language,” in Language and 
Lingusticality in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, p. 34. 
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concluding essay from The Beginning of Knowledge, “Greek Philosophy and Modern 
Thought”. In this essay, he emphasizes that the essential self-forgetfulness of speech 
that characterizes our ways of speaking, and that makes these things visible to us by 
bringing them into articulation. The key to this argument is that the instrumentalization 
of speech (the thematizing of language as if it were a tool) was already a distortion. The 
Greeks understood that the conflict between our world and our ideas was not an 
external struggle but a struggle within speech, a struggle against alien speech and an 
avoidance of discourse that would be alien to their souls. Speech regulates itself not by 
external rules but through the inner logic of showing. This is the truth that modernity 
hides, the necessity of the way we participate in speech (we cannot translate anything 
into language without speech, i.e. logos.  This power has an essential “non objectivity”, 
but sociology could not escape the implications of this energy that speaks to us from 
the inception of philosophy, for this is the difference between alienation and non-
alienation. 
             As Gadamer shows us, the Greeks remain relevant to understanding the 
question of theory. First I introduce a section on Gadamer and Donald Davidson, since 
Davidson's approach to the question of truth of our assertions offers a strong parallel 
with Gadamer’s arguments. They also share a similar interest in Plato’s Phaedrus. I 
also focus on Alan Blum use of Ancient theoria to directly illuminate the human 
sciences. 
            Gadamer’s early Plato’s Dialectical Ethics (1931) has deeply shaped his later 
thinking on hermeneutics with his claim: it is Plato who offers a clear account of why 
the dialectical openness of the dialogue is the root of theory. Second, that by 
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understanding Greek theoria we have access to understanding the problem of the self-
alienating effects of modern theory. By focusing of the shared nature of dialogue in 
Plato and the ethical function of the dialectic is reposting the problem of sophistry and 
linguistic abuse, Plato imparts to elements important to Gadamer's own recovery of the 
concept of theoria. In Praise of Theory, Gadamer tells us that modern theory has come 
to assume an instrumental form of language, and, unlike the Greeks, we detach 
ourselves from the living experience of theory as language.  Showing that the task of 
theory, as Plato establishes, is defined by the good and coming to live life. Blum, 
speaking of the figure of Socrates, in his study Socrates, puts it this way “Socrates 
brings life and theory together by urging us to remember that our examination and 
inquiry is our own way of amplifying a life.”425 
            Gadamer says, “thinking more Greek like is not so much thinking differently as 
it is thinking-with-an-other – a way of thinking which withdraws from our own 
thinking because our thinking is completely fixated on objectification, on overcoming 
the resistant character of the object in a percipient certainty of ourselves.”426 
            Modern theory presents the paradox of the human sciences, and from a 
hermeneutic viewpoint, discovers that we are alienated from our speech. Theory then is 
alienating, insofar, as has become a mode of self-alienation whereby language 
naturalizes us rather than opens us to truth. What Plato could be said to have predicted, 
or saw as the key to preventing the affirmation of the struggle to say things with the 
force of the good and the beautiful in view, had become instead a condition where 
“academic theory” inhibits truth saying and access to things in their truth. In contrast, 
                                                
425 Blum, Alan, Socrates, The Origin and Its Image, p. 2. 
426 Gadamer, “The Greeks,” in Heidegger’s Ways, p. 147. 
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then, to modern theory, with its abstractive and objectifying ways of thinking, theory 
should, as Gadamer says, be recognized as a communicative participation in the world, 
as an action (not to be confused with a pragmatist sense of usefulness), as we live in the 
practice of theoria which concerns the way we, simultaneously, share ourselves with 
others.427 
              When Gadamer asks us to take seriously his title, Truth and Method, because 
“... what method defines is precisely not truth,”428 he is asking that we consider the 
question of theory and truth. When he further asks: “Is there perhaps more to theory 
than what the modern institution of science represents for us?”429 He means that the 
human sciences, having encoded themselves in the region of method and an 
instrumental conception of theory, have alienated themselves from the way language 
conveys truth. In having adopted a modernist prejudice toward language,430 they 
misunderstand their own truth claims that underlie the creation of social knowledge, 
and that inform all their practices.  
                                                
427 A model here would be “friendship,” a topic Gadamer has discussed in his writings. 
He has written that, “The Greek concept of the friend articulated the complete life of 
society.”  “Europe and the Humanities,” in Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, 
Poetry, and History: Applied Hermeneutics, p. 218. Although the theme is not 
discussed in our work, Gadamer writes extensively on friendship and theory, see for 
example, “Friendship and Self-Knowledge: Reflections on the Role of Friendship in 
Greek Ethics”, while, we find Alan Blum discussing this connection in his study, 
Socrates, where he wrote, “Friendliness to Socrates is then personified in the desire to 
keep life and theory together, whereas enmity is reflected in their segregation.” 
Socrates The Origin and Its Image, p. 8. 
428 Gadamer, Gadamer in Conversation, Reflections and Commentary, p. 55. 
429 Gadamer, “Praise of Theory,” in Praise of Theory, Speeches & Essays, p. 24. See 
also, Gadamer, Hans-Georg. “Philosophy or Theory of Science?” In Reason in the Age 
of Science. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001. 
430 The definition of sociology comes to be understood as a methodological debate 
concerned with the question of contrasting “academic” methods. 
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              That is why he states: “In my book Truth and Method, I began my 
considerations first of all with art, and not with the human sciences. Even within the 
“human sciences” it is an art that brings the basic questions of human beings to our 
attention in such a unique way...”431 He insists that the human sciences lie close to the 
rhetorical aspects of language and reveal to us what the poem significantly tells us 
about the way we use language. In summary, the compelling truth of theory lies closer 
to art than to science. 
                   
Gadamer and Davidson on the Proposition 
                   Genuine sharing and being present is where, in dialogue, truth is to be 
found, as Gadamer says, that is not contingent on a proposition.432  Conceptual thought 
concerns how intelligibility is mediated linguistically. In Gadamer’s view, then, the 
world is perpetually mediated through concepts but this does not mean that the world is 
created by concepts. Put another way, we experience the world through our natural 
conceptuality (the fundamental linguisticality of understanding) that found all our 
claims to know the world. This does not mean, as David Vessey for example, has said, 
contrasting Gadamer and Davidson, that we still do experience things for which we 
have no words.433 How does theory make the world visible in its compositional 
structure?  
                                                
431 Gadamer, “From Word to Concept,” in The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of the 
Later Writings, p. 115. 
432 Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science, pp. 17-18. 
433 Versey argues that an important difference arises in the respective work of Gadamer 
and Davison on the question of language and incommensurability of conceptual 
schemes. While they share a similar viewpoint, there is, notes Versey, “a deeper 
disagreement about the relation of thought and the world. For Davidson, the 
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             Davidson states clearly “That no theory of metaphorical meaning can help 
explain how metaphor works. Metaphor runs on the same tracks that the plainest 
sentences do…”434 Language for both Davidson and Gadamer is not a tool nor does it 
determine our experiences but allows us to articulate them, that is how we articulate 
“facts” to for all that we say are facts are articulated as hermeneutic facts. Gadamer also 
makes the claim that linguisticality guides all understanding but this “cannot mean that 
all experiencing of the world can only take place as and in language…Who would deny 
that there are real factors conditioning human life, such as hunger, love, labor, and 
domination, which are not themselves language or speaking, but which for their part 
furnish the space within which our speaking to each other and listening to each other 
can take place. This fact cannot be disputed.”435 
             Vessey further explains, countering any sense of linguistic idealism that might 
appear to attach itself to Gadamer’s views, that “our experiences are not determined by 
language, but simply call for articulation in language,” noting that, “perception is both 
conceptual all the way down and yet provides the friction with the world needed to 
confirm, revise, or reject belief.”436 And, for Gadamer: “in truth [...] the illusion that 
things precede their manifestation in language conceals the fundamentally linguistic 
                                                                                                                                         
relationship is casual, and this thesis is a key element in the argument against 
incommensurability. For Gadamer, the relationship is linguistic, and this forms a key 
element in his argument against incommensurability.” See, Vessey, David. “Davidson, 
Gadamer, Incommensurability, and the Third Dogma of Empiricism.” In Dialogues 
with Davidson: Acting, Interpreting, Understanding. Edited by Jeff Malpas. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2011. p. 255. 
434 Quoted in Bruns, Gerald L. “Donald Davidson Among the Outcasts.” In Tragic 
Thoughts at the End of Philosophy, p. 43. 
435 Gadamer, “Reflections on My Philosophical Journey,” in The Philosophy of Hans-
Georg Gadamer, Library of Living Philosophers, p.43. 
436 See, Vessey, “Davidson, Gadamer, Incommensurability, and the Third Dogma of 
Empiricism,” in Dialogues with Davidson: Acting, Interpreting, Understanding, p. 253. 
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character of our experience of the world.”437  In other words, our experience of the 
world is not determined by language but happens in language. Western metaphysics 
encodes how we see language and dominates our experience of the world, thus, we are 
already constructing our relationship to world and others in a mono-logical form that 
misrepresents the true nature of the relationship of thought to the world.  By placing 
perception apart from our linguistic experience of the world, the human sciences 
seemingly contradict the linguistic nature of experience, creating a false image of our 
relationship to theory. Vessey puts it this way, “language [for Gadamer] does not 
supplement the non-conceptual elements, it introduces a whole new way of responding 
to experience, of taking up experience propositionally, in short, of making experiences 
intelligible to us and others through language.”  438 
            Our verbal orientation to theoretical communication is built on rhetoric of 
distance and the facts of evidence, as fundamental to the transcendental grounding of 
science [i.e. knowledge is a scientific task, which is itself a self-justifying idea].  By 
giving ontological priority however to speech, truth is the participation of speakers in 
conversation, in contrast to a monological communication. We have culturally 
assimilated a technique that conceals our speaking, as if, in some way, our scientific 
speaking masters or resolves the rhetorical.439 A paradox haunts the discourse of social 
sciences because, in fact, the human sciences challenge “science” and this challenge is 
their truth. Theoretical statements become restricted if they are estranged from the 
                                                
437 Gadamer, “The Nature of Language and the nature of Things,” in Philosophical 
Hermeneutics, p. 77. 
438 Vessey, “Davidson, Gadamer, Incommensurability, and the Third Dogma”, in 
Dialogues with Davidson: Acting, Interpreting, Understanding, p. 252. 
439 Outlined by many theorist and writers as they struggled with this question, first 
summarized when Richard Brown published his work, A Poetic For Sociology, in 1977. 
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hermeneutic dimension of truth,440 a consequence of the rise of the empirical sciences 
and the way in which they have come to subordinate the long tradition of rhetoric.  
              How we theorize in this modern institutional viewpoint of science (where the 
knowing subject struggles in opposition to their own ethics of speech) requires us to 
recognize that language exists apart from science, while still seeing how our mediation 
in linguistic sharing enables us to also share objects of discussion in a potentially 
intelligible world, where again, we can shape new concepts to see this world in other 
ways.   
              We need to see, as Gadamer says, the universal linguistic social partnership of 
the hermeneutic dimension of language.441 Systems of methodological approximations 
of truth, and their “naïve objectivism” [nominalism of scientific speech, the world is 
there as an objective realm before their gaze] creates a paradox for us: how is the world 
intelligible and how do we make it intelligible without binding ourselves to treating 
concepts as schematic and secondary to life?   
             How might the human sciences come to know themselves in a hermeneutic 
reconstruction? As we try to understand their knowledge claims. For Gadamer, this is a 
                                                
440 “The Ideal of a completed Enlightenment refutes itself precisely within the human 
sciences. Their particular task is to remain always mindful of their own finitude and 
historical conditioning in scholarly work and to resist the self-apotheosis of the 
Enlightenment. They cannot release themselves from the responsibility which stems  
from the fact that they have an effect.” Gadamer, “Truth in the Human Sciences,” in 
Hermeneutics and Truth, p. 31. 
441 Gadamer, “Philosophy or Theory of Science?” in Reason in the Age of Science, pp. 
166-167.  When we examine our social life it is that it “offer[s] less an objective field 
for the scientific mastery of a subject matter or the extension of our domination by 
knowledge of the unknown than a mediation of ourselves with our real possibilities 
engulfing us – with what can be and what is capable of happening to and becoming of 
us.” p. 167. 
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matter of how we experience the truth of speech and share it with others.442 Our 
scientific speaking ultimately, then, presses the hermeneutic truth of the human 
sciences upon us as a concern for a relationship to theorizing that is neither alienating 
to us or to the public. Witnessed, for example, in various historical attempts to speak of 
the human sciences as somehow akin to art or humanism or as having a more complex 
linguistic relationship to logic or theorizing.443  The question of theory is, as it were, a 
repeated effort to reframe what the social theorist is doing, a story that is repeated. 
           We use the term theory broadly to describe a specific way of producing speech, 
mostly following Gadamer, in terms of both a Greek and a modern conception, e.g. as 
in “Praise of Theory” [Theoria]. We also note the peculiar way theory is described in 
sociology, just as sociology is sometimes described with difficulty. For example, when 
describing sociology in Thinking Sociologically by Zygmunt Bauman and Tim May, 
where we find generalizations that describe what it is [social theory, or what a 
sociologist does] that read like a parody of Plato, or a generalized version of Plato’s 
construction of the theoretical utterance: of theory. The momentary confusion is 
understandable, because inadvertently they describe sociology in terms of concerns 
                                                
442 See, the Introduction to Zygmunt Bauman and Tim May’s Thinking Sociologically. 
Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2001, which amplifies the tension 
between ethics and modern metaphysics. 
443 We see this, for example, in the unfolding of Robert K. Merton’s career (who yet 
remains very much within the horizon of traditional sociology), with his turn to the 
linguistic performance of the theorist in the human sciences. Merton’s interest in the 
“unintended consequences of social action,” his “methodological” interest in “the logic 
of theorizing,” his work in the “history and sociology of science,” and his “enduring 
engagement with neologisms that are needed to describe newly discovered phenomena 
and newly emerging ideas.” Merton, Robert K. The Travels and Adventures of 
Serendipity: A Study in Sociological Semantics and the Sociology of Science.  Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004. p. 235. 
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common to the aims of the Platonic dialogues. So perhaps it will come as no surprise 
that the term theory is used to mean, modern theory and social theory. 
 
Living in the Questionableness of Speech 
             Truth, for the human sciences is not simply to do with the heritage of its 
scientific way of speaking, with its objectivism, for example, but in seeing the very 
conditionedness of all knowing, [our “historically effected consciousness”] – how truth 
occurs in this very condition, which Gadamer describes as the “questionableness of all 
speech.”444 Every human being, as the Greeks recognized, stood in this condition of 
speech, outside of which there is no self-transparency that can be had. But, as we know, 
it is this very questionablness of speech that is seen as an obstacle to scientific practice, 
conceived in terms of the neutralization of the activity of speech that is thought to be 
needed to “overcome” with unitary models of knowledge. 445  
              Science’s public truth is the absence of contradiction. By looking at the 
dialectic of the word [the play of the word] as dialogue, any conversion of the nature of 
critical speech into a neutral place from which to speak: as in the “language” of 
“science,” requires an alienation. The way we make speeches, the very art of making 
knowledge (talking something through with ourselves and others), concerns how we 
enter into discourse while in our understanding something will always remain 
unspoken, lying in the background to what we can say and understand. The true, in 
                                                
444 Gadamer, “Truth in the Human Sciences,” in Hermeneutics and Truth, p. 27. 
445 Otherwise we are always constructing synthetic models that attempt to overcome the 
initial alienation imposed on speech is yet another codification of scientific thinking. 
For example, we see this in Interpretation and Social Knowledge, where the struggle to 
find an acceptable conception of social knowledge becomes a reconciliation of 
alienated modes of thinking. 
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hermeneutics, then, concerns the way our rhetorical forms [speech] bring us to 
knowledge. Rather than being built on a hermeneutic conception of speech, the birth of 
sociology is built on a conception of science that embodies a (hidden) crisis. Thus, they 
cannot, in reality, conceal the tension between scientific knowing and belonging.  Our 
being with ourselves, our being on speaking terms with ourselves becomes reified into 
a practice of estranged knowing (speaking) that estranges us from truth in itself.  
               This paradox is familiar to the human sciences, especially, to the sociologist, 
since the “tension between life world and system has long been a master theme in 
sociology”.446 We build our communal bonds through speech, we note the problem (of 
our experience with language) in the way we are learning and sharing our learning, for 
we remain “active participants in the commonality of our [hermeneutic] experience of 
the world,”447 even when we attempt to locate our speaking in a methodological 
understanding that restricts self-understanding.448 
 
Gadamer and the Greek Conception of Theory 
             The Greeks understood this since they understood both the paradox of learning  
and the paradox of speech. For the Greeks truth is not simply about things [detached 
objects] but about us, about belonging. Truth was a belonging that was already known 
                                                
446 Selznick, Philip. The Moral Commonwealth, Social Theory and the Promise of 
Community. Stanford: University of California Press, 1992. p. 256. 
447 Gadamer, “Hermeneutics a Theoretical Task and a Practical Task,” in Reason in the 
Age of Science, p. 110. 
448 Gadamer, “On the Natural Inclination Toward Philosophy,” in Reason in the Age of 
Science, p.146. 
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to the Greeks, not known as a methodic experience, as we moderns interpret it.449 
Gadamer does not resist science and its advances, rather he questions the way truth has 
become truth as scientific practice by, as Vattimo says,  “putting forward an idea of 
truth as belonging that was already known to the Greeks and which can still be traced 
as a minor theme in modernity.”450 
             Knowledge and truth are exposed in this relationship to the Greeks. Modern 
science avoids finality and history. In this way, Gadamer, by drawing upon the Greeks, 
exposes why truth is the key problem of the human sciences, thus why the dialogue 
between Gadamer, Apel and Habermas captures the essential divide between two views 
of truth and argumentation.451 The human sciences, no matter how they define their 
knowledge, are already pointing back to their unquestioned metaphysical basis: the 
origins of the theoretical utterance. Gadamer asks, how could the wholeness, or 
oneness, of our theoretical utterances be a consequence of statements or method 
[scientific logic], since we shape words through the natural conceptuality of our 
speech?452  Consequently, does not social theory point back to this founding aspect of 
theory-speech to speech,453 to something the Greeks understood? 
                                                
449  Vattimo, Gianni. “Ethics of Communication or Interpretation?” In The Transparent 
Society, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1992. p. 115. 
450 Ibid.  p. 115. 
451 Vattimo discusses the interconnection between Apel and Gadamer, one in which he 
claims they strive for something similar in terms of their seeking to provide an ethics of 
rational argumentation. By “separating hermeneutics, claims Vattimo, in its canonical 
Gadamerian form from the ethics of communication of writers such as Apel and 
Habermas,” we understand these positions “are not really far apart.” He goes on, “To 
be precise Apel and Habermas make explicit a transcendental attitude that Gadamer 
rejects, but which remains as an almost unavoidable risk for philosophy...” Vattimo, 
“Ethics of Communication or Interpretation?” p. 109. 
452 Gadamer discusses at length Plato and the question of appearances and ideas, in 
Gadamer, “The Question at Issue,” in The Idea of the Good in Plato and Aristotelian 
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              To see this is to recognize something that comes down from the Greeks: the 
difference between the Greek view of science and the modern view of science, not only 
with regard to the concept of physis and their relationship to the physical world, but 
more importantly, concerning the way we experience the word. Thus, as Gadamer will 
show, this impacts our conception of theory.  
               Language, Gadamer asserts: 
Is one of the phenomena most pervasive in showing its non-objectifiability, in 
that an essential self-forgetfulness resides in the character of speaking as 
something that is carried out or performed. When the modern description of 
language tries to picture language as an instrument or means of speaking, this 
always already technology-based distortion in which words and word 
combinations are imagined to be held in readiness in a kind of stockpile, and 
are simply applied to something one encounters. The superiority of the 
contrasting Greek view of language is overwhelmingly evident here. The 
Greeks had no word at all for language. They only had a word for the tongue, 
which brought forth the sounds of language – gotta – and they had a word for 
the thing that is communicated through language: logos. Precisely in the word 
“logos” something is brought into view, which is essentially related to the 
inner self-forgetfuness of speaking, which is evoked through the speaking, 
and which is raised into presence in speaking. One moves into a world that is 
created by the availability and communicative sharing that happens in 
speaking.”454 
 
              This description captures many features of Gadamer’s view of language and 
the reasons for our alienation from speech. First, a misleading understanding of 
language has been assimilated into the world of scientific thinking that remains 
                                                                                                                                         
Philosophy.  Here he remarks: “Did Plato really underestimate the problem of 
participation of the appearances in the ideas? […] Or, do both postulations belong 
together: the ideas being for themselves, the so-called chorismos (separation), and the 
difficulty, to which one is thereby exposed, concerning participation, or methexis, as it 
is called? Could it be that chorismos and methexis go together from the start? pp. 9-10. 
453 Gadamer, “Truth in the Human Sciences,” in Hermeneutics and Truth, p. 32. 
Meaning, to put it simply, that the speech of the human sciences determines their truth, 
or their conception of theory determines truth. 
454 Gadamer, “Greek Philosophy and Modern Thinking,” in The Gadamer Reader: A 
Bouquet of the Later Writings, p. 273. 
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unaccountable; second, a taken-for-granted view of science and language now 
dominates the discussion of what theory is, and finally, theory is restricted to a 
conception that cannot describe what really happens in the human sciences.  
             For Gadamer, that which is masterable against is set against that which is 
intelligible. Language is the same, as we see in the above quote: therefore the 
misconception of language that Gadamer speaks of, results in a misconception of 
theory. Gadamer points to his own view of theory in the distinction between the 
masterable and the intelligible. Theoretical curiosity, the very basis of theory, is to be 
found in this early Greek view, but not simply the self-evident presupposition that we 
can know as objects, rather it is a concern with a different matter, which is, how we are 
making ourselves at home as we master a technique, say as in doing “science”? This 
twofold movement concerns the double movement of technical alienation and worldly 
alienation.  
            With Gadamer we look back to the Greeks avoiding a modernist prejudice that 
is the mark of the hermeneutic relationship. A relationship, nonetheless, that goes back 
to a conflict in readings of Plato and Aristotle.  
 
Alan Blum on the Ancients 
              Alan Blum’s work Theorizing, in part, influenced by ethnomethodology, takes 
guidance from the Greeks, as did Gouldner. Blum outlines a distinction between Plato 
and Aristotle, to provide him with his conception of theory as: the togetherness of 
speech and logos. But Blum’s goal is to show why sociology specifically reproduces 
itself in its speech in a circular self-justifying motion. Here is his characterization of 
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what happens: “talk about ‘solving problems’ then permits the sociologist to speak as if 
he has an independent criterion for deciding the adequacy of sociology because it 
sounds as if the problem is external to sociologizing itself rather than a producer of its 
creation. Sociology uses this criterion as grounds of its authority and as a test of its 
claims and it can only do so by treating the problem (the other) as external to its 
language.”455 
            Blum states that, “Aristotle’s theorizing ends where Plato’s begins, for it is the 
communal rationality which Plato accepts as his point of departure,” something 
Gouldner does not see. “In Aristotle, Dialectic come to be paradigmatically personified 
as the conflict between the individual and society (between the individual as 
‘perspectival experience’ and society as the standard of warranting speech which is 
independent of such contingencies); whereas Dialectic for Plato is exemplified in a 
conflict within the should between the goal to which thought aspires and the restrictions 
under which it labors.”456 Without commenting on Blum’s language, we note a key 
point he makes about the reception of Plato that is made in light of the question of how 
we perceive theory. Blum says a difference lies in they way they take up speech. The 
important point is that “Plato shows thinking – which is a conversation with the soul – 
through the icon of the external social encounter as that encounter dramatically gathers 
the togetherness of speech and logos.”457 Blum understands that traditional sociology is 
built on the model of science that ironically somehow impedes the impulse to theorize.  
                                                
455 Blum, Alan. Theorizing. London: Heinemann, 1974. p. 238. 
456 See, Blum, “Aristotle’s Problem,” in Theorizing, p. 14. 
457 Ibid. p. 17. 
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            Blum says we have lost sight of what the Greeks had shown us about speech. In 
other words, the social sciences had adopted a view of language that is already a 
production of an understanding of what speech is, that, to put it simply, acquires a 
metaphorical stability. Modern theory however creates a type of disunity within its own 
normative and metaphorical expressions. So not only are we concerned with the 
manipulation of objects but also with the technical manipulation of language 
(sophistry).458 A manipulation that conceals the reality of theorizing in the way the 
theorist, to quote Alan Blum, “shows what he shares with all men by exemplifying  
what he writes about in his very writing.”459 
              He writes: “In this thinking (Greek), humanity’s ‘being there at home’ in the 
world signifies the inner correspondence between ‘coming to be at home’ and ‘making 
oneself at home’ that characterised the craftsman, the expert, the creator of new shapes 
and forms, the technites, the man who masters a technique and at the same time finds 
his proper place.” This leads to the characterization of the theorist’s self-relation in this 
way: “this is why it [theory] requires the discovery of a free space of creative 
production that will be available to him in the middle of a pre-given nature, a 
wholeness of the world that orders itself in shapes and forms. Thus, philosophy in the 
                                                
458 Blum in his study of the Ancient Greeks, Theorizing, recognizes that the question of 
speech, language as communal, ultimately informs theory: “Theorizing does not create 
community, but affirms it; theorizing is not guided by the desire to establish a 
community of speakers and hearers, but the Desire to expose its self same commitment 
to a conception of that which makes speaking and hearing intelligible as the speaking 
that is hearing. Theorizing does not bring speakers and hearers together but affirms 
their togetherness in its very act of speaking. Theorizing does not seek to bring speaker 
and hearer together because theorizing is a speaking that is a hearing.” p.182. Blum 
adds by writing: “Theorizing justifies itself on the grounds of its claim to re-produce (a 
record) that which it records (growth and sharing) as the same kind of thing (as an 
instance of sharing).” p. 132. 
459 Ibid. p. 131. 
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Greek awakening is the thoughtful becoming aware of the enormous exposure of 
human beings within the “there”, within this tiny field of free space that the ordered 
whole of the course of nature allows for human will and human ability.”460 
                  For Gadamer, the Greek view of physis, is different for the moderns, the 
difference is that in excluding one aspect of the path to knowledge it leaves a legacy 
that turns what is understandable into what is masterable – science, as master, authority, 
force, and power.  He writes that in opposition to this “constructivism“ of modern 
sciences, which only accepts as known and understood what it can reproduce, the 
Greek conception of sciences was characterized by physis, that is, by the horizon of the 
existence of the order of the thing that shows itself out of itself and regulates itself,” In 
this way, we can begin to see why modern theory repeats a story, with a type of silence 
toward language, that excludes the fuller dimension of their own truth, and, in turn, 
restricts the human sciences view of theory. So the Greek heritage has to be considered 
if we are to have a full grasp of the question of what theory in the human sciences 
really includes. The question, underlying theory, and theory construction, is the 
question “to what extent the ancient heritage offers a truth that remains concealed from 
us under the peculiar conditions of modernity.”461 
                Once again, Gadamer builds on Heidegger’s thinking as well as the Greeks 
(especially Plato) to illuminate the nature of concept creation and thus theory. Brice R. 
Wachterhauser makes clear that a lot of misunderstanding of Gadamer’s work resides 
                                                
460 Gadamer, “Greek Philosophy and Modern Thought,” in The Beginnings of 
Knowledge, p. 120. 
461 Ibid. p. 123. 
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in failing to understand his deep ties to Plato.462 Gadamer’s work is an encounter with 
Western philosophy that consists in finding a path back to the original Greek 
experience of language,463 something that is indebted to Heidegger and which becomes 
a founding point for his discussion of theory, and consequently, his critique of 
objectification and the human sciences. Gadamer seeks to show how theory retains 
something of the primacy of our encounter and belonging that happens in speaking. In 
this way, Gadamer sets forth, in some measure, to give an answer to his own question 
about the nature of theory in the human sciences.  
 
 
The Ancients and the Objectification of Theory               
              Ancient Greek thinking already anticipates and reveals the limits of the 
objectification of speech that arises out of scientific speaking. Our understanding of 
truth is concealed under the objectification of speech.  According to Gadamer, “If we 
keep this in mind, we will no longer confuse the factualness (Sachlichkeit) of language 
with the objectivity (Objektivitat) of science.” Language is not imposed in some 
rationalized fashion upon an indifferent world. Brice Wachterhauser, paraphrasing 
Gadamer, says, “Language ‘participates’ in intelligibility and the intelligibility of 
reality ‘participates’ in the intelligibility of language.”464 
                                                
462 Ibid. p. 8. 
463 Gadamer, “Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and Language,”  in Language and 
Lingusticality in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, p. 41. 
464 Wachterhauser, Brice R. Beyond Being, Gadamer’s Post-Platonic Hermeneutic 
Ontology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1999. p. 9. 
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            The human sciences resistance to seeing speech as the “grounds” of theory 
brings them into a fundamental misunderstanding for “everything they do increases 
speech’s rich variety of reference and extends its capacity for containing knowledge 
[but this] can turn into confusion when everything depends on univocal denotation.”465  
As Gadamer says “The comparative particularity of scientific languages as they 
dissociate themselves from the overall phenomenon of language always stands in 
tension with the totality that binds us all together into a humane society, our ability to 
speak, to seek and find words to communicate.”466 
             Consequently, “in the logic of the social sciences as a field of study,” says 
Gadamer, “the hermeneutic problem acquires new importance. One must recognize the 
fact that the hermeneutical dimension plays a basic role in all experience of the world 
and therefore also plays a role even in the work of the Natural sciences, as Thomas 
Kuhn has shown. But this holds ever more strongly in the human sciences. For insofar 
as society is always a linguistically understood existence,”467 so, as with all 
philosophical labor with concepts, all theory too, is based on a hermeneutical 
dimension of intelligibility, as it mutually appears in words and things.468  
              To overcome nominalistic speech, we must assert the power that comes from 
humans speaking to one another, which is not about “statements,” in the sense of 
logical judgments, “whose univocity and meaning is confirmable and repeatable,” 
                                                
465 Gadamer, Hans-Georg “The Expressive Force of Language”, On the Function of 
Rhetoric in Gaining Knowledge, in Praise of Theory, Speeches and Essays, translated 
by Chris Dawson, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1998. pp. 133-134. 
466 Ibid. p. 134. 
467 Gadamer, “Classical and Philosophical Hermeneutics,” The Gadamer Reader: A 
Bouquet of the Later Writings, p. 67. 
468 Ibid. p. 66. 
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rather recognizing that “they have their occasional side.”469 In other words, they reside 
in the very possibility of speech.  A recovery can happen in this moment when the 
linguistically mediated content of our utterances is accepted as key to theory making. 
              What theory, then, shares with truth (aletheia), beauty (kalon) and the idea of 
the good, is that they are not ends in themselves. Beauty, for example, is essential to 
Gadamer’s thinking insofar as it shows that the power of each concerns their manner of 
self-presentation. The force of truth is at play in theory, and theory itself, as the power 
of reason, cannot simply be a disposition toward the abstract. Rather it is better 
understood as the way we self-critically occupy ourselves with, in our linguistic 
belonging and disclosure, theory making. 
              The difference, here, is what theory is and what science represents theory to 
be. Gadamer treats theory as an emergent part of our eternal shared conversation – 
rooted in the natural conceptuality of language – with others. How are we to understand 
theory: is it the distance involved in methods we apply, or, is it in fact, part of what is 
brought together by the lyrical structure of speech?  For the Greeks theoria is “to have 
been given away to something that in virtue of its overwhelming presence is accessible 
and common to all.”470   
            Science, to put it simply, retains this truth. Mathematics reveals to us a model of 
discursive thought that isolates its assertions, that builds a storehouse of ideas, falls 
short and remains insufficient, because it assumes an “objectifying split” between 
                                                
469 Ibid. p. 63. 
470 Vattimo is quoting one of Gadamer’s essays from Die Vernuft im Zeiter der 
Wissenschaft. 
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subject and object.471 Mathematics, then, illuminates this discontinuity in a specifically 
productive way (for mathematical reason), but as Badiou would say, it remains a truth 
that “fails to achieve the form of wisdom.”472 So when Gadamer contends that the 
human sciences, the Geisteswissenschaften, are a hermeneutical problem not a scientific 
one, he is alluding to the limits of scientific assertions as a vocabulary that would 
illuminate the human sciences. Therefore, the fate of truth, in the legacy of western 
rationality and science, has hidden the wisdom of theory as the continuity between truth 
and knowledge.473  
            What was radically important to the Greeks, as we shall see, was to bring forth 
our being at home within our being – the whole, as well as truth, that had become 
hidden to us. The speculative nature of the being of language is crucial to theory. In 
Gadamer’s vision, language and theory have an ontological significance for us; theory 
is a hermeneutic problem not a technical problem (as it was in classical sociology). The 
recovery of theory then, in this regard, becomes a recovery of speech, the living culture 
of speech that always precedes the man-made order of method. 
            Consequently, truth is displaced into a self-certification in speech. Such 
orthodoxy rests on the idea that, “The primacy of self-consciousness is the primacy of 
                                                
471 Ibid. p. 133. 
472  Badiou, Alain. “Philosophy and Mathematics.” In Conditions. London: Continuum, 
2008. p. 104. 
473 Badiou describes at length the specific way truth in mathematics create a 
intermediary position, beyond opinion and everyday communication, and, as Badiou 
says, this means that: “Mathematics is animated by an obscure violence, it is because 
the only thing that makes it superior to opinion is its discontinuity.” Badiou, Alain. 
“Mathematics and Philosophy: The Grand Style and the Little Style.” In Alain Badiou: 
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method.”474  The grammar of method is assumed, not questioned. Habermas describes 
this thinking in these terms: “Hermeneutics defines its task in contrast to linguistic 
descriptions of different grammars,”475 adding that Gadamer’s critique of “false 
objectivity of understanding,” cannot, however, lead to the suspension of the 
methodological distancing of the object that distinguishes a reflective understanding 
from every communicative experience.”476 
              The very unreliability of our daily expressions and utterances, the words we 
struggle with, the risks we take, allows us to bring forth understanding and the claim to 
truth in our words.477 Language, then, is where beings reveal themselves and their 
concepts. Eloquent speech, then, concerns the unity of life and theory (wisdom) where 
the word as concept is not put in the mouths of the audience impel a certain response 
and disposition. Truth cannot be encompassed or “approached by objectivization and 
treated as methodological objects.”478  The truth of the word, then, the way the meaning 
is shaped, words that assume the abstraction of scientific thinking have already created 
a disposition in the listener. 
              Habermas claims that Gadamer inserts an “abstract opposition” between truth 
and method. But is this so?  Habermas does not want to accept a conception of truth as 
disclosive. As we seek to be perfected beings of our scientific understanding, however 
we remain the uneasy participants of modernity. Our constant need for scientific 
                                                
474 Gadamer, Praise of Theory: Speeches & Essays, p. 29. 
475 Habermas, Jurgen. On the Logic of the Social Sciences, Cambridge Massachusetts: 
MIT. p. 144. 
476 Ibid. p. 167. 
477 Ibid. p. 16. 
478 Ibid. p. 29. 
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reassurance breeds new insecurities.479 The human sciences, therefore, contain a self-
obscuring horizon, resulting in a self-alienation in being-with-oneself, since truth and 
falsehood take place only within a framework that does not match our aspirations 
regarding our possibility for life and theory. What is meant by eloquence, here, remains 
centrally important to Gadamer’s sense of how theory and the good combine in our 
living eloquence. 
                Habermas speaks of the “complementary oscillation between proximity and 
distance” that permits subjects who are “transparent to themselves and others in what 
they actually do and believe and, if necessary, can translate their non-verbal 
expressions into linguistic utterances.”480 Upon these thoughts Habermas builds his 
conception of the ideal speech situation. For, as he writes, “to this reciprocity of 
unimpaired self-representations there corresponds a complementary reciprocity of 
expectations about behavior...”481 But the ideal speech model cannot correspond to the 
living way theory happens, since it is not an ideal that is occurring, but an escape from 
objectification and self-objectification. Since, with this conception, speaking is the 
ground of our openness, and not a vision of the domination of speech that stems from 
logos, “which was conceived as the foundation which penetrates the existing things in 
its ‘what’ and ‘how’ and ‘whereby’.”482 
              By taking up the theme of intimacy, sharedness, and community, Gadamer can 
address the question of alienation in the life of the theorist. Intimacy, for Gadamer, 
                                                
479 Many sociologists have discussed this theme, and, as we discuss, Giddens has 
chosen the theme of “disembedding” as one of the hallmarks of modernity. See his 
Consequences of Modernity, for example. 
480 Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences, p. 99. 
481 Ibid. p. 99-103. 
482 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], p. 375. 
 180 
concerns our belonging to speech, in the words we use, also our saying “something that 
only language knows.”483 Gadamer is seeking, as it were, a listening to speech, a power 
to hear and make words heard among speakers.484  The validity of what is said cannot 
simply be the realm of propositions and verification of statements. When we think of 
language as a controlling force, one that can produce clarity, we miss the true nature of 
understanding and speech. For here, as Gadamer writes: “Self-presentation and being 
understood belong together not only in that the one passes into the other, and the work 
of art is one with the history of its effects, and traditional is one with the present of its 
being understood; speculative language, distinguishing itself from itself, presenting 
itself, language that expresses meaning is not only art and history but everything insofar 
as it can be understood. The speculative character of being that is the ground of 
hermeneutics has the same universality as do reason and language.”485 
                 Being-for-itself, may lead us to think we are dealing with something closed, 
what Gadamer describes as an ultimate closedness, or a “final refusal to an inaccessible 
otherness,”486 for which we may seek an ideal corrective. In contrast, Gadamer says of 
this assumption, that we experience the very opposite. Because, as he affirms, “It is 
precisely in interpersonal relations that people open themselves to a kind of intimacy 
that does not allow one to experience the other as another, as a limit to being with 
                                                
483 P. 173. 
484 “Our speaking is also always a listening to the language spoken by us.” Gadamer, 
Truth and Method [Second Revised Edition], p.376. 
485 Ibid. p. 472. 
486 Gadamer, Praise of Theory, p. 29. 
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myself, but rather an intensification, extension, and restoration of my own particular 
being…”487 
                   “Theoria,” Gadamer writes,“ is genuine participation, not accomplished by 
an external deportment, not a doing, but a being acted upon (pathos), namely, a being 
torn away and absorbed by the look of something.” 488 William McNeill has described 
this: 
The classical Greek “theatrical” and tragic view of the world was precisely 
such that it could not be reduced to a merely pictured or represented totality 
of meaning. Ancient theoria entailed, on the contrary, an involved 
participation in the disclosure of other beings, a seeing oneself as addressed, 
invited, called upon to disclose oneself in response, if only in the matter of 
reticence or awe.489 
 
               Gathering one’s being into the world is not setting ourselves apart from the 
world; we are speaking participants in the world. Theory requires a way of “being at 
home” – at home in speech.490 In this way, Gadamer sees theory as the hermeneutic 
experience of our linguistic performance and as an event of being. 
              If we ask: whence does theory come? We must first uncover the hidden costs 
of what happens when we subjugate truth to “science”: First, our conceptions of theory 
                                                
487 Ibid. p. 29. 
488 Gadamer,  Praise of Theory, p. 31. 
489 McNeill, William. The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of 
Theory. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999. p. 255. 
490 McNeill views the tension between Greek theoria and modern theory in these terms: 
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can carry on any form of action.” (4) Such activity, furthermore, as activity in 
accordance with Sophia, is generally acknowledged as the most pleasurable activity. (5) 
Theorein is that activity which is most self-sufficient (autakeia). (6) Theorein is 
genuine only whenever it extends over to a complete lifespan. 
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are narrowed down and restricted in the way theory is thought of as a mode of address; 
consequently such narrowing-down concerns our relation to ourselves and others, and, 
finally, theory is made into a self-alienating objectification of the world.   
             Gadamer’s concern is to move theory out of the restricted horizon of the 
modern concept of science into the universal realm of speech, especially, by drawing 
on Heidegger’s thinking on the Greeks and the Greek sense of presence.491 Presence, in 
Gadamer’s view, is participation; it concerns wholeness, understood by the Platonic 
term Oneness. In the Greek view, theory will share with beauty (kalon) the idea of the 
good, meaning that they are not simply ends in themselves.492 We participate in them; 
they stand present to us. Theory, if considered in light of this ontological attribute, is 
not merely being busy with constructs, with the mechanisms of thought, with the 
priority of method, which treats theory as an abstraction, [organizing of interrelated 
propositions], since this invites self-estrangement and self-alienation, but involves 
participation and that “every logos has this formal structure.”493 
           Gadamer treats the Geisteswissenschaften as a hermeneutical problem - not a 
scientific one where the fate of truth has been obscured, hidden or complicated for us, 
                                                
491 Gadamer describes how: “Heidegger encourages us to work ourselves into the 
original experience of the world that resides in the language and conceptual 
development of the Greeks.” Gadamer, “Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and 
Language,” in Language and Lingusticality in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, 2000. p. 41. 
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in “Truth and Rhetoric in Hermeneutic Ontology,” in The End of Modernity. 
493 Gadamer’s “Plato’s Unwritten Dialectic,” quoted by Brice R. Wachterhauser in his 
Beyond Being, p. 80. 
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but is recovered by the original wisdom of theory in the continuity of truth and 
knowledge.494  
            We belong to theory; we appropriate theory, but neither as our master nor we its 
master. We face the imperative of true speech and true being in all learning. Plato, 
Gadamer argues, understood this as in Protagoras’ dialogue on the role of deception 
and non-deception in learning; for if speech is the basis of the human sciences, so too is 
the imperative to strive for good speech, speech that brings forth new understanding 
and thoughtful reflection. Authenticity, inauthenticity, concealment and 
unconcealment, happen in speaking voices. The human sciences exemplify the paradox 
of speech. Specifically in the way we participate in ideas and wholeness in the words 
we speak. Our ability to release ourselves into our responsibility to truth is not by 
blanketing language with methodological orientations, but by seeing that every word is 
a question, an agreement, as well as a disagreement.495    
   
 Gadamer and the Figure of Socrates 
              In “The Figure of Socrates in Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics”, Francis 
Ambrosio points out how Gadamer “reenacts this Socratic discipline of dialogue in the 
development of his hermeneutic philosophy, and it is this identification with the care of 
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the soul in mind that is carried out in and through philosophical conversation that gives 
Gadamer’s thought as a whole its own proper character and identity.”496  
              Socrates, of course, evokes the topos of public speech and truth. If we wish to 
know what speaking as truth is, we look to the way Socrates establishes truth-saying, a 
speaking that contrasts with mere technique, speaking cleverly and skillfully. Socrates 
poses or stages, then, the problems and the tensions of community and self-creation in 
terms of theory and speech. In the dialogues we witness the birth and rebirth, of a 
model of theory as living speech.   
              Socrates is an odyssey on the good and, as Blum notes, the trial should not be 
seen as a test of Socrates’ reputation, but of a choice that a theorist makes in their work, 
that is, like Socrates, our understanding of what is good.497 Speaking is the public 
display of conversation, a testimony to unity in difference. Socrates and theory go hand 
in hand.  Socrates, Blum remarks, opens the Apology by distinguishing between beauty 
and the good, between method and truth. We know, here, that we are dealing with how 
our words stand as true. Gadamer’s work takes up this question. Blum and Gadamer 
share the Platonic a conception of theorizing as conversation.498 How we reformulate 
conversation, speaking as concept formation, becomes the key to understanding the 
nature of theory, which was laid out by the Greeks, especially Plato, to shape speech as 
both beautiful and true. 
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                In The Apology Socrates says: “I admit I am not a speaker on their level 
(Meletus and his accusers). They said almost nothing that was true, whereas I, men of 
Athens, shall tell the whole truth – not in a language like theirs, decorated with words 
and phrases skillfully arranged, but in haphazard language with everyday words that 
will, I believe, be just.”499   
                Nussbaum writes: “But by placing the Socratic criticisms of writing inside his 
own writing, Plato invites us to ask ourselves, as we read, to what extent his own 
literary innovations have managed to circumnavigate the criticisms”.500 Thus, 
philosophy is a kind of theatre in which we are compelled to ask the truth of writing 
(presentation). Theory comes to be something that we share with both ethical life and 
beauty. Theory is not stultifying, abstract, or analytic, but part of the way we are living 
language. 
                Plato observes this in his Apology: to correct sophistry we stand as witnesses 
and participant to the Socratic dialogue, guided by the ethical and poetic work in terms 
of the primacy of the ethical and poetic constructions of what we read, so that we may 
identify and engage with them. Martha C. Nussbaum describes it this way: “Like the 
spectator of a tragedy the dialogue reader is asked by the interaction to work through 
everything actively…”501 Theory is, then, a cooperative activity where we are invited to 
participate, just as we are in art, not abstractly excluded by meta-language, but moved 
by the natural determination of the language we speak. One can sense this immediately 
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in the writings of Bauman; we are not required to enter some meta-language, some 
analytic disposition, to theorize in the first place, but we are really already in the realm 
of the natural concept formation of language itself that the theorist builds upon. 
               The Apology places the performance of truth at the center of ethical life. 
Gadamer’s quest, like the Socratic quest, recognizes that thinking rests on speech, an 
open performance of truth not pitted against an accuser (as we find in The Apology). 
Socrates’ accuser (Meletus) does not see theory as exemplifying a life, rather his speech 
performance treats life only as that which is instrumental, whereas, for Plato, speaking 
is more than method. Thus, Gadamer writes, “I particularly love those scenes in which 
Socrates gets into a dispute with the Sophist virtuoso and drives them to despair by his 
questions. Eventually they can endure his questions no longer and claim for themselves 
the apparently preferable role of the questioner. And what happens? They can think of 
nothing at all to ask. Nothing at all occurs to them that is worthwhile going into and 
trying to answer.”502 
               Truth and knowledge oscillates in the verbal structure of speech.  Theory is 
some thing we undergo, like art, but without succumbing to subjectivism. Our 
estrangement from truth shows we lose our being-together, a being together in 
community and wisdom, and lose sight of the character of theory making. Theory, the 
Greeks understood, concerns finding unity through our intimacy with our theoretical 
posture. What was radically important to the Greeks, as we shall see, was to bring forth 
the universality of our being, to be at home within our being. The whole, as well as 
truth, that now has become hidden to us.  
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               Speaking speculatively expresses our whole relation to being. The speculative 
mode of the being of language is crucial, then, to how we might understand theory. In 
Gadamer’s vision, theory is a hermeneutic problem, specifically that is, that the living 
culture of speech always precedes the man-made order of method. 
               Recovering theory becomes a recovery of its origins in speech. We live in the 
universal linguistic horizon, and the complex happening of truth. What has crystallized 
modern theory for Gadamer, however, concerns a disregarding of this dimension of 
truth, and its communicability. In his view, truth does not conform to modern science 
or in the perfecting of its terminology and methods. Scientific truth has, in other words, 
become the default orthodoxy of truth. Modernity, in contrast to the Ancient Greek 
thought, sees truth in the form of a perfected speech, and in a self-certification in 
speech. Such orthodoxy rests on the idea that: The primacy of self-consciousness is the 
primacy of method.503  
 
The Eloquence of Theory 
               Speech, like art, is where beings become visible to one another, in our 
founding eloquence we display our existence, so, the very unreliability of our 
expressions and utterances, the words we struggle with, allows us to bring forth 
understanding and to claim to truth in our words.504 Language, then, is where beings 
first reveal themselves. Eloquent speech, then, concerns the unity of life and theory 
(wisdom). Speech captures those areas of valuable truth in life that cannot be 
                                                
503 Gadamer, Praise of Theory: Speeches & Essays, p. 29. 
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encompassed or “approached by objectivization and treated as methodological 
objects.”505  
                What is meant by eloquence, here, remains centrally important to Gadamer’s 
sense of how theory and the good combine in our living eloquence? In other words, by 
simply treating the world as methodological object we conceal important aspects of our 
relationship to theory, life and being. Gadamer shows how our being in language is 
being. When we do this, as a consequence of method, we ourselves become a language 
of perfected concepts; a house in which we are not home, that excludes us. As we seek 
to be perfected beings of our scientific understanding, we remain the uneasy 
participants of modernity. Our constant need for scientific reassurance breeds new 
insecurities.506 The human sciences, therefore, contain a self-obscuring horizon, 
resulting in a self-alienation in being-with-oneself, since truth and falsehood take place 
only within a framework that does not match our aspirations regarding our possibility 
for life and theory. 
               We may think of the other as the ultimate closedness, or as the “final refusal 
to an inaccessible otherness.”507 Gadamer tells us that what we experience is the very 
opposite. He says, “It is precisely in interpersonal relations that people open themselves 
to a kind of intimacy that does not allow one to experience the other as another, as a 
limit to being with myself, but rather an intensification, extension, and restoration of 
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my own particular being...”508 In a summary way, we could legitimately argue that this 
is Gadamer’s theme and variation throughout his work. 
             Here, thoughtful statements contrast to “empty speech” where truth has 
contracted into simply the correctness of assertions.509  Gadamer does not hesitate to 
note that the genuine path of theory, as it was for the Greeks, involves discovering a 
divine sense of being present to the world.510  
             In Praise of Theory, Gadamer notes that the Greeks, attached to “the whole 
genre of eloquence that [which] was considered an undisputed good.”511 In this regard, 
Gadamer, like the Greeks, wants us to consider the way theory appears in protreptic 
speeches or writings that celebrate theory as a good.  Theory is also thinking gathered 
in, “philosophy, the love of sophon, of true knowledge, [and] and the ‘theoretical’ ideal 
of life.”512  
             All life is captured by the wonder and anticipation of living that we discover 
within ourselves through theory and speculation. Still, further, that this disposition, as 
epitomized in the Platonic/Socratic realm meant that one “challenged the norms of his 
home city, Athens, and its society.”513 Theory, then, is a search to find words to speak, 
to speak of social life, driven by the good.  Theory, was in fact, praised for the 
discovery in life of true knowledge. In Gadamer’s view, theory is the struggle between 
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“the construction of social practice” and “being given to pure knowledge, seeing and 
thinking.”514 Our tendency has been, in modernity, to transform our theoretical life into 
knowledge as research, data, or information.515 
             Theoria for Gadamer, like the Greeks, concerns cultivating oneself and not 
seeking a mode of speech that appears to posture as it has disregarded oneself for some 
higher principle of purity and objectivity. Rather, theory, specifically in the human 
sciences, concerns our complex relations to the other and ourselves. Our ability to 
theorize rests in, and needs, to be a part of our “humanly cultivated consciousness that 
has learned to think along with the viewpoint of the other and try to come to an 
understanding about what is meant and what is held in common.”516 Theory is here a 
dialogue that moves between the practical perceptions of the theorist and his ability to 
speak, by finding words to share, for challenging listeners, in a space that illuminates 
the present and points to the future. 
               Without theory and truth, we will remain incomprehensible, stuck in a schema 
of mechanisms of modern theory, in an alienation concealed from us under the peculiar 
conditions of modernity. Logos becomes a tale that is characterized by a view that 
humans are expounding their power by way of knowledge. 
                Hermeneutic experience, being in language, that is: speech – the power of 
verbal event – shows us that “language […] is one of the most compelling phenomena 
of non-objectivity.” With the Ancient Greek conception of theory, the illuminating 
power and priority of the dialectic of dialogue, we engage in communicative 
                                                
514 Ibid. p. 21. 
515 Ibid. p. 23. 
516 Ibid. p. 35. 
 191 
participation with others in conversation.517  Our mediation in speech is the universality 
of language that, for Gadamer, creates all conceptual meaning and value. Theory, is 
not, as Gadamer says, an individual or momentary event of the individual, nor 
especially something that appears as a scientific comportment, but rather it is “a 
position, a condition.”518 Simply seeking conceptual mastery draws us away from this 
power of theory and away from our finding how “to be at home” and in actually 
“making oneself at home.”519  Theory is not a self-exile, but is a coming to be, a being 
present.  
 
Theory as Participation 
                The Greeks understood why theory was participation: they were guided by 
the ideal of finding our proper place in community and life.  Theory is the path we take 
as we live and participate with others in dialogue; it is what happens in conversation, it 
includes “participating equally with others and possible others.”520  To be (with one-
self), to participate (being-together), to see (seeing what is), in other words, is to 
recognize that what is real is something we reach when we encounter ourselves in the 
movement of participation with others and learning with others in dialogue. Dialogue is 
the common horizon within which the disruption of understanding is always at play. 
The real cannot be understood here with what we call the “fact” as somehow 
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transparent to us. To offset the monopoly of this scientific conception of the self-
evident, of a “fact,” the hermeneutic conception of the fact “always refers back to a 
context of supposition and expectation, to a complicated context of inquiring 
understanding.”521   
              The original Greek sense of theoria means: “observing (the constellations, for 
example), being an onlooker (at a play, for instance), or a delegate participating in a 
festival.”522 We stand before something, that opens us to what is both common and 
what is different; what is common in language as such, against which all dialogues 
begin, is the very distinct communicability that happens in speech, art, and theory, that 
happens because we belong to the world as a linguistic horizon.   
               Participation, being there, seeing together, concerns how we are engrossed in 
the ideal and possibility of thinking with others, and this in one way that we can discern 
how: the restoration of one self in the act of theory concerns sharing or participating 
with others in the conversation we call theory. It is not about how I “self-certify 
myself” in this speech by a specifically chosen diction that asserts the primacy of the 
objective “facts” of the real. Truth, as Gadamer and Heidegger agree, is neither about 
correctness nor the externalization and comportment of an isolated subject of 
utterances, but rather of the sharing in the ideal of a theoretical life, through the 
eloquent speech, that is already a demand of the dialogue. 
              The early Greek abstraction of thinking provides the framework that informs 
modern science, but the Greeks also had another concern: that the nature of all thinking 
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and theory-making that laid in our utterances that first served our intelligibility and 
self-understanding. 
              Our assurance about modern individuality happens in the presence of loss and 
insecurity. Because our grasp modern life cannot be explained institutionally, as, for 
example, in Anthony Giddens verbal machinery of a “reflexive modernity” but, rather, 
requires our reconnecting to the roots of language as a creative space of discovery, self-
discovery and theory-making. The Greeks were the precursor to our view of theoretical 
ability and mastery.523 Yet, Greek thinking focused on the intelligibility of the whole 
world and not simply the institutional mastery of aspects of the world. 
               Hermeneutic experience is a verbal conception that is distinctly different from 
the prism of logical mathematical ideals, as in scientific inquiry and modern theory, 
since theoretical value resides in the presence of our original being and in our linguistic 
mediation with one another.  That is why Gadamer is quite aware that truth has 
historically been mediated within different traditions, specifically, the theological or 
Christian ones, as well as the early Greeks. Suspicion of speech and truth, then, went 
hand in hand in the early Enlightenment tradition, but at the cost of losing insight into 
truth and speech, and losing insight into a vision of theory that prevented us from 
becoming an object to ourselves, and to a sense of social reality in which we seek 
ourselves through artificial institutions of solidarity.524 
                Theory is a question of the theoretical life. As Gadamer reminds us this was 
fundamental to the Ancient Greeks.525  The Greek approach to theory differs in this 
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regard from the modern topology of theory. Theory always relates to the question of the 
fulfillment of the speaker, in two seemingly divergent paths: to master existence as well 
as to fulfill our own nature to achieve happiness, between logic and the good.  Theory, 
however, as in the Ancient Greeks, especially Plato, stressed our knowing reality not as 
a matter of methodological rigor, but as a seeing what is, which is more than a 
fundamental process of eliminating prejudices, but is a comportment toward 
universality and the desire to fulfill our own lives outside of material necessity. In other 
words, theory involves a complex union with the theorist that includes happiness, as a 
key goal, guided by the freedom to choose the good and recognize the beautiful.  
              Theory (theoria), involves participation; it is participation where we really see 
the world, not with a method  [technique, or tools] of knowing reality, but with an ideal 
of being with others that furnishes the “theorist” with a sense of understanding of what 
is meant and what we hold in common with others.  What is Greek theoria? “The word 
means observing (the constellations, for example), being an onlooker (at a play, for 
instance), or a delegate participating at a festival.”526 Theory cannot, in this regard, be a 
mere seeing. Rather it involves levels of complexity and intimacy, looking at things and 
experiencing them, as part of our desire for knowledge of reality. 
             Theory, in this way, involves an “intimacy” (Gadamer uses the analogy of our 
relationship to our bodies). He notes: “If it is the case that language is a conversation 
and can be what it is only in that way, and if the true conversation includes a with-one-
another, then we must order language under the basic concept of partnership. This 
proposed word reminds one of the Greek concept of methexis. The expression 
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partnership indicates that the with-one-another does not consist of the separateness of 
the partners, but in the communality of participation and concern.”527 
               One may now consider, for example, the way the word has been discussed in 
previous pages in terms of untranslatability, specifically the “untranslatability of the 
poetic word. Language happens in our relationship with the other, where I am 
compelled to open myself, breaking away from any self-willed obstinacy, to ultimately 
find and recognize what is real.528 Being-for-itself, Gadamer points out, is our ultimate 
closeness, one that no systematic observation can break open; we are encapsulated in 
Being; which he calls the “final refusal and an inaccessible otherness” that surrounds 
us. 
              Theory is not a technical abstraction, nor is it an act of a “subject,” rather it is 
the opposite; theory is a seeing-what-is a seeing of hermeneutic facts (not things 
present-to-hand – “a ‘fact’ is rather a hermeneutic concept” that is shared and 
participated in), which are “referred back to a context of supposition and expectation, to 
a complicated context of inquiring understanding.”529 The place from where we speak 
is already an event of the experience of truth that allows us to discover what is and 
what might be. 
              “Theoria is not so much an individual momentary act as a way of comporting 
oneself, a position and condition.”530  It is not simply about the distribution of goods, 
but a good of another kind, where there is no gain, where we belong to nobody, but 
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where we are part of the reciprocal enrichment that understands theory itself as a 
belonging with others. To write theory, to speak in conversation with one another is to 
speak and express reality, which also celebrates the love of “theoretical life itself.”  
                “Are theory and practice correctly distinguished when they are seen only in 
opposition?”531  In the following pages we will return to this question; but it should be 
clear that I am exploring Gadamer’s conception of theory in relation to his thesis of 
methodological alienation; so two competing conceptions of theory, Ancient and 
Modern, and their rapprochement, motivate all of Gadamer’s writings. How we 
perceive verbal experience is how we perceive theory. The so-called loss of 
understanding of theory has simultaneously resulted in a transformation of our verbal 
orientation to reality as well as our selves. When we become rigorously subjectivized, 
our capacity to prioritize our theoretical lives is inhibited. Modern theory, seen as a tool 
of production, involves a particular way of taking up our verbal performance (logos), 
our comportment, thus ourselves, as we construct theory. In other words, as Gadamer 
says, we are guided to gather experience, if possible, to dominate it.  
              Speaking is contingent on expanding our notion of theory into, simultaneously, 
the underlying intelligibility of the world as key to all rational argument. By restoring 
theory, we restore the genuine ethical subject and rediscover our original enchantment 
with thinking. We question our own existence because we exist in our questioning (in 
the intensification of living that the Greeks called theoria), which implies our ethical 
task – a practical task rooted in understanding the intelligible world that the Greeks, for 
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example, always started with.532 By contrast, we always begin with the world as 
“object” – famously captured in Heidegger’s phrases world-picture and en-framing  
 
Pointing Back to Parmenides 
                Words that rest upon being as much as being-true; it is this fundamental 
dynamic that points back to Parmenides. Parmenides [Parmenides of Elea, the known 
fragments of his work], founds “every scientific and histographic practice of ours”,533 
which is similar to Gadamer’s point that in Parmenides we find something like the very 
first creation of the concept.534 Carlo Sini explains it this way:  “one should think of it 
as an example of the use of myth in Parmenides and Plato. Parmenides assumes myth 
into his logos, and this is not without consequences for the way in which Plato employs 
myth in turn. We (that is, our way of thinking and interpreting depend on those 
gestures) are already comprehended or pre-comprehended in them, and there is no hope 
that we can look at them from the outside. We can only re-interpret them finally asking 
ourselves about their meaning, without hiding from us their aporeticity.”535 
                 What slides away from absolute capture is the true, says Sini, attempting to 
show the significance of Parmenides, he writes, “The foundation of onto-logy and thus 
science, both ancient and modern, is the Parmenidian knot of being, thinking and 
truth.” 536 Our existence in truth and falsehood is wedded to our being–with-one-
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another and this is a peculiarity of being human, found in the word that speaks, a word 
that makes a claim upon us, as the word tries to say something that draws upon us to 
think about its resonance beyond us [as in Socrates dialectical speech that gives birth to 
philosophy]. Words are not solely about objects, but about a potential in which truth 
takes place, in the logos, were we can find the genuine word as well as our way of 
accepting a new way of being in language.  
                This is not about truth and correctness, nor about an interior subject 
externalizing his private interior through utterances, but about participation, a sharing, 
with the other half of truth as Gadamer says.537 Concept formation, likewise, requires a 
speaking forth that happens in our (modern) understanding of language; for this reason, 
any reconstruction of theory in the human sciences consequently involves a 
transformation of our embeddness in metaphysical thinking. Communication is a 
relationship where we freely attend to the other as someone with us, someone who 
shares human existence. But it is a sharing that we do with language. Sini gives 
summary to the way we encounter truth: “in the last instance to the question, what is 
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true? We must answer: it is true that one runs up against the untruth of one’s own 
truth.”538 
                 Parmenides Proem poses this question: what is truth and how do we speak of 
it? We have trouble speaking about truth without making it into a truth practice that 
tends, especially in the modern period, to conceive of itself as truth-in-itself, that is, as 
a methodological approximation. Parmenides haunts us. The Parmenidian “knot”, as 
Sini describes it, is exactly that, the playful paradox of the speech that seeks truth. 
Speech is personified in the Parmenidian struggle of knowing and not knowing. 
Speaking the truth is not simply technical. Truth underlies the logical leap from 
narrative speech to the logical speech of theory. But as Sini implies, this leap (found in 
Plato specifically) implies a continuity for when philosophical speech [theory] emerges, 
when we stand at a distance, we do so on the basis of truth, which in this transition it 
suppresses.539 
               Speaking, says Gadamer, dwelling on Parmenides’ Proem, expresses 
multiplicity and that this is not something to be eliminated, a burdensome ambiguity, 
rather it is the way spoken words express the interrelated aspects of meaning “which 
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articulate a field of knowledge.”540 In other words, speech is the source of all aporia 
and the euporia of all speech.  
                Productive ambiguity, then, is the very thing that makes speech possible.  The 
event of truth that happens can never be known in any absolute fashion, yet the desire 
to acquire truth remains. Productive ambiguity leads us to the dialectic as the positive 
side of the nature of speech. Speaking requires, in the dialogical form, an identification 
of the thing itself (as an affinity for the thing itself) – therefore it is not babble – and, 
finally it becomes reaching understanding in terms of  “the Just, the Beautiful, and the 
Good.”541  
 
Parmenides and the Birth of the Concept 
                 Noting that Heidgger continually sought a conversation with Parmenides, 
Gadamer wrote: “To be sure his  [Parmenides] pedagogical poem was written in 
Homeric hexameter, and it was not without a certain poetic power, as the preserved 
proem proves. For this poem there were still no concepts. Nevertheless, something like 
the creation of the concept is encountered for the first time in these verses…”542 
Heidegger, as Gadamer points out, sought concepts, through a rethinking of Pre-
Socratic and Socratic texts. Parmenides’ connection of thought and being ties into his 
speaking voice, the poet’s voice, as the locus for the play of the word and its power. 
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Lingusticality in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, p. 42. 
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               Both Parmenides and Plato’s Seventh Letter provide Gadamer, therefore, with 
key elements of his view of dialogue as multiplicity and the singular – clarity and 
ambiguity, but also a reminder of the moment of concept formation as poetic in the way 
it is to be found in the Greeks. The rhapsodic form lies at the heart of the 
communication of ideas. Truth lies halfway in the movement between speech and 
dialogue (dialectic), in the process and movement of opposition that originally builds 
understanding, as well as in the openness of a flash of insight that can appear when 
there is genuine discourse among speakers.  The creation of the concept, the 
construction of concepts, never departs fully the struggle to be free and expressive but 
faces the secondary struggle with a linguistic inheritance that has turned concept 
creation over to scientific speaking and the objectification of the world. 
                Parmenides’ poem demonstrates our debt to the Greeks (Pre-Socratics), as 
well as the metaphysical origins of our differing views of language and thinking. The 
metaphysical paradox is in how we understand distance and intimacy as the knot of 
being. Thinking and being bound together in speech; speech, seen here, is a “being in 
common” and is already a place of truth.  
                In Parmenides, saying and thoughtful perceiving of what is; what is for us, 
cannot be “disentangled from the consequences of what is being expressed and 
perceived; the presentness of being is precisely its perception. But there is one further 
point of continuity that matters to our discussion of theory. Parmenides poem is not to 
be thought of as a work that exists in two distinct sections, one on thinking and one on 
doxa (nor, perhaps, conceptual and poetic thought). Parmenides does not separate the 
topics in a Platonic way. Here, theory as a style of expression is rooted in living 
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conversation because cultivating communal judgment is always in the fluid movement 
of discourse and concepts, which always remain open in a balancing of conceptual and 
poetic thought.  Untruth is seen to inhere in all knowledge. There is not one way that 
steps outside”. In fact, speaking of the Proem’s thesis, Gadamer says,  “since human 
beings are exposed to a multitude of influences and distractions, it turns out that untruth 
inheres in the concept of knowledge itself, that it is an inseparable, even constitutive 
element of knowledge.”543 
                 We are forgetting of “one half of truth” that is the half that lies in the living 
conversation: “in speaking things are there; it is in speech and speaking with one 
another that the world and the experiential world of human beings constructs itself and 
not in the a objectification that (vis-à-vis the communicative transmission of the 
insights of one person to the insights of another) bases itself on objectivity and purports 
to be knowledge for everyone.  
                 Parmenides Proem is not simply a polemic directed at another thinker. 
Rather it is composed as a conversation with the many, a consequence of the Homeric 
poetic form of the work and reveals an original relation concerning the birth of theory 
out of poetry. The Proem is a conversation with the many, or, at least not just simply a 
polemic with Heraclites.544 Gadamer suggests the contrasting of the two is less 
revealing than what they connect. Theory belongs to logos (speech) and logos is the 
conversation of being with others. Objectification, as we have seen, cancels or conceals 
the metaphysical tendency of modern theory, distorting the dialectic of distance and 
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intimacy that is posed by speech. Greek thinking, therefore, holds for Gadamer a 
message for modern theory and how we arrive at truth. In Gadamer’s view, Parmenides 
addresses what he calls the “inseparability of the speculative problem of the truth of 
logical thought from experience and its plausibility, that is, states of affairs having to do 
with human nature, even lending it a certain superiority when it knowingly makes [use 
of] divine help.”545 
               Firstly, Greek theoria is rooted in this aspect of the logos (speech); second, 
speech lifts the world into view, not simply as an array of objects, therefore, the 
essential move by Gadamer, regarding theory, is to: re-define rationality, in relation to 
poetics in terms of the Ancients communicative participation in the world, and of the 
unity that holds fast and changes in itself. Truth in art and truth in the human sciences 
have more in common with the Ancients than they do with our understanding of truth 
in scientific self-understanding.  
               Theory, then, is no longer simply a logic of communication (more 
geometrico), nor, we can say, a logic of investigation, rather, as Gadamer reminds us, it 
is the living play of concepts. Sometimes, our play requires that we take back what we 
say – our dialegesthai therefore implies a multiplicity of possible reactions where we 
make possible the living sign of the phenomenon of language.   So our co-belonging in 
conversation is an ethical praxis.  Theory is a relationship to others as well as to our 
selves; it is a task, a task that for Gadamer is our belonging to one another, “with one 
another” Miteinander) in speech. 
             Gadamer makes this claim: 
                                                
545 Ibid, p.  99. 
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I think the Greeks had it right when they placed the idea of being shaped 
by society, ethos, along side the fact of reason.  Ethos is the term that 
Aristotle coined for this. The possibility of conscious choice and free 
decision is always accompanied by something that we always already 
are - and we are not an object to ourselves.546 
 
              Second, commonality (belonging together) resists any objectification of the 
other in relation to my social reality or myself. Interestingly, and this is the key point, 
he asks that we consider friendship – Philia – by arguing that: 
It seems to me that one of the great legacies of Greek thought for our 
own thinking that, on the basis of actual lived life, Greek ethics allowed 
ample space for a phenomena that, in modernity, is hardly ever given as 
a theme of philosophical reflection – I mean the theme of friendship, 
Philia.547 
 
 
                Theoria is a way of being held by something – just as we are held by a truth 
that can happen through our aesthetic participation. Aesthetic experience and the fusion 
of horizons share this way of participating with theory. As we know play (paidia), in 
turn, is close in Greek to paideia (pedagogy), and this quality captures for Gadamer all 
theoretical activity.  
                Heidegger opens us to the Greeks, to the power of language, in his early 
writings. And it is this extra methodological sense of truth that Gadamer wants to make 
us aware of. He writes: “We are carried away not only by the storytelling art. We are 
not just readers of the great novelists. The fine arts accompany everything, so that a 
whole world arises before us. Recalling the fine arts is necessary. One cannot overlook 
that they testify to the temporality of our Dasein in the building of a structure that we 
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call a work of art. Even if it concerns only a sculpture or an overwhelming impression 
from a building that ‘comes forth’, it is also to be found in the linguistic arts.”548  
               Truth in the human sciences is hermeneutic. Art invites us to question it, to 
enter a dialogue, not in an explanatory way, since art is about a truth that is about to be 
given. Truth in art occurs in the duration of the work’s power to speak directly to us 
that is also fundamentally unlimited.”549 Art demands an answer not an explanation.          
Vattimo argues, “the truth of art is not to represent truth of the world but, rather, to take 
a stance in the name of a project of transformation.”550 Listening and responding to art 
closely links with our response to listening to each other’s speech.  In Gadamer’s view 
the question of the “truth of art is identical with the way we experience truth in the 
Geistesswissenschaften, that is to say, as the hermeneutical problem. 
                Art is always the key to this challenge. Gadamer is saying that if we want to 
“know what truth is in the human sciences,” then we must look at our encounter with 
the work of art. How are we to understand this challenge? 
                Art, emerging in critical relation to certain features of the Enlightenment’s 
worldview, holds that the highest achievements of the human spirit are the creative 
productions of the unique individual. We can clearly see the interconnection of 
Gadamer’s arguments on the hermeneutical nature of experience in the light of these 
points. Gadamer overcomes the aesthetics of genius with a renewed discussion of 
mimesis and the way it brings reality to light. Gadamer writes on Kant’s impact on the 
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matter this way, “We must say that this giving aesthetic a transcendental philosophical 
basis had a major consequence and constituted a turning point.” He argues: 
In his critique of aesthetic judgment what Kant sought to and did 
legitimize was the subjective universality of aesthetic taste in which 
there is no longer any knowledge of the object, and in the area of ‘fine 
arts’ the superiority of genius to any aesthetics based on rules. Thus 
romantic hermeneutics and history found a point of contact for their self-
understanding only in the concept of genius, validated by Kant’s 
aesthetics.  That was the other side of Kant’s influence. The 
transcendental justification of aesthetic judgment was the basis of the 
autonomy of aesthetic consciousness, and on the same historical basis 
historical consciousness was legitimated as well. The radical 
subjectivising involved in Kant’s new way of grounding aesthetics was 
truly epoch making. In discrediting any kind of theoretical knowledge 
except that of natural science, it compelled the human sciences to rely 
on the methodology of the natural sciences in conceptualizing 
themselves.551 
 
                Our tendency to neutralize the truth claim of art is in turn embedded in the 
social sciences. Kants’ subjectivization of aesthetic truth therefore also, in an odd way, 
now further neutralizes truth with regard to the human sciences. Gadamer writes: 
If we want to justify art as a way of truth in its own right, then we must 
fully realize what truth means here. It is in the human sciences as a 
whole that an answer to this question must be found. For they seek to 
surpass but understand the variety of experience – whether aesthetic, 
historical, religious, or political – but that means they expect to find 
truth in them.552 
 
                A work of art, while standing as a work, requires no biographic relationship 
to a subject.  Kant’s transcendental analysis made it possible to acknowledge the truth 
claim of traditional material, to the cultivation and study of which they devoted 
themselves. But this meant that the methodological uniqueness of the human sciences 
lost its legitimacy. Art as knowing is not a subsidiary to science, a limited partner in the 
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search for knowledge. Truth is not conceptual, as ascribed by scientific consciousness, 
nor is it to be excluded in the work of social theory. 
             Truth is encountered in art. This guides Gadamer’s approach to the human 
sciences: 
If we are to know what the truth is in the field of the human sciences, we need 
to ask a philosophical question of the whole procedure of the human sciences in 
the same way that Heidegger asked it of metaphysics and we have to ask it of 
aesthetic consciousness.553 
 
            Gadamer uses the Greek term theoria when speaking of theory. Theory is to be 
celebrated as a part of culture: 
 
When he showed that the concept of presence at hand is a deficient mode of 
being and viewed it as the background to classical metaphysics and its 
continuance in the modern concept of subjectivity, he was pursuing an 
ontologically correct connection between Greek theoria and modern science. 
Within the horizon of his temporal interpretation of being, classical metaphysics 
as a whole is an ontology of the present at hand, and modern science is, 
unbeknownst to itself, its heir. But the Greek theoria there was undoubtedly 
another element as well. Theoria grasps not so much the present at hand as the 
thing itself, which still has the dignity of a “thing.”554 
 
             Theoria involves the speaker in a non-alienated self-cultivation of oneself in 
the world.  Theory is not about pointing to knowledge or remembering information but 
rather about an event in the course of questioning through which one realizes meaning 
either as the recipient of address by someone or something, or by addressing someone 
or something where a relationship to Being speaks. That which is shown and what is 
revealed is a matter of our conception of theoria. Theoria carries forth in history the 
double legacy, a paradox, of manipulation and domination that is further and further set 
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apart from the contemplative self-creation that appears in Greek cosmology, and now 
appears at the center of hermeneutic thinking and hermeneutic grounding. 
                 Plato’s discussion on the status of argument, in the Gorgias and Phaedrus, 
and the exclusion of the poet, discussed in the Republic, converge in the status of 
theory as the oscillation between poetry and theory. Hermeneutics, by posing the 
question of poetics and thought, echoes Parmenides paradox.  Parmenides’ writings are, 
for Heidegger, governed by the special way they occur as a speech that does not 
distinguish the philosophic word from the poetic word. By which he means the claims 
of thoughtful words, and being acquainted with them, involves seeing how poetic 
expression occurs as thought and lays before us a special claim.  
             Does truthfulness reside in the perpetual tension between theory and poetry? 
The poem, naturally, attains to something different to that of the Sophist’s speech, 
especially the arbitrary perversions brought on by sophism; but both, while engaging 
with the power of language, move toward different ends. Gadamer does not argue that 
the poetic replaces rational argumentative speech; rather he says that we learn to 
understand how truth happens also in the rational and argumentative.  The poetic offers 
a type of corrective to the self-understanding of the human sciences. 
            The being of speaking of the word brings things near. Theory, if it detaches us 
from being in language, removes the possibilities of a living closeness to being, and 
beings, that poetry can bring forth. Gadamer proposes a dialogue that does not close 
down the listener but instead, asks the listener (or reader) to hear the words spoken as 
those that somehow speak for them, to show us who we really are. Thus, a double 
demand is made because theory involves the consideration of who speaks.  
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              Clarke notes: “This double demand of both commonality and singularity 
resounds throughout Gadamer’s experiments without ever being discussed at length.”555 
But we could claim that this question remains at the core of his arguments insofar as it 
is implicitly inherited from the Greeks. We must recall that everything that makes itself 
present, for Heidegger entails a publicness that objective philosophy conceals by 
offering a security of holding onto a real that moves away from this truth. 
               The Philebus offers Gadamer an insight into the connection between dialogue 
and dialectic, but also carries within it a concern with the original pleasure of theory (in 
art and science). The soul is sometimes like a book, announces Socrates (Plato, 
Philebus). Within this book, memory unites with sense, while the passions write words 
in our souls. When we write truly then truth is produced in us. However, when the 
writer within us scripts falsely then truth is no longer apparent. We may further think, 
in this regard, of the poet’s capacity for seduction and Plato’s famous exclusion of the 
poet from the city of knowledge.  
                The human experience of the world concerns that which may be brought forth 
in language and not what can be abstracted into conceptual purity. Language is the 
center of an originary co-belonging, a concern that Heidegger lays before us, wherein 
may be found pleasure. This may be understood in the complex way that language 
involves concealment and revealment, aletheia. Truth as a form of revelation is located 
in this condition, which does not mean that it is a type of mysticism.  
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                 When this sense of truth; i.e. the power of speaking truly, is lost in our 
modern view of knowledge, the human sciences lead us back to classical metaphysics. 
Heidegger spoke of the freedom of standpoint that is common to the claims of 
methodological detachment and methodological alienation.  In Plato’s Socrates, and 
especially in the staging of the dialogues, we see the basic outline of Gadamer’s work.  
Heidegger writes: 
Rejecting this way of proceeding in which the subject-object schema is foisted 
on fields of investigation is only one of the most urgent precautionary measure 
needed today. A second concerns a prejudice, which merely constitutes the 
counterpart to the uncritical approach of generating constructions and 
theorizing. This is the demand for observation, which is free of standpoints. 
 
The second prejudice is even more disastrous for research because, with its 
express watchword for the seemingly highest idea of science and objectivity it, 
in fact, elevates taking an uncritical approach into a first principle and 
promulgates a fundamental blindness.556 
 
            Plato’s thought never simply justifies the overcoming of the poetic. Likewise, it 
neither justifies the notion of the power of language by adopting the ideal of a pure 
symbolic language. However, what arises in the dialectics of speech, in Gadamer’s 
sense of the priority of question and answer found in the event of language, is a setting 
for a discussion of sophistry, or rather the question of the status of critical thought and 
speech.  
               The Greek sense of sophistry remains a question of the correct pursuit of 
knowledge, and as we know, this question remains central to the entire project 
Gadamer sets before him in arguing that methodological knowledge is one-sided and 
precludes the very grasp of truth.   
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             “The first course I attended,” writes Gadamer, “in the year 1923 had the title: 
‘Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity.’ The whole reach of our topic [hermeneutic 
ontology] here is presented in the title of this lecture course. Hermeneutics of facticity,” 
notes Gadamer, “stands before the puzzle of Dasein, thrown into the Da [there], 
explicates itself to itself, and constantly projects itself on its own possibilities, on what 
it encounters. Heidegger made this as of the interpretation of its future possibilities the 
hermeneutical as. [To interpret is to see something as something].”557 All questioning – 
the task of philosophical thinking – always dwells with human factual existence of the 
human. 
             “Concealment is in all of Daseins’s self-explication” therefore: “Every Dasein 
understands itself on the basis of its environment and daily life, and articulates itself in 
the linguistic form in which it lives and moves. To this extent, then, there is always and 
everywhere concealment – and always also the deconstructive explication of 
concealments.”558 The conclusions drawn from this involve the complex relationship 
between Heidegger and Gadamer as well as the way we can see the founding moments 
of Gadamer’s own thinking on the question of truth. 
             Heidegger asks the question of truth in a special way. Truth, he points out, 
concerns a primordial encounter with the meaning process, the way we are actively 
[Ereignis] sustained and appropriated by it as we speak and encounter others and 
ourselves. Heidegger saw that the being that can be understood is meaning.559 It was 
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one step for Gadamer to the being that can be understood is language.  In this way, 
theory occurs in the originary aspect of speech, where we open to meaning and concept 
creation. Gadamer's emphasis, as Wachterhauser says, on “dialogue as the place where 
truth occurs”, includes this connection to Heidegger. 560 Theory is not simply 
something tested against a model of thinking (built in the image of science), but rather 
is the communal dialogue that opens to us in speech, which tells of its insights, not just 
for the specialist, but also for everyone. 
            “In the puzzling miracle of mental wakefulness lies the fact that seeing 
something and thinking something are a kind of motion, but not the kind that leads 
from something to its end.”561 Finally, in this recognition lies the very notion of why 
the inner infinity of speech is ontologically prior to theory and yet remains intrinsic to 
theory. We need now only connect ideality to the movement of being to see how 
thinking too rests on this condition, grounds us and gives over to an utterance, that if 
dislocated feels inauthentic to us as a speech that is really speaking. 
            Theoria is living speech, neither resting on a reductive concept of subjectivity, 
nor the corresponding desire, generated by the subjectivization of knowledge, to find an 
objectified methodological ideal. Theory “keep[s] the dignity of the thing and the 
referentiality of language free from the prejudice originating in the ontology of the 
                                                                                                                                         
argues: “For me to have knowledge of things only through their meaning, and meaning 
at all levels is a matter of disclosure-to-understanding…” and, furthermore, 
characterizing Heidegger, “Ereignis and Faktizität bespeak the same thing: the ‘fate’ of 
human being as necessary for maintaining (holding open) the meaning-giving process.” 
p. 68. 
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561 Ibid. p. 367.  
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present-at-hand as well as in the concept of objectivity” What is not to be calculated 
and measured is the sense of theoria as originally presented as ‘divine’ contemplation. 
Gadamer contends that theory is participation, of being present to the thing that 
includes something we forgo, or even suffer. It is “an event that happens to me” that is 
likewise a matter of a distance to oneself.: 
Our starting point is that verbally constituted experience of the world expresses 
not what is present-at-hand, that which is calculated and measured, but what 
exists, what man recognizes as existent and significant. The processes of 
understanding practice in the moral sciences can recognize itself in this – and 
not in the methodological idea of rational construction that dominates modern 
mathematically based science.”562 
 
            Theory is itself a hermeneutic praxis, not an independent body of knowledge 
that can be “applied,” which we see transported into Gadamer’s opposition to the one-
sidedness of method (and modernity). That which gives being to thought is already 
there [Da]. Much like art it gives itself.  But how might we better understand the 
fundamental opposition to theory as an abstraction from the ordinary held in modern 
thought? We must, as always for Gadamer, return to the Greeks – to the beginnings of 
what has been thought.                 
                 Speech produces; it shows things.  Gadamer says, “When someone is 
looking at something, this is when he or she truly sees it, and when one is directing 
one’s thinking at something, this is when one is truly producing it [my emphasis].”563  
                 Critique requires asking new questions. It rests upon and opens up speech to 
manipulation. The Sophist as a public speaker pretends thoughtful reflection, twisting 
the founding movement of philosophy, the question of effective speech, into a smart 
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cosmetic game. Experiencing truth shifts to the truth of the utterance of authority even 
if that authority is in itself deceptive. So reaching the public, the growth of public 
dialogue that expands democracy, was also the growth of speech that rather than 
disrupting order, maintains it. 
                We can now grasp the nature of the alienation of theory and its relationship to 
inauthentic speech (false concepts, false speech, false sociology, false poetry, etc…) 
Motion, Gadamer notes, is “a holding of being, and through this motion of human 
wakefulness [Lebendigkeit, liveliness], a process that ever and again allows a new 
perception of something to open us.” 564 One short step from here we are now in 
language, and specifically the word, especially the word of the poet. 
               When Gadamer asks: “What is the authentic word?”  He also questions: “How 
is poetry made? How is theory made?” Each step of the way, Gadamer engages in a 
discussion of the poetic to restructure the way we think about limits of theory framed 
by western metaphysics. 
               Celan spoke of poetic language as vielstellig [having many places] and leaves 
many paths open. At the same time, however, he demanded from the readers of his 
poems a “right” to understanding. We are all spoken to; addressed by language. We 
speak to something; speaking enters us into something that lies before us, which can be 
shown without any method blocking our perception. Speech is the coming into meaning 
of the universal. This allows us to ponder the co-possibility of art, theory, and truth.  
 In Gorgias, Socrates distinguishes between sophistry and rhetoric.  Truth of the 
utterance is always at stake, as may be seen with the Delphic Oracle. Socrates task is to 
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confound the Sophists, by accepting the riddle of speech. Sophistry is charged with the 
appearance of a truth.  
Rhetoric is the art of speaking, but it also reflects the primacy of speech to the 
question of truth. We are not talking primarily about good and bad speech, but that 
which illuminates the interconnection between the just, the good and the beautiful. Both 
Gorgias and The Apology show a distinctive quality to Plato’s thinking. Socrates will 
not manipulate his speech even to avoid death and the condemnation of his sophistic 
accusers. 
              Christopher Fynsk notes that “modern scholasticism,” or the rationalism of 
speech, cuts off discussion.565 He speaks, in this regard, of the silence of theory, 
especially found in the academy, the language of the theory of silence,566 arguing that 
the very structure of theory silences community. The homogenization of discourses, 
within the academy, produces a decline of critical public discussion.  We know that it is 
this contradictory posture, a consequence of the objectification of speech, which 
compelled debate in the human sciences concerning the nature of theory, because it 
impacted the social scientist’s ability to find a way for his words to converse in the 
continuing self-overcoming of concepts that would not end in fixity. His voice, his 
speaking in a conversation, appeared conceptually compromised. Truth is problematic 
for modernity because it seeks to find a way to ‘correct’ the oracle’s speech. This 
primary scene – found in Greek metaphysics – continues to describe the tension in the 
performance of truth and its representation.  
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               Theory concerns the play of conversation that structures the dialogue as 
speech between speakers. This speaker-to-speaker relationship is one where we step 
outside subjectivity and enter language that binds us. However, it is not a consequence 
of methodological strategy but, rather, a primary recognition that speech is always 
spoken to someone. To speak theoretically is to speak at the crossroads of theory, self-
creation and public life. 
              Speech is the tendency to want to be with others (to-be-with-others), speaking 
with one another, where our being together can be accomplished. It is not so much 
one’s being toward the object as the sharing of this being toward an object. Speech is 
essentially expressing oneself: a performance that is a communication of how one is 
faring.” 567 In this shared performance we are not grabbing a word if one has something 
firmly in his grasp, but rather, in this resting and tarrying, exhibits our tendency to want 
to be with others.  
               In Plato’s Dialectical Ethics, we see one of Gadamer’s key themes: speaking 
and being together constitutes the grounds of an ethics of speech. How one holds 
speech in mind, is how one holds to an ethics of co-responsibility to an “other.” Theory 
presents things for consideration. Gadamer notes, “If we keep this in mind, we will no 
longer confuse the factualness (Sachlichkeit) of language with the objectivity 
(Objektivität) of science.”568 Reality is intelligible in language. However, language’s 
intelligibility is not a supplement to reality. Language is not imposed in some 
rationalized fashion upon an indifferent world. Brice Wachterhauser says that language 
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“participates” in intelligibility and the intelligibility of reality “participates” in the 
intelligibility of language. 
                 Method is a paradoxical demand, according to Gouldner, produced a “fatigue 
of reason” [alienation]. The overreaching and self-certifying tone of methodological 
speech involves a sense of loss. Only through a return to the speculative structure of 
speech can one be protected from passivity and alienation that comes from the self-
imposed isolation of the panoramic subject. The theorist searches for a genuine 
encounter with others through himself/herself in the immanent recognition that the 
metaphysics of modernity promotes the self-alienation of their theoretical utterances.  
 Gadamer reminds us: 
The whole value of hermeneutical experience – like the significance of history 
for human knowledge in general - seemed to consist in the fact that here we are 
not simply filing things in pigeonholes but that what we encounter in a tradition 
says something to us. Understanding, then, does not consist in the technical 
virtuosity of “understanding” everything written. Rather, it is a genuine 
experience (Erfahrung) – i.e., an encounter with something that asserts itself as 
truth.569  
 
Theory, the conception of Greek theoria, illuminates the problem of modern theory that 
manifests itself in the human sciences. There are two key reasons. First, speech is an 
essential non-objectivity. Second, speech that is instrumentalized violates what we 
know and experience in language (i.e., its compelling non-objectivity).  
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Chapter 5. 
 
 
 
                                                        Theory and Beauty  
 
 
 
The event of the beautiful and the hermeneutic process both presuppose the finiteness 
of human life.570 
 
In my book Truth and Method I began with considerations first of all with art, and not 
sciences or even the “human sciences.” Even within the human sciences it is art that 
brings the basic questions of the human being to our awareness in such a unique way – 
indeed, in such a way that no resistance or objection against it arise. An artwork is like 
a model for us in this regard.571 
 
 
             In the closing chapter of Truth and Method Gadamer addresses the concept of 
beauty. Beauty is the theme of this chapter because it is key in showing how truth sets 
the limits upon the idea of modern theory. Beauty brings together several themes – art, 
theory, truth – but especially how we experience art. Truth and beauty emerge from 
within themselves; they show themselves. The key term here is presentation or the 
evidentness of the intelligible. Art is vivid – it stands out – to us.   
            Beauty, therefore allows us to better grasp what happens when art speaks to us 
and why it continues to speak to us. Art presents itself without any addition to itself. In 
this way, we can understand how the experience of beauty is familiar to us and yet also 
how it surpasses us. Beauty [in Greek, kalos, Kallos] is, then, also a question of truth.  
                                                
570 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], p. 486. 
571 Gadamer, “From Word to Concept,” in The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of the 
Later Writings, p.115. 
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            Likewise, for Gadamer, words (and concepts) surpass subjectivism and enter 
into the dialogical sphere; the poetic word is a special case, where the word points to 
itself.  Bruns reminds us: “What is it that allows pictures, statues, buildings, songs, 
texts, or dances, to appear beautiful, and, if ‘no longer beautiful,’ as art nonetheless?  
Beauty, whether classical or baroque, rather, defines art as art, namely as something 
that stands out from everything that is purposively established and utilized.”572 
             Gadamer reminds us that truth, “shines,” “radiates.” He writes, “The 
metaphysics of the beautiful can be used to illuminate two points that follow from the 
relation of the radiance of the beautiful and the evidentness of the intelligible [my 
emphasis]. The first is that both the appearance of the beautiful and the mode of being 
of understanding have the character of an event; the second, that the hermeneutical 
experience, as the experience of traditionary meaning, has a share in the immediacy 
which is always distinguished by the experience of the beautiful, as it has that of all 
evidence of the truth.”573 
              A second, yet important point is that the beautiful (kalon) concerns speech. In 
this way, beauty (the beautiful, the noble and the fine), for Plato, is key to an 
individual’s self-formation in life, and this self-formation is also our way of 
speaking.574 Today, however, the concept of beauty and speech seems misplaced, 
conservative, if not elitist, and yet, beauty matters to us. Speaking is how we are with 
others. If the gesture of the word is coded before we speak, then how we are with others 
                                                
572 Bruns, On the Anarchy of Poetry and Philosophy: A Guide for the Unruly, pp. 50-51. 
573 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], p. 479.  
574 In Crito, Socrates asks whether his speaking is noble and beautiful (kalon), because 
he wants to show Crito how speaking adequately is a matter of how the beautiful and 
the good are at play in argument.  
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is affected. Gadamer’s concern is to show us why speaking, truth and the beautiful 
assert themselves against modern scientific methodology. 
             We confront ourselves as actors in modernity through the Greeks – as we 
confront the question of theory – and this confrontation concerns how methodological 
speaking immobilizes dialogical play of words.  Greek thinking presents us with a self-
encounter that is otherwise concealed by the epistemological conditions of modernity, 
revealing why speaking encumbers subjects with monological features through 
methodological ideals.  In the Greek concept of theory, theory concerns a non-
instrumental approach to truth and knowledge. In this regard, beauty and theory has a 
special importance in Gadamer’s critique of theory, which is why the topic plays an 
important role in the closing arguments of Truth and Method.575  
             Our desire to create (ourselves), in Plato, is deeply attached to beauty: to the 
desire to create beauty in oneself.  The Greek ideal of moral beauty, in essence the 
beauty of mind shows itself to be the best part of the soul.576 In Gadamer’s view, the 
concept of beauty extends his own critique of self-consciousness and subjectivism. The 
ancient vocation of theoria confronts us because of what modern theory excludes: the 
place of self-formation in theory and its ethical task where speaking allows the subject 
to place themselves more intimately to themselves and others. This is linked to a 
tension between the ideal of value-neutrality and the question of vital values, like 
beauty. For Gadamer, modern theory hinders our sharing of speech with the whole 
                                                
575 As well as in Gadamer’s subsequent essay, appropriately entitled, “The Relevance 
of the Beautiful,” in The Relevance of the Beautiful, and Other Essays. 
576 Murdoch, Iris. “The Fire and the Sun: Why Plato Banished the Artists.” In 
Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and Literature. Edited by Peter 
Conradi. New York: Penguin Books, 1999. p. 364 & p. 425. 
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because objectivity stands over understanding, therefore, dominating our native speech 
and sharing. 
              Theory, for the Greeks, since Plato, concerns being at home with oneself in the 
world, as a conversation with society and others, where we work upon ourselves in 
society with others: because genuine conversation expresses our eternal and finite 
being.  Greek theoria concerns the vocation of theory. Theory, in its Greek sense, then, 
puts one in relation to oneself (the care of the soul taking place in conversation), and 
the social situation in which we live as a whole. 
              The beautiful reveals the comprehensiveness of hermeneutics: where the event 
of the beautiful and the hermeneutic process both presuppose the finiteness of human 
life. The good and the beautiful show that theory [dialectic and argument] is not simply 
a science but the journey of the soul. The beautiful is self-presentation, standing alone, 
while evoking us (in the sense of co-speakers) it also shows how we dwell in the world.  
The concept of beauty illuminates theory with regard to the question of coming to be at 
home in the world and making oneself at home.577  Beauty is knowing the world as a 
whole that rests in a finite knowing: how the whole of something is there in a different 
temporal experience (play, festival) other than through distancing or objectification. For 
beauty is neither objective nor neutral. 
               Gianni Vattimo explains the connection between theory and the beautiful in 
this way:  
                  Gadamer describes the linguistic and ethical dimension that governs 
experience by referring back to the Greek notion of kalon [beauty] in 
connection with theoria. In the earliest linguistic usage of the term by the 
                                                
577 Gadamer, “Greek Philosophy and Modern Thought,” in Beginnings of Knowledge, p. 
120. 
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Greeks, theoria is not primarily a formalized conceptual construct that entails 
an “objectifying” split between subject and object. It is, rather, related to 
participation in the god’s possession, a participation in which the theoroi 
function, moreover, as the delegates of their polis. It is thus a “looking at” 
which is also a “partaking in” and, in a certain way, a “belonging to,” rather 
than a possessing of an object.578 
 
          James Risser notes: “Everything that is language, Gadamer insists, has a 
speculative unity whereby that which comes into language is not something pre-given 
before language. This means that the being of language is self-presentation.”579  
             In Gadamer’s view the beautiful is the “most important ontological function: 
that of mediating between idea and appearance.”580 Beauty, then, is ontological. 
“Beauty of itself, presents itself,” meaning “that its being is such that it makes itself 
immediately evident.”581 Beauty, then, shows the evidentness of truth. Such evidentness 
of something also belongs, he further notes, to the tradition of rhetoric.582  
Gadamer says: “Now it [beauty] is no longer a question of, as it seemed in the 
nineteenth century, justifying the truth claim of art and the artist, or even that of history 
and the methodology of the human sciences, in terms of a theory of science. Now we 
                                                
578 Vattimo, “Truth and Rhetoric in Hermeneutic Ontology,” in The End of Modernity, 
p. 133. See also, Science in the Age of Reason. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
1981. pp. 56-70. 
579 Hermeneutics and the Voice of the Other, Re-reading Gadamer's Philosophical 
Hermeneutics, James Risser, SUNY, Albany, 1997. P.144. 
580 Ibid. p. 476. 
581  Gadamer writes: “Through the analogical function of the beautiful, which Plato has 
described in unforgettable terms, a structural characteristic of the being of the beautiful 
becomes visible, and with it an element of the structure of being in general.” Ibid. p. 
476. 
582 Ibid. p. 479. 
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are concerned, rather, with the much more general task of establishing the ontological 
background of the hermeneutical experience of the world.” 583 
             Both language and art share the self-showing of hermeneutic experience as the 
claim to truth. When the thing itself compels “us to speak of an event and of an activity 
of the thing. What is evident (enleuchtend) is always something that is said – a 
proposal, a plan, a conjecture, an argument, or something of the sort. The idea is always 
that what is evident has not been proved and is not absolutely certain, but it asserts 
itself by reason of its own merit within the realm of the possible and probable.”584 The 
“evidentness” of concepts, of idea and appearances, is more that one conceptual scheme 
chosen among others; it is a universal ontological claim. Plato’s concept of beauty 
merges with the event character of hermeneutic understanding itself.585 
             “The truth of a theory’, Brice R. Wachterhauser reminds us, “is beautiful 
because it is true not because it is beautiful”.586 Gadamer by putting the question of 
beauty in the closing section of Truth and Method [Language as the Medium of 
Hermeneutic Experience] permits us to see how the universality of hermeneutic 
practice replaces an estranged conception of theory.  
             Truth occurs as we experience the world in the “beautiful ambiguity of the 
question”.587 Beauty, then, takes on singular significance in Gadamer’s writings 
especially in the closing arguments of Truth and Method. Beauty is a characteristic of 
                                                
583 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], p. 479. 
584 Ibid. P. 479. 
585 Ibid. P. 481. 
586 Beyond Being, Gadamer’s Post-Platonic Hermeneutical Ontology, Brice R. 
Wachterhauser, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois, 1999. P.126 
587 Truth and Method, as is widely know, was not the original title for this work, rather 
it was Philosophical Hermeneutics. The publisher thought the word “hermeneutics” was 
too vague. 
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our being, like the event structure of all understanding.588  Beauty, Gadamer 
emphasizes, is not different from itself “in presenting itself.”589 In this regard, mimesis 
points to the closing of the gap between appearance and the idea. Mimesis is not simply 
about copy of something but the way something presents itself. It is a type of 
performance, where what is meant is there, it is itself what it means.  Thus, art and 
beauty both are models for understanding prior to formulation, which is self-
presentation.  Both words and images perform this event of their understanding in this 
way. Beauty shows how “it is possible for the particulars to participate in one 
idea…”590 therefore, according to Gadamer, “a structural characteristic of the being of 
the beautiful becomes visible, and with it an element of the structure of being in 
general.”591   
James Risser notes: “Consistent with Gadamer’s claim that as living language 
the being of language is in conversation, this means that the structure of being, the 
intelligible, is not simple copied language. Rather, in language the intelligible forms 
itself. In the word, as in the beautiful in its shining forth, there is a showing forth.”592 
              Our hermeneutical experience of the world shows us: “That being is self-
presentation and that all understanding is an event, this first and last insight transcends 
the horizon of substance metaphysics as well as the metamorphoses of the concept of 
substance into concepts of subjectivity and scientific objectivity.”593  
                                                
588 Ibid. p. 487. 
589 Ibid. p. 487. 
590 Gadamer, “Plato’s Unwritten Dialogue,” in Dialogue and Dialectic, p. 133. 
591 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], p. 481. 
592 Risser, Hermeneutics and the Voice of the Other: Re-reading Gadamer’s 
Philosophical Hermeneutics, p.149. 
593 Ibid. p. 484. 
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              Beauty attaches to the genuine experience (Erfahrung), where something 
asserts itself to us as truth. Gadamer writes: “The coming into language that occurs in a 
poem is like entering into relationships of order that support and guarantee the ‘truth’ of 
what is said.”594 Theory presents more than the scientific outlook. Truth and beauty 
share this capacity to present. Neither, is methodological, or is known through 
objectification. Rather, truth and being are part of the self-presenting qualities of 
thought. Gadamer affirms how ideas can be presented to us, as we participate in them 
(using the Greek term Methexis); as we mediate idea and appearance, which is shown 
by the way “[t]he idea of the beautiful is truly present, whole and undivided, in what is 
beautiful.”595 “The mind that unfolds from within itself the multiplicity of what is 
thought is present to itself in what is thought.”596 Gadamer asserts: “Just as the mode of 
being of the beautiful proved to be characteristic of being in general, so the same can be 
shown to be true of the concept of truth.597 
              Gadamer’s overall thesis has moved to dispel historicism, relativism, and 
objectivism from the self-understanding of the human sciences. He asks: what is true of 
the concept of truth? Gadamer’s broader vision draws on what he calls the 
metaphysical crux of Platonism to confirm the centrality of beauty in understanding the 
ontological function of language. He writes: “the basic idea [is] that language is the 
medium where I and the world meet or, rather manifest their original belonging 
together.”598  The universality of the medium of language has something to share with 
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596 Ibid. p. 483. 
597 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], p. 487. 
598 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], p. 469. 
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the universality of the concept of the beautiful that apply to critiquing the human 
sciences. With this ontological term, his inquiry has adopted the metaphysical idea that 
comes from Greek thought. “We will see,” he writes, “that this ancient conception of 
the beautiful can also be of service to the comprehensive hermeneutics that has 
emerged from the critique of the human sciences.”599 
              In the beautiful, both self-presentation and being understood belong 
together.600 The Greek idea of kalon (beauty) shows Beautiful things are those whose 
value of self is evident. The logic of this argument is that we see the beautiful as 
possessing self-evidentness [presentation], it does not differ to itself, but it is a 
cognitive faculty.  This allows us to see that beauty is a genuine experience of the thing 
in itself, like art, which is also a self-presentation of the true being of the work of art, 
and like the poetic word, each entails and asserts the concept of truth. The thing itself 
cannot be considered methodologically, but resides in the activity itself. Thus, the 
universal structure of our experience of being is of language as the being: “the being 
that can be understood is language.”601 
               We are being in language before anything else. Our relation to the world is 
fundamentally verbal. Beauty, truth and language are all manifestations of our original 
belonging together that are beheld in verbal (speech).602  
               What Gadamer shows is that the character of understanding, upon which the 
human sciences really reside, is not a method matter; in fact, methodological 
conception interferes with genuine knowledge and its transmission as I have sought to 
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601 Ibid. p. 474. 
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show.  “The objectifying procedures of the natural science and the concept of being-in-
itself, which is intended in all knowledge, proved to be an abstraction when viewed 
from the medium that language is.”603 The abstraction and loss from a genuine dialogue 
both with language and others results in the alienating stance of the human sciences and 
their place in the world. Understanding is a genuine experience we have and share, 
there is, as Gadamer says, no technical virtuosity involved, rather understanding has to 
be understood as a genuine encounter we have when something asserts itself as the 
truth. If nothing spoke to us in this way we would not have a world. 
                Hermeneutic experience is an acknowledgement that there is an 
understanding; that understanding comes forth by revealing itself in its being and we 
experience this in the medium of language. What impact this insight has for our 
conception of theory has been our on-going concern in these pages.  What we know is 
that being, in Gadamer’s view, is a matter of self-presentation and that understanding is 
an event, not a method. What is important, argues Gadamer, that these two insights: 
“[transcend] the horizon of substance metaphysics as well as the metamorphoses of the 
concept of substance into the concepts of subjectivity and scientific objectivity.”604  
               His critique of the human sciences is completed in understanding that 
language is the event of understanding in which we are mediated.  The truth lies in 
what we say and how we say it; and the poetic utterance, as we have seen, was for 
Gadamer a special case of this capacity of language to embody meaning in its 
utterance. 
                                                
603 Ibid. p. 471. 
604 Ibid. p. 484. 
 228 
                First, the concept of beauty is intimately related to the way we speak and 
experience words. That is beauty is self-standing in the way the poetic word can be. 
Our words do not happen through a superior knowledge of objects but rather our words 
embody us not as a subjective particularity but in understanding what is spoken in the 
evidentness of the way the words speak and share their truth with us.  
               Second, scientific methods appropriated into the self-understanding of the 
human sciences do not suffice to grasp the nature of truth, and the concept of beauty 
becomes an illustration as to why.  
              Why is the truth of the human sciences closer to an understanding of the 
concept of beauty? The difficulty that Gadamer wants to show, as did Plato, is that 
beauty is not a concept that is amenable to definition. Rather, beauty’s showing is 
different.  What beauty repeatedly illustrates is that theory [theoretical utterances and 
our understanding of them] cannot be reduced to a method of science, but requires 
recognizing not the limits, as it were, but the expansive meaning of understanding that 
make theoretical life possible in the first place. 
               Plato’s Symposium speaks of the “sudden vision of beauty” that is the 
experience of nothing other than the good itself. The Symposium is also the living 
embodiment of beauty itself not simply a set of discrete discourses at a party of friends.  
We can see that it is about beauty and not knowledge. 
                Beauty reins in the whole of the cosmos and makes this visible. Gadamer 
claims that it was in the tradition of Platonism that the conceptual vocabulary “required 
for thought about the finiteness of human life was developed.”605  Beauty and truth 
                                                
605 Ibid. pp. 486-487. 
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concern us as participating beings in the world. We are free to choose our way of life, 
our way of discourse, but we do not choose these for they are part of our lives that exist 
beyond any subjective appraisal of them. 
               Gadamer reminds us that speaking is never just when we subsume individual 
words under universal concepts.  Rather, speech unfolds naturally and conceptually in 
the dialectical unity of the word. Words, especially the poetic word, are themselves 
made present in what is said.606  This is true of the way Plato describes the beautiful. 
Truth’s power of self-presentation, especially, as found in the work of art, like the 
poetic utterance, attests to what the poem proclaims.  
              We are engaged in the realm of our senses, beauty and truth claim us, in our 
fundamental experience of the world, our mode of being in language, because beauty is 
one thing that opens us to the true nature of truth.  Out of our finitude, our 
hermeneutical experience of the world, what we experience is similar to our way of 
experiencing the beautiful, and the “idea that the beautiful is present in what is 
beautiful.”607  
              Beauty opens toward the good; they come together, since, both the beautiful 
appear and goodness appears, to reveal their being: that is, they are in their 
presentation. Gadamer writes: “What presents itself in this way is not different in itself 
in presenting itself. It is not one thing for itself and another for others, nor is it 
something that exists through something else.” 608 Such standing in its truth will be 
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important to grasping what exists too in the nature of theory and cannot be expelled by 
a methodological attitude. 
              Our place in our life work resides in recognizing our finitude in relation to that 
which exceeds us and stands before us, and within us, as in the poetic word.  Beauty 
also presupposes our finitude. Beauty challenges abstract consciousness by returning us 
to ourselves in its self-reflection. Beauty then, is not an act of reason, needing a special 
(methodological) access, but rather is an awareness of our residing in truth at play. This 
is especially evident in the being of speaking, where we can see our relationship to all 
that holds back from us, that refuses transparency, and yet demands we see ourselves 
within this larger whole as interpretive ethical beings.  
               In the closing arguments of Truth and Method, Gadamer says:  
When we understand a text, what is meaningful in it captivates us just as 
much as the beautiful captivates us. It has asserted itself and captivated us 
before we can come to ourselves and be in a position to treat the claim to 
meaning it makes. What we encounter in the experience of the beautiful and 
in understanding the meaning of tradition really has something of the truth of 
play about it. In understanding we are drawn into an event of truth and arrive, 
as it were, too late, if we want to know what we are supposed to believe.”609 
 
              Chris Dawson expresses the case well in his Forward to Gadamer’s Praise of 
Theory. Beauty, he says, “keeps overflowing the bounds of the aesthetic, spreading out 
to embrace all those things that Diotime calls the whole ocean of the beautiful 
(Symposium, 210d).”610  
                In Truth and Method, Gadamer says that the beautiful plays a role in ethics, 
while in Praise of Theory, he writes that the human impulse toward kalon has a 
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decisive, even defining, place in science as well.”611 What might this mean for the 
human sciences? Ever present is the universality of the beautiful. 
                Beauty brings us once again, as we have mentioned, to Gadamer’s 
“Platonism.” Beauty’s affinity to the Greek logos shapes Gadamer’s understanding of 
the linguistic presentation of ideas and the quest of theory.   
                 Beauty lies at the core of human life. This may seem an anomaly to the 
modern mind but once we follow Gadamer’s arguments, we begin to see why this 
concept is important. Gadamer tells us: “Science exists and is important for no other 
reason than because it is ‘beautiful’…This broadly conceived the beautiful (kalon in 
Greek) pertains to all theoretical science. It is the joy of theory, the joy of discovering 
the truth, that science lays claim to.”612 
               Beauty is not a recipe (or utility); Beauty attaches us to the intricate balance 
between knowledge and nonknowledge, between dialogue and pure conceptuality, as 
we articulate ourselves in the zone of theory. This is why the concept is so important to 
Gadamer. Plato taught that the beautiful is the good and the true. In other words, beauty 
is the display not only of self-validity in understanding but pertains to moral and 
intellectual clarity. Finally, beauty exists in the living play and certainty of our speech.  
               We may be in denial of the true and the beautiful in a social world caught up 
in extending one’s fulfillment in the logic of converting all experience into 
consumption. But it would also be true that neither concept can be assimilated; they 
push back. Truth, according to Risser is the “transformative unfolding of dialogue” but 
it is also the transformative unfolding of the universality of beauty.  
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               Plato’s sense of philosophical unity is repeatedly found to be the center of 
Gadamer’s thinking. When we say that our self-attestation occurs in our verbal 
performance, we mean the good occurs because: “Human life desires the good”. Such a 
seeing of things occurs in the way we are articulating ourselves as theorists, a unity 
shows itself in theory that involves the good, true and beautiful. 
              Beauty is the interface of the good and theory; beauty meets us as a “self-
evident” truth. What is at our disposal is this capacity to see and speak these things as 
linguistic events.  Thus, in theory we engage in a practice, speech, whereby being and 
the good are inextricable. 
              Beauty holds before us something that is common to us, for beauty illuminates 
the hermeneutic experience in the unity of expression. Beauty tells us something about 
our relationship to our conceptual work, our power of self-presentation that shows itself 
in our utterances. For example, the poem stands, like beauty, as a form of self-
presentation in which we can see truth. For this reason, poetic thinking is, important to 
understanding Gadamer’s aims. We can recognize things for what they are without 
further objects being added. We do not ask if art is proved by the facts but whether it is 
true. Gadamer says to “know what truth is in the human sciences,” we must look at the 
way we encounter a work of art.   
             By this, Gadamer means that we need to grasp how presentation is the practical 
craft of theory. Beauty allows us to see the ways in which we do not know ourselves, 
while articulating ourselves; there is no method, we are not methodologically guided by 
pre-set conceptualizations like science, rather we recognize ourselves in ignorance and 
dialogue, in perceptions we bring to presence in the art of talk. 
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              Beauty, like art, or the poem, if conceived in Kantian terms, is absorbed into 
and restricted by an assumption of a radical subjectivity distorting the meaning of art’s 
communicative power. The human sciences, as they turned away from art and historical 
studies, challenged the Kantian assumption of subjectivism and relativism, by 
becoming objective, as it were; this principle of justification – if not always consciously 
– is the counter-point to art and truth. 
              Beauty emerges naturally and centrally “from the critique of the 
methodologism of the human science,” according to Gadamer. That is, if one asks a 
question of the whole procedure of the human sciences in general, then art and beauty 
both become important in any discussion of understanding and the concept of truth in 
relationship to them. 
             The recovery of truth in the human sciences (truth as a belonging /dwelling in 
conversation) is uncovered by looking at the concept of beauty as a key to the event 
structure of being in general. What is common to beauty and art is common to all 
understanding. Encountering an artwork, for example, highlights this where there is 
always something to be seen that is in itself marked both by dialogue and hiddenness. 
The core of the experience of understanding leads naturally to finding an account of the 
truth baring capacities of the concept of beauty. When an object, or speaker, becomes 
an exposition of itself (when it stands alone); it exemplifies the concept of a self-
standing truth, as we discover in the concept of beauty.  
              Beauty’s power of self-presentation is in the act of interpretation. Beauty 
communicates itself, just as language communicates itself. The beautiful presents, 
therefore, with the quality of the self-evident. In this way, the beautiful has a special 
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advantage, as Gadamer says, in showing itself. Since such showing, as we have already 
seen, founds itself in truth.  He writes: 
 If we start from the basic ontological view that being is language – i.e., 
self-presentation – as revealed to us by the hermeneutic experience of 
being, then there follows not only the even character of the beautiful and 
the event structure of all understanding. Just as the mode of being of the 
beautiful proved to be characteristic of being in general, so the same 
thing can be shown to be true of the concept of truth.613  
 
              Gadamer adds: “Obviously what distinguishes the beautiful from the good is 
that the beautiful of itself presents itself, that its being is such that it makes itself 
immediately evident (einleuchtend). This means that beauty has the most important 
ontological function: that of mediating between idea and appearance.”614 The beautiful 
like the good, reveals itself in its being: “it presents itself. What presents itself in this 
way is not different from itself in presenting itself. It is not a thing for itself and another 
for others, nor is it something that exits through something else.” 615 
            Beauty restores what was lost in the transformation of the human sciences. In 
Truth and Method, Gadamer writes: 
If we now follow and examine the importance of Kant’s Critique of 
Judgment for the history of the human sciences, we must say that his 
giving aesthetics a transcendental philosophical basis had major 
consequences and constituted a turning point. It was the end of a 
tradition but also the beginning of a new development. It restricted the 
idea of taste to an area in which, as a special principle of judgment, it 
could claim independent validity – and, by so doing, limited the concept 
of knowledge to the theoretical and practical use of reason.616 
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                 Art is a mode of self-presentation. Art’s autonomy and interpretability 
coexist; an art work speaks, still further, it speaks of its being to us.  “A work of art 
belongs closely to what it is related to so that it enriches the being of that as if through a 
new event of being.” 617 Art is not simply an object that we stand over but is an object 
that is able to take hold of us. In this way, the discussion of beauty concerns the 
question of the self-presentation in theory and how theory takes hold of us.  Gadamer 
says, echoing Heidegger’s The Origin of the Work of Art, “When a work of art truly 
takes hold of us, it is not an object that stands opposite us which we look at in hope of 
seeing through it to an intended conceptual meaning. Rather, it is the reverse. The work 
is an Ereignis – an event that ‘appropriates us’ into itself” 618 
               “All encounter with the language of art,” says Gadamer, “is an encounter with 
an unfinished event and is itself part of this event. This is what must be emphasized 
against aesthetic consciousness and the neutralization of truth.” 619 The concept of play 
is a key to recovering the truth of art in relation to the human sciences. Play, like 
beauty, will show how we belong to a work of art and ultimately thereby being.  
 
Play, Truth, Art 
               Gadamer critically discussed play [Spiel] especially in his essay “Art and 
Play” in The Relevance of the Beautiful (Die Aktualität des Schönen). The concept of 
play, he claims, shows how truth appears in self-presentation (words, word 
combinations and concepts) that is itself to be understood as a form of performance. 
                                                
617 Ibid. p. 40. 
618 Gadamer, Gadamer in Conversation: Reflections and Commentary, p. 71. 
619 Ibid. p. 71. 
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Play, then, is a model of the hermeneutic experience. Aesthetic experience and art are 
traditionally located as playfulness (aesthetic play) but this does not fully capture how 
Gadamer uses the concept to counter a subjectivist view of aesthetic consciousness, or 
what he calls the “abstraction of aesthetic differentiation.”620 
               If art concerns the concept of play, as Gadamer argues, then “its actual being 
[being of art] cannot be detached from its presentation and that in this presentation the 
unity and identity of a structure emerge. To be dependent on self-presentation belongs 
to what it is [as art].” In the horizon of play we both belong to something in which we 
can no longer speak of having a fixed or controlled I as the unproblematic grounds to 
what we know.  
               Art’s quality of self-showing cannot be defined merely as an object of 
aesthetic consciousness. The “play character of play,” as Gadamer puts it, offers a way 
to understand our relationship to truth and language. Gadamer’s effort to define the 
“being of art” involves a consistent formulation of a hermeneutic ontology. He 
formulates this concisely in the following way: 
My thesis, then, is that the being of art cannot be defined as an object of an 
aesthetic consciousness because, on the contrary, the aesthetic attitude is more 
than it knows of itself. It is a part of the event of being that occurs in 
presentation, and belongs essentially to play as play.621 
 
            Art is itself part of the event of being that occurs in presentation, and belongs 
essentially to play as play, which implies a different way of understanding our own 
relationship to presentation, thereby, linking art to an ideality, a way of knowing that 
detaches itself from subjectivity and indicates art’s autonomy. It also shows that 
                                                
620 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], pp. 85-87. 
621 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], p. 116. 
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autonomy implies a particular way in which the spectator relates to the artwork. 
Theoros is, as Gadamer adds, a spectator, meaning the spectator is part of the play of 
the art (or festival); theory, insofar as theory involves us in such an act, occurs when a 
person is lost to themselves because they are involved or are present to the self-
presentation of the work (or artwork). This autonomy involves, for Gadamer what he 
calls a “transformation of structure,” one that occurs between players and in play for 
play where the players achieve ideality.622 Being present retains, paradoxically, the 
character of being outside oneself.623 
                 Play, in this special way, implies a form of transcendence that is expressed 
in Heidegger’s use of the term Er-eignis, discussed in The Origin of the Work of Art 
and The Essence of Truth, as “self-showing.” Such transcendence means we enter and 
become part of the event of truth of the artwork.  Er-eignis corresponds to play as 
Gadamer uses the term. One does not possess the meaning of an artwork the artwork is 
“there”.  
Truth happens in a playful way – it is a self-transformation – that cannot be 
understood as a passive contemplation. Rather, it involves a change in the viewer, 
where, as Gadamer says, the viewer has become engaged in the artwork but also has 
become another person.624 The viewer has undergone a transformation in the process of 
engagement with the artwork. Play shows us how the subject is taken over by the work 
that now constitutes the form of the actualization of the experience of art which leaves 
behind any concept of grounding. Play then offers a way to understand how we are also 
                                                
622 Ibid. p. 110. 
623 Ibid. p. 126. 
624 Ibid. p. 111. 
 238 
given over to something, and how a hermeneutic grounding involves losing a 
determinateness of metaphysical thinking. 
             Theory “plays” the theorist whose self-presentation is in his text, which allows 
the readers to enter and enjoy the performance. Play shows us that we grasp theory as 
we might art.625 In this way, theory can be seen also to bring something into 
appearance, to extend the idea to the way truth emerges through its performance. “My 
thesis, then,” writes Gadamer, “is that the being of art cannot be defined as aesthetic 
consciousness because, on the contrary, the aesthetic attitude is more than it knows of 
itself. It is part of the event of being that occurs in presentation, and belongs essentially 
to play.626  
              For Gadamer, play is an event of being. Theory is illuminated by the concept 
of play insofar as the understanding of the presentation of art, foregrounds two 
important points: First, theory is a presentation that takes the form of self-presentation 
(as it speaks of the “real” world) and second, theory involves an action by all players to 
make the transformation and reception of the work accessible.  
                 Theoros, Gadamer noted, means someone who takes part in a delegation to a 
festival. Theoria, he claims, is linked to participation (a true participation) and to 
understand this participation we must understand how we participate in art.627  
 Play immerses us in the game; we have a stake in the game where theory and practice 
become one. Play, notes Gadamer, is never a mere object but rather has an “existence 
for the one who plays along, even if only a spectator.”628  
                                                
625 Ibid. pp. 72-73. 
626 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], p. 116. 
627 Ibid. pp. 124-125. 
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                 Play is essential to the experience of art; it involves a self-forgetfulness, a 
giving over to something other than mere subjectivity. Art and speech convey the event 
of truth in that we recognize in each the way in which we are ensconced in a mode of 
presentation that is not exclusively subjective – subject and object. Play, involves self-
presentation, in which we have a relationship to the way we grasp play as a given and 
sufficient reality. We are bound up in play and in the presentation of play. Neither is 
this presentation the mere consequence of some original object, performance or word, 
rather play is more than the players yet involves all who participate.  
                The experience of truth is an event of truth. Art brings forth a validity 
recognized as a total mediation of that which it presents. The spectator is no longer a 
contemplative being, but an engaged being, losing themselves in the play of thought 
coming to discover a self-continuity through a common grasp of what is being 
discussed. One grasps the truth here because, in Gadamer’s view, play implies a self-
forgetfulness. Such a forgetfulness of oneself (which occurs in language) is required to 
properly be mediated by the idea (or artwork).  
  In art we encounter truth as a transformative event. According to Gadamer, truth 
is a transformation into structure that he identifies with the concept of play. What is 
present in play is neither reducible to the performer nor the spectator. Truth is not so in 
and of itself, rather, it is present in the form of a successful event in speech, art or 
theory. Play presents the way in which we experience truth, since in the playing both 
the spectator and player are suspended in the autonomous moment of truth.  
                                                                                                                                         
628 Gadamer, “On the Origins of Philosophical Hermeneutics,” in Hans-Georg 
Gadamer: Philosophical Apprenticeships, p. 178. 
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             Gadamer explains: “Play is structure – this means that despite its dependence 
on being played it is a meaningful whole which can be repeatedly presented as such and 
the significance of which can be understood.  But structure is also play, because – 
despite its theoretical unity – it achieves its full being only each time it is played.”629 
The transformation in structure that occurs in the experience of art, for example, also 
involves understanding one quality of the object (of art) as self-presentation. The 
players are not the subject of play, Gadamer says, rather play is the way presentation 
(darstellung) happens through the players.630  
                In play, we are autonomous performers bringing forth a representation that is 
“disassociated from the representing activity of the player.”631 Neither the player nor 
the spectator commands this condition. Gadamer contends we should understand the 
relationship between performer and observer, artist and artwork, theory and the subject. 
We see not just ourselves, but another to ourselves in the event of play. Something new 
comes into existence through the moment of play that depends on the original play yet 
now exists uniquely. Such a difference, according to Gadamer, now represents itself in 
the play of art, for example, and “is lasting and true.”632  
               Art is a presence whose existence rest on participation and engagement. 
Within these definitions we can better grasp how Gadamer extends the argument to the 
human sciences. Since aesthetic experience is close to us it too extends into our 
understanding of theory as in some measure a quality that involves self-presentation. 
                                                
629 Ibid. p. 117. 
630 Ibid. p. 103. 
631 Ibid. p. 111. 
632 Ibid. p. 111. 
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             According to Gadamer, play has an endless variety and may appear in “The 
play of light, the play of waves, the play of gears or parts of machinery, the interplay of 
limbs, the play of forces, the play of gnats, even the play on words.” 633 Chris Lawn 
puts it this way: 
“Play is a constant to-and-fro movement and Gadamer focuses on this incessant 
back and forth motion because it reveals something about the nature of art as 
being essentially incomplete and complete. The meaning of art works is what is 
revealed and opened up in a constant oscillation between artwork and 
interpreter. The meaning of the art work is never final, just as a game never 
reaches true finality; the game can always be played again and again and 
players will always be drawn into its horizon.”634 
  
            “All writing is a kind of alienated speech, and its signs need to be translated 
back into speech and meaning.”635 Play is a moment of suspension and insight that we 
characterize as a space of autonomy, in which truth happens in language. Gadamer’s 
emphasis upon speech, therefore, results in an inquiry of how we may once more find 
our voice in language. We search for a style of writing, says Gadamer, that “reads 
itself” in the likeness of the verbal, the spoken, the perfect yet unobtainable voice. With 
this priority of speech Gadamer locates the ontology of the hermeneutic experience in 
spoken language. Thinking seeks both the clarity of word usage but also struggles today 
with the metaphysically alienated word.  
                 Plato’s eloquence staged in the dialogues, presents the word (outside a 
modern technical view) as the word of the thinker that progressively discloses the 
object as a “positive dialectic” where agreement with oneself and others guides the 
                                                
633 Ibid. p. 103. 
634 Lawn, Chris. Gadamer: A Guide for the Perplexed. New York: Continuum, 2006. p. 
91. 
635 Ibid. p. 393. 
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process a shared process of search.636 This is a matter of the power of a conversational 
logic and the ideal that “what is, can never be completely understood,”637 since speech 
as living dialogue is always open to the unsaid. Art and speech are ways in which we 
participate in knowledge. Echoing Plato, Gadamer reminds us that speech opens us to 
the possibility of experimentation with the word as concept (and the word) that inheres 
in speech.  
             What limits the speaking-voice as theory (which both philosophy and poetry 
anticipate) is the ways in which we have come to consider our linguistic access to the 
world nominalistically. Gadamer writes: “One moves into a world that is created by the 
availability and communicative sharing that happens in speaking.”638  Gadamer’s 
contention is that we have linguistic access before we think of the matter in terms of a 
speech driven conceptually by a scientific mindset. Such access has already taken place 
and needs to be part of an account of the structure of theory. The voice is not a 
conceptualization but a recognition of the origin of the philosophic in speech. Our 
access to the other cannot be mastered since it is one that already happens within our 
commonality.  
                Having appropriated the wider discourse of modernity (metaphysics), we 
have begun to discover ourselves as the voiceless subject. We are neither at one with 
being nor with our words. This is not simply because of the desire for objective 
abstraction, or methodological separation, but rather a failure to discover the meaning 
                                                
636 See, Gadamer’s discussions in Plato’s Dialectical Ethics: Phenomenological 
Interpretations Relating to the Philebus. pp. 17-65. 
637 Gadamer, Truth and Method  [Second, Revised Edition], xxxv.  
638 “Greek Philosophy and Modern Thinking”, in, The Gadamer Reader, A Bouquet of 
the Later Writings, edited by Richard E. Palmer, Northwestern University Press, 
Evanston, Illinois, 2007. pp. 272-273. 
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of a living shared dialogue that does not lead to self-alienation. The Ancient Greek had 
confidence in the powers of speech. Can this be regained? Yes, if we see this as the key 
of modernity; that is, if we see that the voice of the theorist and the way he is asked to 
inhabit himself to produce a life form is a mirror of modernity.639 Theory and topic 
merge, in Giddens words, spiraling in and out of each other. Our verbal lives cut down 
and misdirected, perhaps, as Bauman has argued, away from self-love toward self-hate 
(ressentiment) thus disfiguring life even further away from the unity of beauty, theory 
and self that was affirmed by the Ancient Greeks.640  
               The totality of the world that is revealed in speech is because the experience is 
primarily verbal in nature.641 When Gadamer adopts the idea of Die Sachen, he 
detaches speech from any absolutely transcendent conceptual realm, such as a world of 
Platonic ideas, or the Hegelian conceptualization of the absolute, however, he carefully 
retains the sense in which language embodies wholeness. This unity itself is a linguistic 
fabric, found in our quest for the logos.  When we speak we understand one another in 
the unity of the word. Speaking remains tied to the language as a whole, the 
hermeneutic virtuality of discourse that surpasses at any moment that which has been 
said.642  
                                                
639 A theme that is taken up by Zygmunt Bauman in several of his works on 
postmodernity and ethics. Bauman is an important theorist, different to Giddens, for all 
his particular skill, in that Bauman discusses the way we live our lives without jargon, 
of the meta-structure of modern theory. 
640 See, for example, Zygmunt Bauman’s book Does Ethics Have a Chance in a World 
of Consumers? pp. 35-37. 
641 Ibid. p. 443. 
642 Gadamer, “Hegel and Heidegger,” in Hegel’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical 
Studies, p. 115. 
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                   Gadamer writes: “The virtuality of speech brings a totality of meaning into 
play, without being able to express it totally.”643 This remark emphasizes the powers of 
speech to bring forth something with out assenting to any completion of meaning. The 
word in effect multiplies, breaking down the methodological conception of language. 
Every word, writes Gadamer: 
Breaks forth as if from a center and is related to a whole, through which 
alone it is the word. Every word causes the whole of language to which 
it belongs to resonate and the whole-view that underlies it to appear. 
Thus every word, as an event of a moment, carries with it the unsaid, to 
which it is responding and summoning. The occasionality of human 
speech is not a casual imperfection of its expressive power; it is rather, 
the logical expression of the living virtuality of speech that brings a 
totality of meaning into play, without being able to express it totally.644 
 
             Bringing forth a word is already a part of the whole that lies within every 
being’s finite speech. This speculative idea of speech, speaks in dialogue with another 
that resonates beyond either speaker, speech then implies something to say without 
technical predefinition. Speech is, as we have seen earlier, more than what is said, and 
what may not be said.  
              Modern science operates to create its representations by generating technical 
discourse that forces them upon us as if they are self-evident terms. However, these 
merely become the self-concealment of truth. They are but a dream; to understand 
others through calculation and power. Gadamer invites us to consider the ways in 
which a tyranny surfaces amidst the domination of certain modes of speech. Gadamer 
argues that our struggle between truth and tyranny is still a matter of how we 
                                                
643 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], p. 458. 
644 Ibid. p. 458. 
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understand our relationship to living dialogue.645 An ethics of respect requires that we 
do not view theory outside the play of self-assertion or a need to acquire control.  
                   Play, in Gadamer’s view, is a medial voice that opens us to the middle 
space of understanding. While instrumental speech displaces truth and our primordial 
space of play as it is constituted in language. Giddens, in his terminology, speaks of 
how the subject today is “dis-embedded.” Modern science dis-embeds us from the 
primordial play of language. Speech after all is a space in which, at least in Heidegger’s 
terms, we are suspended because we are properly speaking in language that speaks. 
                   Speech implies the commonality of speaking beings that is neither a given 
community nor one tradition over another, rather it is a matter of dialogue across such 
differences, the possibility of coming to understanding across our differences.  
 
Art is Not Theoretical 
                    Art is neither subjective nor objective in our understanding. This is why 
the question of art becomes pertinent to social science. Gadamer writes:  
Art begins precisely there, where we are able to do otherwise. Above all, 
where we are talking about art and artistic creation in the preeminent sense, 
the decisive thing is not the emergence of the product, but the fact that the 
product has a special nature of its own. It ‘intends’ something, and yet it is 
not what it intends. It is not an item of equipment determined by its utility, 
as such items or products of human work are. Certainly, it is a product, that 
                                                
645 “The question is not whether human facilities, and thus the achievements of science 
in making our world known, also find sufficient reception in the minds of humanity. 
The opposite is the real life question for human beings: whether we will succeed in 
tying the immense increase in human power, but only through insight and increasing 
solidarity between people as it has been conceptualized via the heritage of Aristotle’s 
practical philosophy and paralleled in the great religions, as well as in other cultural 
circles.” Gadamer, “Aristotle and Imperative Ethics,” in Hermeneutics, Religion, and 
Ethics, p.160. 
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is, something produced by human activity that now stands there available 
for use. And yet the work of art refuses to be used in any way that is not the 
way it is ‘intended’. It has something of the ‘as if’ character that we 
recognized as an essential feature of the nature of play.”646  
 
                   Gadamer shows us that there is a manifestation of an object, or work, as in 
a work of theory, that is apprehended in itself. Once it was common to say that theory 
needed empirical verification that always implied a negation of theory in proportion to 
the greater truth to be found outside the work as a self-sufficient creation. 
                 Art points beyond itself within its manifestation. Theory may not be the 
same as the reproductive arts but, nonetheless, theory can generate a productive play of 
shared meaning through its rhetorical nature, which is the ideality of showing. To show 
something means that the thing shown is seen correctly by the spectator (or reader). 
Here, “[w]hat is shown is, so to speak, elicited from the flux of manifold reality. Only 
what is shown is intended, it is held in view, and thus elevated to a kind of ideality. It is 
no longer just this or that thing that we can see, but it is now shown and designated as 
something. An act of identification and, consequently, of recognition occurs whenever 
we see what it is that we are being shown.”647 
               Art shows self-concealment, i.e. that there is no truth unto itself, only the play 
of truth. Truth is the play that presents. The joy of recognition is the pleasure of 
knowing more than that which we are familiar. Recognition resonates with play. It is a 
concept of participation. We are not speaking of knowing something because it accords 
with some external fact, or something that is given by conceptual language, or in the 
alienated language of methodological thinking. According to Gadamer, we see where 
                                                
646 Gadamer ,“The Play of Art,” in The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays, 
pp. 125-126. 
647 Ibid. pp. 128-129. 
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“the known enters into its true being and manifests itself as what it is only when it is 
recognized.”648 Speaking of the concept of play he writes: 
This kind of representation leaves behind it everything that is accidental 
and unessential – e.g., the private, particular being of the actor. He 
disappears entirely in the recognition of what he is representing. But 
even what is represented, a well-known event of mythological tradition, 
is – by being represented – raised, as it were, to its own validity and 
truth. With regard to the knowledge of the true, the being and 
representation is more than the being of the thing represented…649 
 
             Speech is the relationship between things. It is communicability at its finest. 
“(I)n communicating with others, it presents the entities.” Conceptual clarity is a resting 
and tarrying, or “a way of being together,” an accomplishment as vital as the actual 
object of discourse. Here the emphasis is shifted to the saying (presenting) not the 
method of saying.   
                  Theory remains a communal dialogue because it presupposes speaking 
beings already within the commonality of speech.650 Theory is a dialogue between 
speaker and speaker – a space wherein one is present but only insofar as one has 
disregarded self. It is not a relationship between neutral thinkers to facts. Gadamer sees 
it as a “subject-to-subject” model that only makes sense when the speaker is understood 
to be involved in a conversational logic that knows no bounds.  
                 The event of art concerns the participatory dimension, so does theory. Art is 
not theory, and theory is not art. However, our participatory entry into the work and the 
                                                
648 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], pp. 101-110. 
649 Ibid. p. 114. 
650 “This idea of coming to shared understanding, which arises form a specific tendency 
of self-reflection in being with one another, must contrast the idea of coming to a 
purely substantive shared understanding and the way in which that idea is implemented 
in scientific conversation.” “On Plato’s Ethics,” in Plato’s Dialectical Ethics: 
Phenomenological Interpretations Relating to the Philebus, p. 38. 
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idea do happen. We agree to go along with the very play of discourse itself as it opens 
us toward a place of difference that does not control. Plato once termed this nowhere, a 
place where we write words within our souls that is true beyond self or other.  
               The Beautiful is the universal character of being. The artist’s construction and 
the poet’s construction, for example, also present the appearance of being in this 
universal manner.651 Beauty, like art, is self-presentation, which I have linked to the 
special qualities of both the poem and theory (neither is reduced by the other, rather 
they are mutually part of the coming to speech of ideas). Being is recognized in these 
realms, primarily as a form of belonging that is not reducible to a discourse based on 
method, or as Gadamer argues, neutralized by western metaphysics.  
                Plato prepares the ground for aesthetic discussion of the beautiful. He 
nonetheless also thinks of the concept of the beautiful non-aesthetically.652 Metaphysics 
delimits the concept beauty by delimiting it to aesthetics. The character of the beautiful, 
Gadamer argues, is the universal character of being. What Plato shows is that the 
speculative movement and mode of being has “a universal ontological significance.”653 
Gadamer reconstructs the “classical” Greek ideal of the beautiful for the modern reader 
to overcome the aestheticism of art, and point to the way art (and theory) to emphasize 
the speculative event presented by words and art, but most importantly to show Beauty 
engages us in self-evident appearance that is no longer contemplative but active, in the 
classical sense of poiesis.  
                                                
651 Gadamer, “The Relevance of the Beautiful,” in The Relevance of the Beautiful and 
Other Essays, p. 13. 
652 See, Heidegger’s lectures on Holderlin in Holderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’. Translated 
by William McNeill and Julia Davis. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984. pp. 
87-88. 
653 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], p. 475. 
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                 The Platonic theory of beauty has an affinity with the universality of 
hermeneutics, Gadamer writes: “If we start from the basic ontological view that being 
is language – i.e., self-presentation – as revealed to us by the hermeneutic experience of 
being (or we can add the pure poem), then there follows not only the event-character of 
the beautiful and the event structure of all understanding. Just as the mode of being of 
the beautiful proved to be characteristic of being in general, so the same thing can be 
shown to be true of the concept of truth.”654 
                 Art is not theoretical but like theory expresses the origins of 
conceptualization itself found in the weave of thinking and being. Art speaks to a 
belonging in which we participate and observe: we actively secure a place for ourselves  
in the art. Gadamer writes; “The experience of the work of art does not only understand 
a recognizable meaning, as historical hermeneutics does in its handling of texts. The 
work of art that says something confronts us itself. That is, it expresses something in 
such a way that what is said is like a discovery, a disclosure of something previously 
concealed.”655 
               The beautiful provides an image of something that discloses itself both by 
appearing, as a presentation and as a completion. Beauty is harmonious because it 
adequately shows something.  Gadamer turns to speak of beauty as being a mode of 
light. Which means it is visible itself, not by making something else visible to us but by 
making itself visible.  
            The human sciences should be brought closer to the rhetorical speech so that 
they can honestly speak of their work as bringing ideas to presence, and of providing 
                                                
654 Ibid. p. 487. 
655 Ibid. p. 487. 
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listeners with believable statements. According to Gadamer, sight becomes idea but 
only insofar as it “is only encountered in a form that resists pure conceptualization.”656 
Art is likened to participatory understanding – to play. Commonality or participation is 
lost within the privatization of knowing that flows from the subjectivism and 
objectivism of modern social science. 
               Gadamer writes, “This is the focus of our question: What does it mean,” he 
writes, “to speak of the ‘coming forth of the word’ [das Hervorkommen des Wortes] in 
poetry?”657 Gadamer sees the being of truth in the way language and art can be shown 
to weave together our discourse on the world. It involves the possibility of communal 
understanding that does not involve the necessity of a predetermined structure 
(dogmatism) of the logos.   
                 Truth speaks to the self-understanding of every person. We are bound to 
truth in our shared finitude. Truth lies within the human dimension of communication. 
Beauty and art both show that our understanding of truth concerns sharing that cannot 
be understood as in a model of total self-certainty, clarity, objectivity and transparency. 
Gadamer writes: “the language of art is constituted precisely by the fact that it speaks to 
the self-understanding of every person, and it does this as something ever present and 
by means of its own contemporaneousness.”658 Art, Gadamer says, has its being in the 
Vollzug – the vital, living event of its appearing, or its performance.”659 Gadamer says, 
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657 Gadamer, “On the Truth of the Word,” in The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of the 
Later Writings, p. 143. 
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“I take a different approach to the question of what truth, aletheia, or unconcealment 
really means. I invoke the concept of energeia here, which has special values because 
in dealing with it we are no longer in the realm of sentence truth.”660 We cannot do this 
with any method; rather, truth and living, is a part of all understanding, a part of our 
hermeneutic being. Art then, has its being in this vital event of appearing and this 
agrees with the “Greek teachings about beauty and its application.”661 
               His vision of art agrees with his conceptual reflections on the Greek concept 
of beauty. However, we are presented with a paradox if what comes forth cannot be 
explained, or rather “cannot be put into words.” What we have to understand is that 
Gadamer is saying we have language and language understands, within limits, yet 
produces because of the fact that presentation may hold something back within itself 
and does not yield entirely to our comprehension. Art speaks.  Art shares something 
along with all speaking, since like speaking it is “more than an anticipation of meaning. 
It is what I would like to call surprise at the meaning of what is said. […] The work of 
art that says something confronts us itself. That is, it expresses something in such a way 
that what is said is like a discovery, a disclosure of something previously concealed.”662 
This must be understood as active in relation to us, as something having a reality for us, 
where the lyrical and ethical are linked.  Gadamer speaks of the Greek concept of 
energeia, of the simultaneity of activity and reality.  Like understanding speech, we 
understand something more than what appears in the wording of what is said, Gadamer 
describes as a unity of meaning that “always transcends what is expressed by what it 
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said.”663 Art then consists in the way we experience this while “it both conceal[s] itself 
and at the very same time authenticates itself.”664 
 
Richard Bernstein and the Question of Truth in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics 
               By contrast, the ideal of knowledge, determined by the concept of method, 
“consists in pacing out a path of knowledge so consciously that it is always possible to 
retrace one’s steps. Methodos means a path of recreated investigation. Always to be 
able once again to go over the ground one has traversed, that is methodical and 
distinguishes the procedures of science.” In What is Truth? Gadamer remarks: 
There is [also] much in the human sciences that can be brought under 
the concept of method of modern science. Each of us must allow as valid 
the verifiability of all knowledge-claims as an ideal at the limits of 
possibility. But we must admit that this idea is very seldom reached and 
that those researchers who are the most precise in striving for it often do 
not have the truly important things to say.665 
 
                  Richard Bernstein has written a comprehensive and eloquent account of 
Gadamer’s Truth and Method, nevertheless he challenges the significance of 
Gadamer’s concept of truth.666 He seeks a positive concept of truth, and, to put it 
simply, Gadamer is asserting a negative understanding of truth (which he says includes 
echoes of Hegel). This puts the matter rather simply, but it captures the way Gadamer 
draws on the Greek sense of aletheia of concealment and revealment.  Bernstein feels 
that in the end we do not get a clear distinction between the meanings of truth and “the 
                                                
663 Ibid. p. 101. 
664  Gadamer, “The Art Work in Word and Image,” in The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet 
of the Later Works, p. 214. 
665 Gadamer, “What is Truth?”  in Hermeneutics and Truth, pp. 33-41. 
666 See, Bernstein, “From Hermeneutics to Praxis,” in Beyond Objectivism and 
Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis, p. 168. 
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validation claims of truth” from Gadamer. In this way, Bernstein introduces 
Habermas’s critique of Gadamer.667 
                 Bernstein objects to Gadamer’s devaluing Enlightenment thinking. He thinks 
that Gadamer is not providing an adequate hermeneutical account of its political and 
social roots. He sees this as a fundamental ambiguity in Gadamer’s treatment of the 
human sciences. He writes: 
There is a fundamental unresolved ambiguity in Gadamer’s philosophy 
concerning the social sciences. However much one recognizes the 
importance of the hermeneutical dimension of the social sciences, one must 
also forthrightly confront those aspects of these disciplines that seek to 
develop theoretical and causal explanation of social phenomena. Sometimes 
– and Gadamer’s remarks about the social sciences are very sparse – he 
writes as though they are like underdeveloped natural sciences, implying 
that it is essential for us to realize their limited relevance,” because they 
never tell us how they are to be applied.668 
 
 
                Bernstein’s argument can be challenged because it is evident he is asking of 
Gadamer what Gadamer is not proposing.  Gadamer is not proposing a theory of 
science, although he retains a vision of that culture. What Gadamer does want to say is 
that both sciences and human inquiry reside in a fundamental conception of the 
beautiful. This is not about the adequacy or inadequacy of his view of science, or the 
human sciences, but his view of the wider question of our relationship to theory as 
either alienating or non-alienating. Bernstein has not addressed Gadamer’s discussion 
of beauty adequately. He overlooks the way this poses a question about what a 
philosopher’s discourse is and what a philosophical life is. 
                                                
667 Ibid. p. 168. 
668 Ibid. pp. 160-161. 
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              Bernstein does not see it as a question of philosophical writing itself or the 
manner and way we take up theoretical writing. It means that to arrive at any assent in 
dialogue involves more than validity claims.  Truth involves overcoming oneself in the 
process of theoretical discussion, not just an artificial agreement or consent with others 
driven by a methodological stance but through a stance that anticipates dialogue. 
              Beauty, as a concept, is a counterpoint to the alienation of dialogue. James 
Risser notes that: “For Gadamer, the mimetic field, although endless by virtue of its 
practical performance (which we describe as the temporal aspect of theory), is not a 
house of mirrors without a referent, an endless play of a copy copying a copy. Rather to 
be caught up within the mimetic field is to be caught in a play of truth.” 669   
                Bernstein claims that truth, in Truth and Method, never becomes “fully 
thematic.” Truth though is not something that is “fully thematic” or “true”. As if there 
is a truth of truth. We are still able to say things that we cannot fully thematized. 
However, this does not exclude truth. Truth signifies a limit on the thematic, not the 
exclusion of judgment, but rather alludes to the way we think we are acquainted with 
what we know. Bernstein seems to capture, but not capture what this implies for any 
critique of metaphysics. Perhaps the problem is that Bernstein is still within the 
problematic of metaphysics and construes the debate as purely a duality, rather than 
seeing that what Gadamer seeks is a reconfiguration of our prejudice for metaphysical 
thinking. 
                                                
669 Risser, James. “The Imaging the Truth in Philosophical Hermeneutics.”  In 
Phenomenology, Interpretation, and Community. Edited by Lenore Langsdorf and 
Stephen H. Watson with E. Marya Bower. Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1996. p. 166. 
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                 We are reminded, once again, of Gadamer’s thesis: “The humanities and the 
social sciences, whose honor I am trying to defend by offering a more appropriate 
theoretical justification, really belong in the same line of succession, and have the same 
heritage as philosophy.”670 
                 Critique is in an awareness of our hermeneutic situation that implies a 
relationship to the question of Being [Sein] insofar as being is self-reflection in the 
universality of language [being-in-language]. Gadamer has said: “We encounter the 
world as we encounter another human.  Speech makes Being accessible, we are 
accessible to one another, and this is not a matter, as we know, of an appropriate 
method – a methodos of logic.” 
                Anthony Giddens spoke of the theorist/theory as a “subject standing over and 
against as ‘object’ – our world of ‘objects’. Giddens summarizes the logic of methodos, 
one that estranges truth from theory. But Giddens theorizing is deeply wedded to a 
view of theory, like modernity, as something apart from us; between lay culture and 
theory culture. The distinction of the human sciences then is not that they are sciences 
but that they address us when “we repeatedly come to realize something we did not 
know before, something we have always wanted to know. What they offer has first to 
be said to us and then we respond by saying, ‘I understand.’” 671 Giddens, however, is 
not interested to hear what addresses us but rather he wants to validate “theory” 
(sociological knowledge) as a knowledge that “spirals in and out of the universe of 
social life, reconstructing both itself and that universe as an integral part of that 
                                                
670 Gadamer in Conversation: Reflections and Commentary, p. 53. 
671 See, Gadamer in Conversation, Reflections and Commentary. Edited by Richard E. 
Palmer, Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 2001. p. 50. 
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process.” 672 Thus, conceding to a hermeneutic vision, but clearly staying within a 
matephysical pattern of thinking.  Understanding is not the apprehension of an object 
over which we stand; rather, understanding is an event of our being in language, of our 
being in the world. 
               Beauty concerns a self-attestation and presentation that is inherent to theory 
too. A concept tells me what it wants to say; beauty reminds us of the occasions when 
there is a closing of the gap between idea and appearance, when our belonging to 
speech and concepts, is quite different to concepts that seek self-transparency (the 
absolute assumption of “scientific” consciousness), or mastery. Concepts rather can 
disclose something in a harmonious way within themselves.673 Concepts speak to us; 
this is the truth of a concept, and we learn this with the concept of beauty. 
Beauty shows how speech and human understanding is not about mastering 
something that stands opposite us; it is not simply a question of knowledge but more 
importantly is a matter of understanding. Understanding occurs as an ethical 
relationship. A question happens; we can recognize what someone is saying or what 
they want to say as an unthematized truth.  Beauty is not thematic, we have seen.  We 
share in the possibility of a universal agreement. Thematizing something simply fails to 
acknowledge how things come to appearance in speech, how something is shared that 
has already placed me in relationship to others.  Beauty shares itself without conceptual 
definition. When we are caught in the self-objectifying tendency of the mastery of 
doing a “science” the human scientist sets in play a self-alienation from the core nature 
of the theorizing self.  To self-annul what already concerns me as well as others, is to 
                                                
672 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, p. 15-16. 
673 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], p. 481. 
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alienate myself. Beauty, however, shows us how we have access to a non-objectifying 
sense of the truth.  
What Gadamer’s discussion of the beautiful allows us to see, I argue, is that the 
whole can become visible to us in speech. Each of us can agree, should we wish, to an 
assertion not purely by argument but by the play of speech that aims to say what is true, 
especially, of things that we cannot subsume under the language of science.  
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Chapter 6. 
 
 
 
                                                   The Nature of Theory 
 
 
 
It is not easy for the human sciences to find the right understanding for the nature of 
their work with the public at large. What truth is to them, what disseminates from them, 
is difficult to make visible.674 
 
 
 
Our concluding chapter takes up two challenges to Gadamer’s conception of truth and 
theory. Before I turn to discuss both Richard Bernstein and Karl-Otto Apel, I want to 
clarify further the context for the claim that theory is an ethical and lyrical practice, 
and, second, why, I have adopted the broader term ‘poetics’. Once again our chapter 
takes up the argument that Gadamer’s hermeneutic theory grasps the truth of the human 
sciences. As I have argued at length, the human sciences have phrased this matter in 
divergent ways, but what should by now be clear is that the question of truth and theory 
recurs in different ways. One of these is Zygmunt Bauman’s declaration, which, I think 
summarizes the question:  
We sociologists rarely write poems and yet, if we do not share the fate of “false 
poets” and resent being “false sociologists,” we ought to come close as the true 
poets do to the yet hidden human possibilities [my emphasis]; and for that reason 
we need to pierce the walls of the obvious and self-evident, of the prevailing 
ideological fashion of the day whose commonality is taken for proof of its 
sense.675 
 
                                                
674 Gadamer, “Truth in the Human Sciences,” in Hermeneutics and Truth, p. 25. 
675 Bauman, “Afterthoughts: On Writing and Writing Sociology,” In Liquid Modernity, 
p. 203.  
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            Bauman reaches toward a rhetorical conception of theory. Bauman’s conception 
of theory, I argue, is the meeting point between historical concepts, new concepts, and 
living conversation with theory as it moves within contemporary social life as the 
language of insight. Bauman reinvents his own language, like a writer of prose, he is 
not encumbered by a conceptual machinery of disciplinary rhetoric. Social life resides 
in his prose style. His is not a “sociology” of “objects”, but rather, it is a language that 
is more musical than scientific, (Socrates in the Phaedo said his work was ‘music’ for 
this was what he was already doing) as we enter along with his concepts we enter into a 
public discussion. That discussion is conceptually illuminating and that brings us closer 
to being at home (a comportment in which we hold ourselves) in what is being said. 
Thus, we are no longer alienated by the prose of a thinker who is theorizing our world. 
Theory concerns conceptual work that we are already doing but becomes misplaced 
when we conform to the ideal of scientific theory. It is here that social theorists 
recognize that they are out of sync with what they are actually doing because it was 
self-alienating. Bauman’s own prose and concept formation echoes the memorable way 
Socrates spoke of his task. Bauman reaches toward the listener and shares his concepts 
without the distraction of methodological pretensions.  
Here we see how Bauman identifies the poet’s special power, in relation to the 
practice of writing theory in the human sciences. The implication is that it is the power 
of the word to redirect our thinking, to mobilize our moral sense, and break through 
objectification and its alienating walls. When Gadamer identified the problem of the 
human sciences in terms of the dimension of self-creation over that of self-alienation 
that has plagued the human sciences in their traditional self-conception, his project 
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converges in some measure with Bauman’s formulation.  And in answer to Bauman we 
argue that it is the hermeneutic dimension of being humans that opens toward speech 
that is not false, for it concerns how we take up ourselves as we speak. Hence, as we 
have seen, Gadamer’s way of drawing upon the Greek conception of thinking and self-
discovery as dialogue now emerges through Bauman’s own formulation of sociology 
and poetics. 
                For Gadamer, “Our verbal experience of the world is prior to everything that 
is recognized and addressed as existing.”676 This means we can say that true 
meaningfulness for example, in the human sciences, concerns a deeper question than 
what their scientific self-understanding might provide. It points to the ethical and moral 
dimension of thinking that came into view with the ethical paradox of sociological 
discourse. 
            Alan Blum, we may recall, calls for a change in the sociologist’s relationship to 
the “language of sociology.” Like Gadamer, Blum identified the problems of sociology 
in terms of the rules of creation of their speech. Speech transforms its objects of study 
into external objects (thus rationalizing the other) bringing about a paradox 
(rationalization of the self) through the inner speech of the sociologist. Blum puts the 
problem this way, “Talk about ‘solving problems’ then permits the sociologist to speak 
as if he has an independent criterion for deciding the adequacy of sociology because it 
                                                
676 In Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], Gadamer writes, “That language 
and world are related in a fundamental way does not mean, then, that world becomes 
the object of language. Rather, the object of knowledge and statements is always 
already enclosed within the world horizon of language.” p. 447. 
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sounds as if the problem is external to sociologizing itself rather than a product of its 
creation.”677  
           Bauman contextualizes the problem as a product of the paradox of the human 
sciences in postmodernity. In Intimations of Postmodernity, he points out that a changed 
social reality requires a new relationship to modernity found in a reorientation to both 
social reality and the reality of sociological theory, both of which require grasping the 
connection between speech and theorizing. Sociology’s need for new strategies, to 
generate sociological discourse as ethical discourse requires what he calls the 
“sociology of postmodernity.” This is a two-fold demand to respond to the changes in 
society and a sociological discourse to capture these changes. The shift concerns, in his 
view, with the replacement of one ethical discourse (the objective, trans-local and 
impersonal truth) of modernity, with another, that is hermeneutic in conception. 
            Hermeneutic universality places into the context the ethical and linguistic 
dimension of being human (our lyrical and ethical being), that, to use Blum’s 
conception, concerns how “What I hear my-self speak (voice) must be converted into 
some thing that all can hear,”678 so that, in this listening, we can now change our 
relationship to the scientific self-understanding of the human sciences, thereby 
challenging our self-conception and our relationship to the human sciences and, 
consequently the way we think we are using the language of sociology. In this regard, 
both Gadamer and Bauman identify how speech and sense lie at the root of this “ethical 
paradox of modernity” that is also the ethical paradox of theorizing.  
                                                
677 Blum, Theorizing, pp. 237-238. 
678 Ibid. p. 131. 
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             Zygmunt Bauman will be our example of this new self-understanding of the 
human sciences. We will also discuss the arguments of Karl-Otto Apel and Alan Blum, 
mentioned above, and revisit the singular significance of Plato once more, in order to 
further illuminate Gadamer’s position. 
              When we go back to the Greek idea of understanding the world, as we have 
seen, we see that theoria is conceived as an overwhelming presence that is accessible to 
all in common. Further, were the truth of Being enters in this commonality through the 
sharing of language in dialogue. Theoria concerns sharing one self with the other in 
speech. Our original belonging together, of man to Being, traverses ancient and modern 
conceptions of theory. An autonomous, neutral, and objective character of speech, 
ruptures the interweaving of the one and the many, reducing social life to an object, and 
not the truth effect of speech.  
            Theory, then, concerns “belonging to” something, which we experience in our 
questioning; It is not simply something that we possess, since if thinking were only a 
possession we would be estranged from truth. Theory is the “onto” - “logical” structure 
of self-differentiation. Theory is not simply the production and reproduction of a 
neutral body of knowledge. Theory carries this contradictory movement, truth as non-
contradiction, and to the art of discourse and rhetoric that Vattimo reminds us asserts 
itself as ethical stance.679 In the Greek view, theory was methexis, (participation); the 
modern human sciences then reveal to us the paradox of theory that attempts to detach 
itself from methexis.  
                                                
679 See, Vattimo, “Truth and Rhetoric in Hermeneutic Ontology,” p. 135. 
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              We are inescapably connected to our participation in conversations that make 
it possible to convey thoughts, a theme that recurs throughout his discussion of theory. 
A central theme of Gadamer’s thinking is Plato’s dialectic. Gadamer notes that the 
“doctrine of ideas” is a defense against Parmenides’ thesis, a way of thinking as 
questioning. Thus: “dialectic is the art of conversation and includes the art of having a 
conversation with oneself and fervently seeking an understanding of oneself.  It is the 
art of thinking. But this means the art of seriously questioning what one really means 
when one thinks or says this or that.”680 For Gadamer, the Platonic dialogue is thinking 
as questioning, a journey where one is never satisfied with what they are saying. 
Theory, therefore, is a “good” because it is a desire of speech to speak the good, as we 
see in the figure of Socrates.  Theorizing does not concern simply putting something at 
our disposal, but rather, “constantly points beyond itself. The work that goes on in a 
Platonic dialogue has its way of expressing this: it points toward the One, toward 
Being, toward the Good which is present in the order of the soul, in the constitution of 
the city, and in the structure of the world.”681 
                Speaking is already interpretation; it is normative and shared; but it is also the 
place where we are already on the way to truth. Such a questioning inquiry (question 
and answer) is what characterizes the human sciences and positions them in truth: that 
is, in the power of their conceptual speech and not the power of the use of scientific 
                                                
680 Gadamer, “Autobiographical Reflections,” in The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of 
the Later Writings, p. 31. 
681 Ibid. p. 31. 
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methods that traditionally defines them.682 Gadamer argues that the ideality of meaning 
of the word shows that “it is meaningful already,” thus our “experience of the world is 
not wordless to begin with.” Rather, “experience of itself seeks and finds the right 
words that express it.”683 Understanding, conceptual words are not solely or purely 
technical684 but are part of the dialogic capacity of the speaker.  When words are 
perceived as tools they lose purchase on us, they are no longer authentic words of 
speech or theory, words that we can experience both as true and as a part of our 
experience.              
               We dwell in speech that accesses Being. There is no way of fully 
encompassing language, for its capacity for truth resides, as it were, in the  ontic 
mystery of speaking685 summarized in Heidegger’s remark: “Being that can be 
understood is language.” Truth exists in the mysterious balance of the “onto” - 
“logical”,686 Being and language. That untruth inheres in the concept of knowledge 
itself is productive of knowledge.687 Thus, there is no outside to the word that struggles 
to speak more authentically or truthfully to us. Heidegger’s later direct turn to “poetic 
thinking” (a thinking in his view, that is genuinely philosophical rather than technically 
                                                
682 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], pp.481- 484. “Throughout 
our investigation it has emerged that the certainly achieved by using scientific methods 
des not suffice it guarantee truth.” p. 484. 
683 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], p. 415. 
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concept. A technical term is always somewhat artificial insofar as either the word itself 
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685 Heidegger, Parmenides, p. 12. 
686 From the Translator’s Epilogue to Heidegger’s Ontology – The Hermeneutics of 
Facticity, pp.88-99. 
687 Gadamer, “Parmenides and Being,” in The Beginning of Philosophy, pp. 107-125. 
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scientific) follows his early conviction that language is not simply a medium for 
conveying meaning. Gadamer conceptualizes the difference between ancient and 
modern theory this way: 
The difference between Greek theoria and modern science is based, in my 
opinion, on different orientations to verbal experience of the world. Greek 
knowledge, as I pointed out above, was so much within language, so exposed to 
its seductions, that its fight against the dunamis ton onomaton never led it to 
develop the idea of a pure symbolic language, whose purpose would be to 
overcome entirely the power of language, as it is with modern science its 
orientation toward dominating the existent.688 
                    
             Speech lies at the center of life and theory. The Greeks recognized this in their 
view that life can be understood only with a philosophy of dialogue. The logos, 
argument by reason does not, as Plato knew, fill the space of persuasion and 
understanding fully. Speech concerns a sharing [being-with-others], yet speech that 
aspires to “pure reason” is not able to sustain a sense of communal life. Conversation 
and argument entail, in some measure, both crafting of stories and conceptual 
invention. Theory creatively assembles our words into a communal communication that 
becomes effective as an understandable way to read the world.689  
                                                
688 Ibid. p. 451. 
689 Richard Sennett, addresses his relationship, as a theorist, to his style of writing, in 
Together, The Rituals, Pleasure and Politics of Cooperation, where he points out that 
writing is a cooperative practice, a communal action, with the reader. He writes, “I 
want to practice cooperation on the page.”689 Sennett, Richard. Together: The Rituals, 
Pleasures and Politics of Cooperation. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012. p. 30.  
Here conversation, between teacher and student, is, in the sense that Plato understood, 
about how a teacher leads a student to enter knowledge in sharing conversation 
together, thus, as Plato says, progressing toward “many beautiful discoveries” (150D7-
8) that, due to their taking up of ideas for themselves, now appear to come entirely from 
“within themselves (par’ hauton: 150D7).”689 See, Sayre, Kenneth M. Plato’s Literary 
Garden: How to Read a Platonic Dialogue. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1995. pp. 17-18. 
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             Clearly, the emphasis here on the reader/listener relationship concerns how 
speakers keep company with each other, with the argument of the philosopher.690 In 
other words, Plato’s dialogues represent a sharing (cooperation) that happens in 
conversation as knowledge. Plato emphasized that knowledge takes place in 
conversation. Socrates did not simply see speaking as superior to writing, but that 
writing and speech, were a moral responsibility, the responsibility to speak and write 
truthfully. Speaking is never simply a technically neutral act.691 Speaking, as well as 
our speaking-in-writing, animates the act of understanding. This would be equally true 
in writing theory.  Theory then takes natural language, everyday language, as its 
resource to shape and transform its own speaking that is not simply a way of creating a 
symbolic language. 
             The human sciences are inescapably rhetorical.  Theory seen as an ideal of a 
non-participating observer, the detached theorist (as a “scientist”), “neutral” and 
“scientific” speech [rhetoric], now contrasts with a notion of theory that “endeavor[s] 
instead to bring to our reflective awareness the commonality that binds everyone 
together.”692 We share theory, as we know, on a page (except when we bring it into a 
classroom or share it in a public speech) according to the power of speech, and the way 
we can bind one another in our written relations. In “To What Extent does Language 
                                                
690 Sayre notes that in Seventh Letter, Plato speaks of conversations that include “well-
disposed refutation by cross examination,” also described as “question and answer 
without indulgence and ill-will (eunioa: 151C8).” Ibid. p. 17.  
691 “So, this then is quite clear: Writing speeches is not in itself a shameful thing. Ph. 
How could it be? So. It’s not speaking or writing well that is shameful; what’s really 
shameful is to engage in either of the shamefully or badly.” Plato. Phaedrus. Translated 
and Introduced by Alexander Nehamas & Paul Woodruff. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995. 
p. 51. 
692 See, Gadamer, “Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task,” in Reason in the 
Age of Science, p. 135. 
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Perform Thought,” Gadamer writes: “The persuasive speech is one that binds one man 
to another or even with himself is so intuitive and living a way that they seem 
inseparable from one another can nevertheless take on the rigid form of written 
relations.”693 Theory then is a form of cooperation we enter into with a reader 
(audience). Theory concerns, therefore, how we participate in these conversations, 
about social life (and tradition), as well as how, when we participate, we are also in a 
conversation with ourselves. 
               Theory makes a claim upon us, concerning the good and the true; through a 
cooperation that resides in dialogic skill. Social life itself is a conversation694 rooted in 
cooperation. In one form or another, theory skills are a part of our social dialogue 
rooted in cooperation. Gadamer, then, in this respect, follows Aristotle, by recognizing 
that although we may not always understand, there might be something perhaps 
insufficient in our words, yet we, nonetheless, communicate, because conversation 
moves forward in our verbal play and listening; as Plato presented in the figure of 
Socrates. The theorist, then, aims at a balance between the two, finding the right way to 
speak and finding the right understanding. By following discourse with understanding 
(sharing in that discourse), either in living discussion or in theory, we aspire to be 
conceptually convincing. This is a persuasion that is founded on the rhetorical aspect of 
speech and dialogue [conversation] that completes itself with our experience of having 
to hand, in what we say, knowledge of the true. 
                                                
693 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second Revised Edition], p. 551. 
694 Richard Brown sees social reality as symbolic [like a “text”] therefore, rhetoric is 
“central to the constitution of truth” and  “there is no social reality that is not 
experience through the matrix of discourse.” Brown, Society as Text: Essays on 
Rhetoric, Reason, and Reality, p. 86. 
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The Rhetorical Nature of the Event of Truth 
               Hermeneutic truth is clearly not a truth proper to science; rather, hermeneutic 
truth permeates life and gives birth to science, but its base is speech (dialogue and 
dialectic). Hermeneutic truth, in fact, is the larger (ethical) context for mediating 
scientific understanding. The question of truth is something that returns to us, 
exemplified in the human sciences, and the question of theory, pointing back to Plato, 
and the Greeks. Gadamer’s concerns, to answer why theory has become “truth in itself” 
and how the telling of truth, is enchanted with the methods of science.  
                Gianni Vattimo observes, “the rhetorical essence [of science], in a sense, of 
scientific logic itself is for the most part limited, however, to a generic acceptance of 
the conventionality of scientific paradigms,”695 adding: “If we take seriously 
Gadamer’s discourse concerning the theoria and the kalon as sites of truth, then we 
must say that the moment of truth for science is not primarily that of the verification of 
its propositions or the laws that is discovers; rather, it consists in a “reconnection” to 
collective consciousness, and it too is therefore characterized in essentially rhetorical 
terms, though necessarily deeply colored with pragmatic concerns.”696 
                Truth is in the speech event of natural language. It is the ground that makes 
possible all concept formation (which is why speech unfolds for Plato into dialectical 
enunciation that governs thinking critically and analytically, and why Socrates practices 
its art as an ethical commitment), that helps us further understand why the nature of 
                                                
695 Vattimo, “Truth and Rhetoric in Hermeneutic Ontology,” in The End of Modernity, 
p. 137. 
696 Ibid, p. 136. 
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social theory occurs inside of the practice of the truth of science, with its neutralizing 
capacity. The tension between a scientific speech and a non-scientific speech lies at the 
center of our concern, because understanding theory in the human sciences, involves 
consideration of both the style and rhetoric of concept formation, thus the limitations of 
scientific rhetoric to its concerns. 
                 Truth is pervasive to life; truth shows the limits of deep metaphysical 
assumptions that guide modern thinking, and, specifically, the human sciences, whose 
authority rests on an ideal (of its own speaking) of a “scientific” theoretical knowledge. 
Gadamer notes in Truth and Method, “The point is to ask how far we can think 
language independently of the sign of representational conception of language that is 
governed by metaphysics.”697 Since their founding, the human sciences adopted 
specific knowledge claims and procedures for how they evaluate knowledge claims. 
But alongside this concern, there is a forgetting that unfolds in having adopted the 
ethics of the language of scientific speech (scientific speech is detached, neutral, 
“objective” etc.) that rests on an unquestioned metaphysical foundation. This “ghost,” 
as it were, haunts the human sciences and continues to haunt the question of theory.  
              Dennis Schmidt remarks: “Among the most distinctive trademarks of the 
hermeneutic approach to language is an effort to attend to a double force – both 
finitizing and fusing – of language in every human affair and to do so in a manner that 
resists any abstraction which results in the construction of an artificial rational 
language. Attentive to the self-effacement of language, its capacity to throw itself ever 
anew into the darkness beyond reach of its own reflexivity, hermeneutics has been first 
                                                
697 Schmidt, “Putting Oneself in Words…” in The Philosophy of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer. The Living of Philosophers Volume XXIV. p. 419. 
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and foremost a theory alert to the finitude of all understanding and the compressions 
placed upon every human affair.”698 
 
The Lyrical and Ethical Nature of Theory 
             It is to Gadamer’s first published study, Plato’s Dialectical Ethics: 
Phenomenological Interpretations Relating to the Philebus (1931) that we can turn to 
find the claim that coming to understanding appears “as the root of the theory of the 
dialectic in Plato’s critique of rhetoric in the Phaedrus.”699 Gadamer’s early writing, 
like many thinkers’ contains the one idea that will recur throughout a lifetime. Here, 
modernist perspective of modern theory may see the claim as a weakness which turns 
out to be strength. For Gadamer, in the Platonic dialogue we find a notion of 
incompleteness: what is signified is that we are always on the way to understanding. Di 
Cesare notes that it is “precisely from this weakness – as Gadamer writes in his study 
on “Dialectics and Sophism in the Seventh Platonic Letter” – the ‘productivity’ of 
dialectic will emerge.” Adding, “Every diaeretic logos always permits its own 
overcoming, because its unity arises from the interweaving of the many, which can 
always be dissolved anew.”700  
             Gadamer shares with Plato the idea that the movement of the dialectic refers 
back to the original movement of conversation, in saying and logos, and that Plato’s 
dialectic shows “the one in the many and the many in the one.”701 For Plato speech is 
                                                
698 Ibid. p. 485. 
699 Gadamer, Plato’s Dialectical Ethics: Phenomenological Interpretations Relating to 
the Philebus, p. 83. 
700 Di Cesare, Gadamer: A Philosophical Portrait, pp. 129-130. 
701 Ibid. p. 130. 
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the original mode by which people come to an understanding – namely, by questioning 
and answering. Speeches concern knowing how to bring about the possibility of  
“developing language in itself into a sufficient means of coming to an understanding” 
[techne], as well as knowing the individual forms of the soul (it is not simply about 
exchanging arguments), on which it intends to operate; dialectical speech rests on 
knowing of what one speaks, of the living dimension of theory-speech, knowing it as 
one might understand it oneself, and sharing of this speech with others by inviting them 
to participate in this understanding.  
              Ethical discourse is part of theory, because theory is a dialogue with the other, 
an invitation to share, not an abstraction of life (abstract ethics such as we find in 
Habermas), which, results in alienation. The living experience of theory then must be in 
some measure analogous to friendship, to a relationship with the other, to whom we 
speak and address ourselves. 
              Socrates’ apparent resistance to writing [Phaedrus], as we have now seen, is 
not simply a refusal of writing over speech but is an ethical action that says we cannot, 
as it were, forget the ethics of speech, even in writing. Theory is a deeply human task, 
not simply a technical task. Speaking is vital; it conveys the word as coming from the 
soul of the speaker.  Socrates’ priority on speech “establishes community (sharing the 
soul, that also underpins the just, in contrast to the isolated, as discussed in 
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Cleitophon),702 being one and being together, speech is knowing the whole.  “The 
genuine art of rhetoric that Socrates presents in the Phaedrus is a human task.”703  
                Speaking together implies a genuine sharing. We come closer to those we 
wish to address, so the manner of our speech concerns not only good writing, but also 
an ethical encounter, the finding a genuine way of speaking to those we wish to 
address. Some writing then may be writing that converses with us, like some theory, 
too, that calls attention to its speech, as in the Platonic dialogue, as in Plato (Plato’s 
writings dramatize conversations), that concern not only the subject of speech but the 
way the subject of the discussion seeks a way to make theory speak to us. 
               Socrates’ conception of correct speech – what the standard is for a “good” 
speech – concerns more than style. But Style is not treated as mere embellishment, 
which naturally, Socrates does not do.  Speaking or writing articulates us knowingly. 
The Phaedrus is a work that is self-reflective in construction. So even if we see the 
Platonic dialogue inviting their audience into them (into an on-going dialogue), it is yet 
anther concern that is taken up in the Phaedrus.704 Lysis, offers a profound sense of 
how, as readers, through the activity of interesting, our experience of another as our 
own and their own as other, (either as speaker or writer) is essential to friendship. In 
other words, Lysis and Phaedrus address the concerns of true speech as well as shared 
                                                
702 See, Davis, Michael. “The Subject of Justice: On Plato’s Cleitophon.” In The Soul of 
the Greeks: An Inquiry. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011. p. 164. 
703 Nichols, Socrates on Friendship and Community, p. 139 & pp. 148-9. She writes: 
“Although Socrates has contrasted the playful written word with the serious spoken 
one, he now acknowledges that his own spoken words are playful.”  Indeed, this may 
be the point that the playful and the serious are not exclusive of one another, but play 
together, where one plays in a measured way.  
704 “Because Socrates’ and Phaedrus’ discussion of rhetoric includes a discussion of 
writing, moreover, the Phaedrus serves as Plato’s reflection on his own activity of 
writing dialogues.” Nichols, Socrates on Friendship and Community, p. 90. 
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community.705 The commonality of theoretical speech shares with its reader a sense of 
participation, the art of words, and is what resists alienating separation between theorist 
and reader.706  
                 In the Phaedrus, Socrates debates the question of the nature of the 
speechmaker and the quality of speech.  One aspect of his argument concerns the art of 
words that is not simply about persuasion, but is encompassed by his terms “speech 
writing” or, “logographic necessity” where speech is created into a whole where all the 
parts “are written appropriately to each other and to the whole (264c).” 707 This 
coherence is contrasted with the example of the butcher, since he describes the 
wholeness, as “living animal,” in this case, “by the time the butcher does his job, the 
living being is no more than a sum of its parts. Its unifying principle, its soul, and the 
cause of its motion has disappeared.”708  
               On the one hand, we learn that “logographic necessity,” i.e. consistency, is 
still not enough, even if practiced well.  Something must be maintained within the art of 
writing and our searching for the right words, in the very art of this process that 
concerns, moreover, how we are leading someone through an argument. Speech, and 
writing not only connect one thing to another (collection and division), but also concern 
                                                
705 Ibid. p. 194. 
706 Not only in terms of the relationship between theory and everyday knowledge, but 
in that very configuration, in terms of the role of scientific speech and the way it 
impacts the self-comprehension of the reader as they enter into the dialogue that theory 
implies. The relationship between the sociologist and the public becomes a source itself 
of contention and suspicion. See, for example, Jonas and Knobl, Social Theory: Twenty 
Introductory Lectures, p. 2. 
707 Nichols, Socrates on Friendship and Community, p. 127. Clearly, I am reworking 
Socrates through the insight of Mary Nichols writings, placing a specific emphasis on 
what we can learn about the nature of rhetoric from Plato’s writings. 
708 Ibid. p. 130. 
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how people connect together in a shared encounter (conversation constitutes 
understanding and sharing as well as being the essence of the dialectical), even if it is 
an audience of one, or many (even if the many are not the one). Socrates understands 
that his dialectical approach involves the way one is concerned with “soul leading,” 
rather than simply seeing rhetoric as a matter of persuasion.709  
                 The shift to theory as dialogue now takes place. Dialogue is to be on the way 
to the concept that now rests on “arriving at a shared understanding that depends upon 
having in common a pre-understanding of the good.”710 Dialectical speech, which Plato 
shows to be the truly philosophical speech, concerns this way of being with knowledge, 
of sharing, and learning together. Speech, specifically Socratic speech (becoming good 
dialectians), involves sharing ourselves with others on the basis of the possibility of the 
common good, and with it, justice.711 In other words, the speech that isolates makes 
ordinary communication into a diction that self alienates resulting in a loss of 
solidarity; signifies the suffering of isolation (Bauman speaks of “loneliness”),  and 
requires understanding as solidarity – the Greeks understood this concerned “friendship 
with one self.”712 And it is the growing sense of the way our interior dialogue is already 
an anticipation of our ethical relations, that the human sciences have a way to overcome 
their participation in an alienating discourse, found in a technocratic culture, since the 
very hermeneutic structure of theory concerns an open attitude to changing social 
                                                
709 Nichols, Socrates on Friendship and Community, p. 125. 
710 Gadamer, Plato’s Dialectical Ethics, p. 63. 
711 Davis, The Soul of the Greeks, p. 164. 
712 Gadamer, “Isolation as a Symptom of Self-alienation,” in Praise of Theory: 
Speeches and Essays, p. 111. 
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reality as well as a changing social discourse that keeps open this interior dialogue with 
the other, by which we face new tasks and new problems.713 
                Kenneth M. Sayre points out that Plato’s Phaedrus turns to the question of 
speech and writing, because it is a work that seeks to discover that both writing and 
speaking concern the genuine path of shared learning. Autonomy and solidarity are 
played out in this pivotal dialogue as a question of ethical and lyrical speech. He notes: 
“That what commentators who dwell on these passages tend to overlook, however, is 
that in the passages immediately following the reference to wiring as a kind of ‘image’, 
Socrates goes on to acknowledge the fully legitimate role for written language in the 
activity of the dialectic. Although the dialectician will place a higher value on activity 
planting and cultivating ‘words accompanied by knowledge’ in souls capable of 
learning – a task best pursued in actual conversation – another activity that is ‘entirely 
noble’ in itself is to sow these seeds of knowledge in a ‘literary garden.’”714  
               In the final instance, it should be clear that following Plato’s conception of 
speech, we reached a conclusion regarding the nature and structure of social theory; 
that social theory matters when both the establishment of the “literary garden” and the 
technical “logographic necessity” coincide as they implant words “infused ‘with 
knowledge’ (Phaedrus, 276E7) that might germinate as ‘living discourse’ 
(logon……..zonta: 276A8) in the mind of the learner.”715 
 
                                                
713 Christopher Fynsk, says: “if theoretical discourse in the academy is marked by an 
absence of distress about the absence of community, this is also for sociopolitical and 
institutional reasons.” Fynsk, “Community and the Limits of Theory,” in Community at 
Loose Ends, p. 20. 
714 See Sayre, Plato’s Literary Garden, p. 20. 
715 Ibid. Introduction, xvii. 
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Alan Blum on the Question of Theory             
              Alan Blum’s two books, Socrates, The Original and Its Images (1972) and 
Theorizing (1974) consider the relation of the Greeks to the question of modern theory. 
Blum anticipates the shift we find in the later writings of Zygmunt Bauman. Bauman 
shares the idea that theorizing concerns the way we share what we have to say. Blum, 
we note, when speaking of how writing becomes present to all, remarks, “The theorist 
shows what he shares with all men by exemplifying what he writes about in his very 
writing.”716 Blum, like Gadamer, sees the Greeks as central to his own philosophical 
outlook. He also has his eyes on the question of the human sciences. What they share 
is, among other things, the perception that is summed up in Blum’s remark that “to 
write about Socrates is to interact with him”.717 Blum’s reading of the Greeks is linked 
to Harold Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology that in turn addressed the problems of the 
language of theory by approaching the self-reflective aspects of the structure of social 
speech.718  
                Blum’s investigation of Plato concerns theory and speech production as 
intimately woven into each other, how theorizing and living life bare upon each other, 
exemplifying one another in the figure of Socrates’ conception of the art of speech.  
Blum formulates Socrates’ concern with speech in the following remarks:  
 
Socrates asks: how does speech as a thing acquire value by virtue of its 
relationship to the worthy, the excellent and the valuable? How does speech 
acquire value through its relationship to what is not a thing? Thus, Socrates 
quest for the value of speech, for its reason or for the Good, which it fulfils, 
                                                
716 Blum, Theorizing, p. 131. 
717 Blum, Socrates: The Original and Its Image, p. 12. 
718 Ethnomethodology sought to “de-reify” sociological speech, it abstractions of social 
phenomena as given, objective, and thing-like.  
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asks for the difference speech makes between the valuable and the common. 
From this day on, Socrates forces speech to defend itself by conceiving itself as 
a contribution of value; it demands of speech that it comprehends its 
requirements to make a Real difference where such a comprehension is show in 
speech it-self as the difference that is Real.719 
 
            Blum explains, the question of the connection between commonality [social 
consciousness] and rhetoric. He writes: 
 
 Where the problem for theorizing lay in the differences to which theorizing was 
a response, the standard for resolving the problem was anchored in an ideal 
communality reformulated as the necessary condition of the failure of unity. 
The theorist, speaking under the auspices of such a standard with concrete 
expectation, would silence difference, i.e. would quiet rhetoric.”720  Echoing 
Gadamer’s ideas, Blum notes that it was otherwise, especially for Plato, 
because, “what we moderns took as difference – as a concrete, empirical 
starting point for the problem to be resolved – is actually a display of 
commonality, the community in which speaking unfolds and which is affirmed 
in the very act of speaking.721   
 
              Blum tells us that there is a silent center in sociology, an isolation that sets up 
an inside and outside, a break between theorist and public. The dialogue between 
theorist and public is one of alienation. Theory concerns, in part, the problem of 
commonality, as it was for Plato; it concerns the unity and universality of speaking and 
the differences that it must embody. Blum writes: “The modern view isolates the 
theorist from that about which he speaks because the unity of difference about which he 
speaks is itself a production of a unity of understandings of which it is an 
appearance.”722  By silencing the rhetorical dimension of theory, theory in effect 
conceals its own grounds. Blum says: “The version of theory as a silencing of rhetoric 
                                                
719 Blum, Socrates: The Original and Its Image, p.153. 
720 Ibid. p. 179.  
721 Ibid. p. 179. 
722 Ibid. p. 179. 
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through the creation of unity overlooks the question of the unity in which the very 
speaking that is theorizing is grounded: theory displays a unity already achieved.”723 
 
Karl-Otto Apel on the Ethics of Discourse. 
                  Key to Apel’s writings is to repel any conception of the poetic in theory. 
When he asks, “How do words create understanding and acquire validity and 
authenticity? How do the words we speak, speak truly?” he argues that a word makes a 
claim to validity as we do in speaking it.724 In poetry and literature, Gadamer, shows 
that the text speaks to us, like theory, because it is speaking in “nobody’s name, not the 
name of a god or a law, but from itself.”725 Gadamer, therefore, emphasizes the truth of 
the word in the context communicating something that is not just a statement (nor an 
utterance that concerns validity claims), but as he puts it, how the word can “exist in 
itself,” and, “lifts and grants itself a claim about being.”726  
               Between Gadamer and Apel lies the difference of how we achieve a 
conception of truth-theoretical speech, in other words, how we reach understanding. 
Apel says even if truth as context bound is true, if we are “always understanding 
differently” as we manifest unmeaning, the “fact related truth of validity claims is not 
yet sufficiently determined by the factual manifestation of meaning. Rather, it requires 
some additional fact-related insight to access it, and this insight needs to be 
counterfactually valid at any time, namely, for an infinite community of 
                                                
723 Ibid. p. 181. 
724 Gadamer, “On the Truth of the Word,” in The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of Later 
Writings, p. 133.  
725 Ibid. p. 147. 
726 Ibid. p.134. 
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interpreters.”727 What makes a word a telling word is not its verification but its validity 
among speech partners, for it holds out the possibility for further discussion and 
progress in speaking to one another [dialogue].728 The dialectic of the word emphasizes 
the speculative nature of language itself, that there is something in the words that brings 
forth meaning, what Gadamer describes as the “inner dimension of multiplication,” that 
is not about a pre-given meaning but about the event in which “meaning announces 
itself.”729  
            We can identify the points that begin to clarify our understanding of theoretical 
utterance: a distinction that recognizes validity of theory over verification of theory, 
and, the dialectic of the word over nominalism. What are the knowledge-claims of the 
human sciences founded on? Does the hermeneutics of speech, in other words, make 
knowledge claims that are part of what we mean by theory?  For Gadamer, “The word 
has a collective meaning and implies a social relationship,” therefore meaning occurs in 
the virtuality of speaking the word.730 
                                                
727 Apel, Karl-Otto. “Regulative Ideas or Truth-Happening?: An Attempt to Answer the 
Question of the Conditions of the Possibility of Valid Understanding.”  In Karl-Otto 
Apel Selected Essays: Volume Two, Ethics and the Theory of Rationality. Edited by 
Eduardo Mendieta. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996. p. 75. 
728 Overall, a view of validity and verification is discussed in terms of theory making in 
the social sciences, since, it is often said that a theory requires some sort of empirical 
support, See, for example, Bryant, Anthony and Kathy Charmaz. The Sage Handbook 
of Grounded Theory. London: Sage Publications, 2012. “If we think of validity as the 
extent to which a theory is well-grounded empirically and conceptually, then we can 
better appreciate the importance of theoretical consistency as well as accuracy” p. 19. 
Theory is seen essentially as the testing of a hypothesis requiring “logic of validation.” 
In other words, theory is a method. 
729 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], p. 464.  
730 Gadamer, “On the Truth of the Word,” in The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of Later 
Writings, p. 133.  
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               Apel engages Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy by sharing an awareness of 
the difficulty of locating the truth power of communicative utterances in the age of 
science. Apel writes, “the philosophical task of rationally grounding a general ethics 
never seems to have been so difficult as it is in the scientific age. This is because in our 
time the notion of intersubjective validity is also prejudged by science, namely by the 
scientific notion of normatively neutral or value-free science.”731 Gadamer naturally 
would not nor could not entertain the notion of an “intersubjective validity” that would 
somehow structure the experience of language and truth. Apel writes of his overall 
project this way: “My chief thesis will be that the hermeneutic dimension of the social 
sciences as well as the necessity and possibility of its normative foundation can only be 
understood if epistemology is, as a whole, no longer grounded by recourse to the 
subject-object relation of cognition but rather by recourse to a transcendental-pragmatic 
structure of communicative understanding and consensus formation about something in 
the world.”732 
             Apel argues that we have to choose between a regulative idea and truth-
happening.733 Gadamer and Apel, see a deep rift between understanding and progress, 
but the differences are informative. For now, how do we understand this two-fold 
movement of theory between truth and rationality that for Apel concerns making valid 
                                                
731 Apel, “The apriori of the Communication Community and the Foundations of 
Ethics: The Problem of a Rational Foundation of Ethics in a Scientific Age," in Karl-
Otto Apel: Selected Essays, Volume Two: Ethics and the Theory of Rationality, p. 1. 
732 Apel, “The Hermeneutic Dimension of the Social Sciences,” in Karl-Otto Apel: 
Selected Essays, Volume Two: Ethics and the Theory of Rationality, p. 294. 
733 This question is taken up in Apel’s work, “Regulative Ideas or Truth-Happening: An 
Attempt to Answer the Question of the Conditions of the Possibility of Valid 
Understanding” in Karl Otto Apel Selected Essays: Volume Two, Ethics and the Theory 
of Rationality. 
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judgments or understandings? To grasp this, we must see that the original place of truth 
lies in an undecided relation we have to the metaphysical concept of truth.  So, 
Gadamer’s concern is at once to reread the question of truth, but to do this in relation to 
the human sciences.  
             Theory should not be consumed by hermeneutics, according to Apel; rather, 
what we need is recourse to a Kantian conception of the apriori of reason with a 
“transcendental conception” of the speaking subject. Such a subject is guided by a 
rationality that applies to all communicative utterances concerning agreement and 
validity. His appeal, then, is to the autonomy of the reason that rests on an interior 
transcendental ideal that guides all speech. In Apel’s eyes, Gadamer’s hermeneutics 
would, in effect, present an obstacle to social theory insofar as it would relinquish the 
transcendental touchstone of understanding.734 To understand how the human sciences 
bring things to thought such that they can be shared and recognized as valid arguments 
requiring thoughtful consideration is not the matter of propositional truth, but how 
language happens to us, how we mediate our understanding through language, prior to 
any propositional truth. Setting before us the question of hermeneutics as validity? 
Gadamer’s critics argue, how does the structure of argumentative discourse claim 
                                                
734 Karl-Otto Apel says that by giving up the a priori of a subject-object relation, and 
thus the idea that social theory can be understood as “methodological” and replacing it 
with a self mediation with tradition (what he terms “truth-happening”) “there can be no 
factual reference for hermeneutic understanding which allows for progress in 
knowledge.” Apel, “Regulative Ideas or Truth Happening? An Attempt to Answer the 
Question of the Conditions of the Possibility of Valid Understanding,” in Karl-Otto 
Apel Selected Essays: Volume Two, Ethics and the Theory of Rationality, p. 77. Apel, 
however, is not using the conception of objectivity as an ideal of natural science “as a 
possible paradigm for factual reference of hermeneutic understanding.”  
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validity?735 Or, that hermeneutics cannot provide justification for a regulative principle 
of possible progress.736 Underlying Habermas’ and Apel’s view is the question of 
public dialogue and expert opinion (including the role of the human sciences in 
adopting this position). Habermas’ work, especially, after the shift to language, was to 
understand the underpinnings of social theory.737 
               Concerned with the implications of a theory of truth happening, Apel 
explains: “I should like to go back to the structure of argumentative discourse. This 
represents that a form of reflection of communicative understanding which philosophy 
– including ‘philosophical hermeneutics’ – take for granted in the context of the 
justification of validity. Should this form of reflection, in turn, only be conceivable as 
an instance of a historically located meaning – and truth happening? Or should it, as a 
condition of the possibility of validity of its philosophical function of reflection, imply 
an intersubjective, and hence historically independent, validity claim per se?”738 
              Theory [“universally valid norms and regulative ideas” of theory], in Apel’s 
view, is not a “truth-happening” like art.739 But in Truth in the Human Sciences, 
Gadamer writes: “The fruitfulness of a knowledge claim in the human sciences appears 
                                                
735 Apel, “Regulative Ideas or Truth Happening?” in Karl-Otto Apel Selected Essays: 
Volume Two, Ethics and the Theory of Rationality, p. 77. 
736 Ibid. p. 98. 
737 The language of technocratic ideology for Habermas required a context where one 
would be free of distortion, where the public is not reduced to technocratic speech. For 
Apel, it was the problem of a reduction of language to a “poetics” of “truth-happening.” 
See, Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Politics and Society. Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1971, and the later work, The Theory of Communicative Action (Volumes 1 & 2), 
Boston: Beacon Press, 1985. 
738 Ibid. p. 78. 
739 Ibid. p. 84. 
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more closely related to the intuition of the artist than the methodological spirit of the 
scientist.”740  
                Apel responds to the hermeneutic position with an attempt to stabilize a 
critical social theory, by adopting what he calls the “normative presuppositions” that all 
participants in dialogue, and in theory making, would need to have adopted to avoid 
what he calls a “performative contradiction.”741 Truth happening [of speech] occurs in 
the natural setting of language, especially, as we move toward, or through, the art of 
words, in a conversation. Plato’s dialogues themselves traverse and announce openness 
to truth, the truth of what we can say (or hear), since the truth of being and being true 
are happening in speech and are made possible by speech, suggesting a specific 
connection between truth and rhetoric.742 What permits Gadamer to speak of truth is 
                                                
740  Gadamer, “Truth in the Human Sciences,” in Hermeneutics and Truth, p. 26. 
741 These, in summary are: Apel’s normative presuppositions for the structure of social 
theory: 1) Philosophers strive to achieve consensus on validity of their own validity 
claims in principle with all (ideally, with all possible) partners in the discourse […], 2) 
When arguing, philosophers necessarily have at least the following four validity claims 
[…]. 2.1. Philosophers must have a claim on intersubjectively sharable meanings of 
their speech acts as a precondition of all further validity claims […]. 2.2. In theoretical 
discourse, the claim to truth of the claim to the unlimited capacity for consensus of 
assertions must be at the forefront. […]. 2.3. A precondition of any further validity 
claims – along with the claim to meaning – is the claim to truthfulness, which refers to 
subjective intentions. […]. 2.4. A precondition of the exposition of the claims to truth 
as claim that can be accepted or rejected in a – in principle unlimited – community of 
communication is an ethically relevant claim to rightness in every argument [….] It is 
clear that there are supposedly no ontological claims made here. Apel, Karl-Otto.  
“Regulative Ideas or Truth happening?: An Attempt to Answer the Question of the 
Conditions of the Possibility of Valid Understanding.” In The Philosophy of Hans-
Georg Gadamer, The Living of Philosophers Volume XXIV. Edited by Lewis Edwin 
Hahn. Chicago: Open Court, 1997. pp. 86-87.  
742 Vattimo, “Truth and Rhetoric in Hermeneutic Ontology,” in The End of Modernity, 
writes: “Hermeneutic truth, which is the experience of truth to which hermeneutics 
refers and which it understands to be exemplified by the experience of art, is essentially 
rhetorical.” p. 135. 
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that he, in following Heidegger, sees that language unfolds in our familiarity with the 
world, one that is always historically a finite and situated condition of the possibility of 
experience and not the autonomy of reason as an underlying perspective. As one moves 
through the movement of a discussion or an argument, how are formal concepts to be 
used?  What happens to our natural language? To what extent following the Greeks, are 
we speaking of this question as one of beauty, the Eros of true speech, and the concept 
of living language rather than utility? Is this not Gadamer’s question as much as it was 
the Greeks’? 
                 How do we establish a formal conception of the structure of argument? 
Apel’s de-ontological view of theory [constructing an argument] confronts Gadamer’s 
ontological conception of speech [as conversation]. What is the art of words for which 
they are searching?743 Since language binds us to thinking as time, as Heidegger shows, 
and this means that one cannot say that philosophy can progress, like science, Gadamer 
asks: “Can progress in the human sciences be such a progress?”744 
                Gadamer’s emphasis on the rhetorical nature of theory contrasts with Apel’s 
account of the form and context of rational argument. Eduardo Mendieta, editor of 
works by Apel, describes this distinction in this way: “Apel understands hermeneutics 
from the standpoint of the a priori of the communication community which is always 
presupposed in all discourse. In opposition to the ontological hermeneutics of Gadamer 
and Heidegger, Apel develops a normative hermeneutics of the ideal communication 
                                                
743 Socrates claiming to have described, to Phaedrus, “the art of words for which they 
are searching” (266c). Nichols, Socrates on Friendship and Community: Reflections on 
Plato’s Symposium, Phaedrus, and Lysis, p. 130. 
744 Gadamer, “Reply to Karl-Otto Apel,” in The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
pp. 94-97. 
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community which transforms the hermeneutic circle and the pre-givenness of meaning 
in terms of the conditions of validity of inter-subjective agreement.”745  
             Apel is concerned to discover moral norms in communication – discourse 
ethics – that follows the deontological thrust of Kantian ethics (a philosophy of rights) 
that now becomes an ethics of communication, clearly differing from the substantive, 
interpretive and ontological ethics presented in Gadamer’s writings.746  
             Gadamer says: “understanding in the human sciences, however, is quite a 
different matter. In order to understand one another we certainly need to attempt at 
communication, where communication means reciprocity in understanding the 
arguments of both interlocutors. But whether communication in the sense of agreement 
and concurrence will result from this, or whether communication fails, the hermeneutic 
virtue consists above all in understanding the other without which communication 
could come about at all.”747 Dennis Schmidt puts it this way: “Hermeneutics pays 
homage to this relation of language and being insofar as it recognizes that when we 
understand something about the need for words, about how it is that we make contact 
with one another insofar as we put ourselves in words, we understand something 
important about ourselves [my emphasis].”748  
 
                                                
745 From Apel’s Introduction in Karl-Otto Apel: Selected Essays, Volume Two: Ethics 
and the Theory of Rationality, p.  xiv. 
746 See, Habermas, Jurgen. “Reconstruction and Interpretation in the Social Sciences.” 
and “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification.” In Moral 
Consciousness and Communicative Action. Translated by Christian Lenhardt and 
Shierry Weber Nicholsen. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1995. 
747 Gadamer, “Reply to Karl-Otto Apel,” in The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
p. 96. 
748 Schmidt, “Putting Oneself in Words…” in The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer 
p. 483. 
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Zygmunt Bauman and the Question of Social Theory 
              Three terms might capture the later Bauman: ambivalence, responsibility and 
the other. Such terms might define his “hermeneutic turn,” especially with regard to the 
way he will read modernity and the holocaust in relation to the dominance of certain 
modes of theory. The turn is ethical and lyrical. William Outhwaite says: “Bauman’s 
sociology, like his public announcements, is not, as Spiegel once wrote of Luhmann, 
‘above the clouds.’ It is grounded, not so much in empirical data as in striking 
examples selected with a keen eye to the telling illustration of the theme which might 
otherwise seem speculative…”749 while, as Tom Campbell and Chris Till note, 
Bauman’s work is indebted to Ossowski and Simmel, but clearly aims at a 
“fragmentary style that is difficult to systematize.”750  
             Bauman’s power lies in his understanding and seeing the crisis of sociology as 
reflecting the crisis of modernity, and key to this: as a crisis about the “social relevance 
of sociological discourse.”751 Sociology is a discipline that becomes obsessed with its 
own possible extinction, with its self-founding and self-alienating tendencies; At the 
same time, it also displays an ethical posture and understanding of our ability to still 
speak about an alienating society without self-alienation.  Bauman tells us that 
sociology has to situate itself in a new world that is strikingly dissimilar from that 
which set its orthodox goals and strategies in place. He asks: “Can sociology enter this 
world?”752 
                                                
749 Outhwaite, William. “Bauman’s Europe, Europe’s Bauman.” In Bauman’s 
Challenge: Sociological Issues for the 21st Century, p. 10. 
750 Ibid. p. 182. 
751 Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity, p.107. 
752 Ibid. xxv. 
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            Bauman’s theorizing tackles the problem of theory as simultaneously an 
adjustment to the world of postmodernity (he later adopts the term “liquid modernity”) 
that alters our understanding of modernity. But Bauman’s work still remains enfolded 
by his deep commitment to the validity and vocation of sociology. But now attention 
has shifted also to style, for style is now deeply connected to moral responsibility, 
especially in the face of the overwhelming tendency to subsume moral responsibility 
into technical responsibility. The reflexivity of prose style and the formulation of 
concepts are both a moral and a lyrical responsibility. We learn that Bauman’s answer 
to the paradoxes of sociology parallel the ethical paradox of postmodernity. “The 
ethical paradox of the postmodern condition is that it restores to agents the fullness of 
moral choice and responsibility while simultaneously depriving them of the comfort of 
the universal guidance and modern self-confidence once promised.” 753  
            In this way, Bauman not only points to the sad complicity of the holocaust and 
the broader development of Enlightenment goals that inserts technocratic and 
bureaucratic goals into both modern life and theory which he identifies as a moral 
barrier.754  
                                                
753 Ibid. xxii. 
754 Hannah Arendt, for example, addresses civic speech and political violence. 
Fundamentally, claiming, using the historical example of the Danish resistance to the 
Nazis, that “mere words, spoken freely, and publicly” are always a point of resistance 
to violence. Her Copenhagen lecture, concerned with her relationship to political 
belonging and belonging to language, brings into view, a way to understanding 
Bauman’s deep ethical sense of his writing as a counter weight to public clichés and 
alienating conceptual speech in social theory. In this lecture, Arendt while discussing 
the Latin word persona, that metaphors are “the daily bread of all conceptual thought.” 
Arendt, Hannah. From the Prologue to Responsibility and Judgment. Edited by Jerome 
Kohn. New York: Schoken, 2003. 
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            Gadamer’s hermeneutics, we can now see, shape Bauman’s ideas in several 
ways. We note that there is a turn to a “postmodern ethics” which is deployed in his 
style of theorizing. By the mid 1990s Bauman’s work is characterized as sociology of 
postmodernism (and postmodernity) concerned with elucidating the new social reality 
and how the new postmodern outlook impacts theorizing these changes, a strategy we 
find in Life in Fragments (1990), Intimations of Postmodernity (1992), and Postmodern 
Ethics (1993). Theorizing comes closer to the “mind’s struggle with the unfamiliar, 
than a comprehensive theoretical model of reality-in-the-process-of-becoming, a reality 
thus far stubbornly defying all efforts of rational ordering.”755 
               In Thinking Sociologically (1990), an introductory text to sociology, the 
sociological vocation is laid out. As Peter Beilharz notes, this is a work that by default 
adopts a view of sociology as critical sociology.756 Here is Beilharz’z full summary of 
Bauman’s position on sociology. It is worth reading these thoughts with the topological 
spaces of Plato’s dialogical dialectic in mind:  
Bauman offers four possible ways of distinguishing the sociological sensibility 
from the logic of common sense. First, sociology, unlike common sense, makes 
an effort to subordinate itself to rules of responsible speech. What does Bauman 
mean by this? We are all social animals; therefore, we are all specialists or 
natural authorities on matters social. Prejudice or mere opinion thus often 
masquerades as sociology, and not only at the hands of non-specialists; 
sociologists in general suffer from a terrible tendency to generalize the 
particular, tendency we need to recognize and work against. Second, sociology 
claims to draw on a larger filed of evidence in order to arrive at its judgments; 
no research, no right to speak when it comes to properly sociological (but not 
ethical, or political) matters. A third difference between sociology and common 
sense pertains to the way in which we seek to make sense of human reality. 
Sociology stands in oppositions to the overly personalized worldview. It shifts, 
rather, form figuration (networks of dependencies) to actors and actions, 
                                                
755 Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity, xxvi. 
756 Beilharz, Zygmunt Bauman: Dialectic of Modernity, p. 46. 
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seeking to make sense of the human condition through analysis of the manifold 
webs of human interdependency. Fourthly, and in some ways most significantly, 
sociology seeks to defamilarize the familiar [my emphasis].757 
 
             Bauman’s tendency to read his own approach to Marx hermeneutically, points 
back to the so-called “humanist” writings of the early Marx. Beilharz observes: 
“Certainly the whole of Bauman’s Hermeneutics and Social Science (1978) is 
constructed within that sense of Vico, mediated through Gramsci, that we know best is 
what we make or create: only this is not simply an occasional, accumulative process, 
but is also accidental and ruptural.”758 In the same work, Bauman makes his most 
specific hermeneutic assertion, echoing Gadamer, when he says that understanding is 
no more than struggle against incomprehension.  
            The force of this idea will guide Bauman’s conception of the vocation of 
sociology in terms of ethical and lyrical leanings of his later works. Bauman’s 
sociology, then, appears to construct a non-systemic “scientific” approach (of 
“legislators”) with the open hermeneutic implications of theory as made by “literary” 
and “ethical” interpreters. For Bauman, the question of style and writing marks a break 
with disciplinary thinking, but not with the vocation of sociology. Peter Beilharz notes: 
“to introduce hermeneutics into social sciences is to add into it respect and curiosity for 
the book of life.”759 We may also recall Berger’s discussion of the relationship of the 
literary and the sociological, and his example of the course that linked sociology to 
literary work, “Balzac and Sociology” to be something that was required in the human 
                                                
757 Ibid. p. 45. 
758 Ibid. p. 69. 
759 See, Beilharz, Peter. “Another Bauman: The Anthropological Imagination.” In 
Bauman’s Challenge: Sociological Issues for the 21st Century. p. 63. 
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sciences.760 Paul Taylor finds a unity between Bauman and Mills by arguing that they 
are both concerned with the style and morality of social theory.761 In Bauman’s case, 
the merging of texts into a prose style, concerns conversation with these texts, 
alongside a conversation that treats the reader as an ethical co-actor; the reader who 
participates in the story told, and who shares in the process of discovery without the 
imprint of a discipline; the very limitation that is presented by scientific speech. 
               Kieran Flanagan describes what happens when theory implies a metaphysical 
challenge, rather than a simple repetition, for thinkers who think outside of these 
guiding assumptions of the “discipline.” Flanagan writes: “Bauman has never been part 
of the sociological establishment in the United Kingdom. Conceiving Bauman as 
having a ghostly presence in the discipline, Blackshaw (2006: 293) rightly asserts: ‘All 
great sociologists stand apart from their time. They are not afraid of leaving the past 
and operating in some version of the present that is altogether their own. Bauman is that 
kind of sociologist’.762 He concludes that Bauman’s sociology “is too good for the 
discursive formation of sociology. His answer to why this should be so appears earlier 
                                                
760 Peter L. Berger claims, “another insight I acquired from the beginning of my studies 
– that good sociology has a kinship with good novels from which one can learn a lot 
about society.” Berger is claiming that the excitement of sociology (that can be 
overcome with disenchantment) can be acquired from literature.  Berger, The 
Adventures of an Accidental Sociologist: How to Explain the World Without Becoming A 
Bore, p. 13. 
761 Taylor, “Totalitarian Bureaucracy and Bauman’s Sociological Imagination.” In 
Bauman’s Challenge: Sociological Issues for the 21st Century. “What distinguishes 
Bauman and Mills from their less imaginative counterparts is their willingness to 
engage with the problems of theorizing the lived experience of ‘liquid modernity’s’ 
uncertain flux rather than to hide disciplinary insecurities behind a wall of falsely 
confident empirical methods.” p. 155. 
762 See, Flanagan, Kieran, “Bauman’s Implicit Theology,” in Bauman’s Challenge: 
Sociological Issues for the 21st Century, p. 104.  
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where he suggest that far from dealing with reality and real lives, Bauman is concerned 
with the ‘fantasy of human lives imagined (Blackshaw 2006:304-5)’.”763 
               Flanagan shows how Bauman betrays an “implicit theology” because of the 
way he “owns” his writings.764 Flanagan speaks of an “ambiguity in his [Bauman’s] 
writings”: how Bauman seeks to express the conditions of “liquid modernity,” with its 
sense of contingency and fear of the unknown, with his specific style of writing.765 
Flanagan argues that Bauman’s attitude to writing and the moral responsibility of the 
sociologist is tainted by a “theology, or spiritual reflection.” He claims that: “In The Art 
of life (2008) a realization dawns that what he is seeking is beyond what sociology 
alone can illuminate.”766  
              Plato recognized in Socrates that thinking, inquiry, questioning, engages us in 
human speech (and writing) as we activate ourselves as moral beings. Theory is also a 
conversation with oneself (much like philosophy) pointing always to its roots in the 
silent dialogue between me and myself. As Hannah Arendt, like Gadamer, made quite 
clear, the speaking of the soul with itself, as Plato describes it, is a precondition of all 
thinking.767 Bauman constitutes himself as a person (and theorist) engaging in a 
dialogue with himself, “non- technically.”  
               Liquid Modernity asks that we rethink how we describe the world we 
experience.  Bauman establishes that the conflict between method and truth concerns 
conceptual style. He speaks of the dualist consciousness of the theorist that needs to be 
                                                
763 Ibid. p. 104. 
764 Ibid. p. 105, p. 118. 
765 Ibid. p. 118. 
766 Ibid. p. 121. 
767 See, Arendt’s discussion, “Some Questions of Moral Responsibility,” in 
Responsibility and Judgment.  
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overcome; where the language of sociology “neutralizes speech” and generates a “false 
sociology.” He says, “The remoteness and unreachability of systemic structure, coupled 
with the unstructured fluid state of the immediate setting of life-politics, change that 
condition in a radical way and call for a rethinking of old concepts that used to frame 
its narrative.”768 What he means is that we need to rethink the scientific narrative of the 
human sciences. 
                Bauman seeks a style of analysis (theorizing) that theorizes the conditions of 
modernity. His searching for a new vocabulary, both implicitly and explicitly, is a 
critique of modern classical social theory: it is a critique of scientific speaking. 
Bauman, in my view, is one of our most perceptive theorists and writers because of this 
sensitivity to the language of theory. Disentangling his analysis from needless 
methodological debate, his work is theoretically and conceptually rich and thoughtful. 
Knowing the limits of a view of language that abstracts the theorist as a subject of 
speaking, he knows too that, in the past, concepts and words, overwhelmed by a 
codified diction and abstraction, often “do not convey our meanings to ourselves and to 
others.”769  
               Gadamer would agree. We understand that Bauman recognizes the falsity of 
perceiving language as the analytic tool by which we create theory. Bauman is a pivotal 
figure insofar as his work exemplifies an approach to social theory that in many ways 
conforms to Gadamer’s ideas. By this we mean that his conceptual expression is not 
analytically driven, but conceptually driven in light of his power of writing as 
metaphorically driven. Bauman has been sensitive to questions posed by Gadamer, and, 
                                                
768 Bauman, “Forward: On Being Light and Liquid,” in Liquid Modernity, p. 9. 
769 Bauman, Does Ethics Have a Chance in a World of Consumers? p. 2. 
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has sought to disentangle himself from a modernist conception of what the human 
sciences (and their conception of theory) should be. Citlali Rovirosa-Madrazo has 
reached a similar assessment: 
Distancing from modernity does not necessarily mean giving up on utopia, in 
the sense of hopefulness.  Drawing on the work of the French philosopher 
Emanuel Levinas, and his crucial notion of being for the other, Bauman allows 
room for suggesting that otherness could play a part in the sense of hope –
though he never fully seems to subscribe to Levinas’s yearnings.770 
                   
             Bauman’s later writings concern the ethical nature of theory and its 
interconnectedness to the status of writing – that is, with the ethical status of the 
theorist who expresses himself in his writings. What we see is evident, for example, in 
Bauman’s Postmodernity and Its Discontents (1997), and Liquid Modernity (2000) is 
deep commitment to a hermeneutic approach to social inquiry. Bauman is not a 
philosopher; he does not have the hope we find in Gadamer. What they do share, 
however, is an unbounded sense of humanity and the ethical responsibility that shapes 
their idea of the practice of theory.  
                 Bauman’s critique of the ethics of writing challenges the self-representation 
of the sociologist who treats speech and language as part of their science. When 
Gadamer claims that the whole of ethics is rhetoric, he is concerned with letting what is 
true appear in our speech without technical hindrance. Bauman’s work engages the 
ethical dimension of writing because it treats the reconstitution of sociology in light of 
the claims that there is no ideal model of writing in sociology.  
                                                
770 Bauman, Zygmunt. Living on Borrowed Time: Conversations with Citlali Rovirosa-
Madrazo.  London: Polity, 2010. p. 9. 
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                Bauman sees writing as the space of prose that is opened in a way in which 
the true can no longer simply be established through the logic of science, but now only 
through the careful adjudication of one’s role as an ethical interpreter.  
                Bauman’s essay Afterthought, in Liquid Modernity, can be read 
hermeneutically. Bauman attempts to describe the mission of sociology in terms of 
literary practice. In other words, in terms of art. Bauman equates sociology with the 
need to de-naturalize language in order to give it the import of the poet or writer. 
However, he does not abandon sociology to literature: 
What follows is that sociology is needed today more than ever before. 
The job in which sociologists are experts, the job of restoring to view the 
lost link between objective affliction and subjective experience, has 
become more vital and indispensable then ever, while less likely than 
ever to be performed by the spokesperson and practitioners of other 
fields of expertise has become utterly improbable. If all experts deal 
with practice problems and all experts knowledge is focused on their 
resolution, sociology is one branch of expert knowledge for which the 
practical problem it struggles to resolve is enlightenment aimed at 
human understanding.771 
 
               Keith Tester describes Bauman as one of our most deliberate sociological 
stylists.772 Style, as Gadamer reminds us, derives from the art of writing and the stylus, 
or slate pencil. Bauman understands the relationship of his prose to being true (to his 
topic/content): to the truth of being and being true, as does Gadamer, which enables 
him to think of theory as an expression of the truth in its capacity as speech. Is this a 
literary-based conception of truth and representation that is inspired by the 
reconstruction of humanist speech? Bauman’s later works are hermeneutic in style and 
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p. 211. 
772 Tester, Keith. The Social Thought of Zygmunt Bauman. London: Palgrave, 2004. p. 
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unimpeded by methodological constraints. When philosophy seeks a return to its 
metaphysical origins, and when sociologist calls upon philosophy to in some way 
ground or compliment to their practice (Giddens, Winch, etc.), we note a call for a 
transformation in the conception of theory.  
              What does Bauman’s intervention in terms of style mean?  Tester argues that 
Bauman’s work is sociology with a literary edge. He notes: “Bauman’s sociology 
draws for inspiration and stimulation on literature as much as he draws on what is 
conventionally identified as sociology.”773 
               Bauman skillfully speaks to social problems with a fluency that offers no 
arbitrating rule (external measure) by which to even measure the power of his words. 
Sociology requires an artistic sensibility to complete the logic of analysis to make its 
saying work, but also, to overcome the loss of its affirmative (and therapeutic) 
component in our communal dialogue. 
               Tester reiterates the point: “critical theory, which in Bauman’s understanding, 
clearly links with literature, is then critical of this world in that it attends to the 
processes through which this world closes down on human possibilities, and it opens 
our other worlds in that it shows that things do not have to be like this since what seems 
to be natural is, in fact, entirely cultural”.774 In other words, Bauman’s writings can be 
seen as a model of theory shaped by hermeneutical consciousness and recovery of truth 
in the nature of theory. 
                 “False sociology” (Bauman’s term) echoes Gadamer’s concept of 
methodological alienation. He writes, “the meaning of postmodern art is the 
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deconstruction of meaning; more exactly, revealing the secret of meaning, the secret 
which modern theoretical practice tried hard to hide or belie, that meaning ‘exists’ 
solely in the process of interpretation (as Gadamer argues) and critique, and dies 
together with it.” 775 The traditional distinction between explanation and 
understanding, as Bauman notes, is at an end, and is now replaced by the motifs of 
hermeneutical understanding and responsibility.776 
                   Bauman brings sociology and aesthetic activity (literature), into proximity. 
Sociology is now identified with art and specifically the art of writing, but also with the 
Platonic/ Socratic way of speech guided by seeking words that can give genuine truth. 
Our commonality is of great concern to sociology. Bauman thinks sociology is the 
power of disclosing the “possibility of living together differently.”777 Bauman’s critical 
stance can be better understood in terms of Gadamer’s own contribution to the critique 
of method. The speculative language of theory illuminates the naturalized world by 
taking us out of the everyday perception through the very play of language itself. 
Theory concerns the way we can wrench ourselves us out of ourselves and into new 
possibilities of discourse. Bauman’s sociological prose retreats from metaphysics to 
lead us to the poetic expression. Why? Gadamer, we recall, explains that the “poets, 
especially, are the one’s who make use of the flexibility of the linguistic gamut beyond 
                                                
775 Bauman, Zygmunt. “The Meaning of Art and the Art of Meaning.” In Postmodernity 
and Its Discontents. London: Blackwell, p. 107 
776 Bauman, “Afterthoughts: On Writing and Writing Sociology,” p. 213. 
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rules, beyond conventions, and who know how to bring the unsaid to speak within the 
possibilities that language itself offers.”778 
                 The truth of theory lies in a style of showing, in the flexibility of the theorist, 
who is not encumbered by verification but in a style of validity that comes forth in what 
we can say with our words. This conception of validity is the capacity of speech to 
allow us to perceive the truth of what is said, not explained by the proposition. We 
agree because we can, as Gadamer puts it, “We participate in coming to agreement with 
one another in the foreignness of language and it is in this play and development of 
language, with others, that we develop concepts. The binding power of theory, then, is 
true speaking, and not, as we have long assumed, the thematization of the scientific 
logos in the human sciences – frequently denoted by the term “objectivity”.  Gadamer 
says “Hermeneutic reflection discloses conditions of truth in the sciences that do not 
derive from the logic of scientific discovery but are prior to it.” Joel Weinsheimer 
summarizes the thesis this way: “method is a response to the alienation of self and 
world and, also an attempt to overcome it”.779  This mirror effect has been of critical 
importance to the approach this work has taken toward the question of the human 
sciences and social theory. Language “has something ambiguous about it, like an 
oracle. But this is precisely where hermeneutic truth lies.” 780 
 
Is hermeneutics epistemological? 
                                                
778 Gadamer, “Boundaries of Language,” in Language and Linguisticality in Gadamer’s 
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779 Weinsheimer, Joel C. Gadamer’s Hermeneutics: A Reading of Truth and Method. 
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               This question is very close to the way we must avoid simply reading 
Gadamer’s work as a theory of language. Vattimo repeats the question: “Is 
hermeneutics itself epistemological that is, argumentative, or is it hermeneutic and 
poetic?”781 Gadamer’s answer is this: “The problem is not that everyday prose threatens 
to infiltrate the language of the concept, but that the logic of the propositions takes us in 
the wrong direction.”782  
               Truth involves accepting something like the ineffability of life in the play of 
language. The word is not simply something against something else, object, or word.  
Günter Figal notes: “Speaking is not simply understood because it displays something, 
but rather that in speaking ‘the said’ is held together ‘with an infinity of what is not said 
in one unified meaning.’ Thus, every speech means more than it explicitly says. The 
speculative character of language is present in the “whole of being.”783 According to 
Figal, “with this response the meaning is no longer equivalent to the linguistic self-
showing of the thing, but rather is determined as the horizon of speaking. Thus, every 
word, writes Gadamer, “carries with it the unsaid”; every speech “brings a totality of 
meaning into play with out being able to express it totally,” and thereby shows it 
“living virtuality” [TM 458].”784 
                                                
781 Vattimo, Gianni. “The Truth of Hermeneutics, Appendix 1.” In Beyond 
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782 Gadamer, “Philosophy and Poetry,” in The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other 
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               Language “has something ambiguous about it, like an oracle. But this is 
precisely where hermeneutic truth lies”. 785 Truth begins when we see that the subject 
who speaks is not an object. How we understand something is not simply about 
information, or the content speech, but about the interpretive insight that allows us to 
really see what is. To see in this way, as the Greeks knew, was to theorize. Truth, in 
theory, then cannot be simply a matter of verifiability, since every proposition, as we 
have learned from Gadamer, involves a question that lives within our very temporality 
and finds its roots in the past and present.   
              Theory, then, is not simply about abstract theoretical relations, but rather 
involves the speculative and metaphorical movement of words where the “speculative 
statement points to the entirety of truth, without being this entirety or stating it.”786 
Hermeneutics articulates, as it were, the Parmenidean non-distinction inherent to the 
beginning of thinking, and recurrent to all thinking (“there is no first word”), that 
argument and the poetic word co-exist; poetic truth begins and returns, as it were, to the 
truth of the word. “Everything that goes under the name of language, says Gadamer, 
refers beyond that which achieves the status of the proposition.”787 Once more we are 
into the matter of how words convey their specific validity, and Gadamer’s claim that 
to speak of truth, of the truth of the word, we are speaking in a special way, like the 
poetic word, which is not a statement, the word can speak in an authentic way, the word 
in this sense means “a word that speaks, a telling word,” that he, attaches to what he 
considers an eminent text, in a way that the word is convincing and really there. This is 
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786 Gadamer, Hegel’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, p. 96. 
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the words claim to validity.788  A validity that here implies the way the word links with 
a collective meaning and implies a social relationship and not simply an arbitrary 
formulation, because a word is not just an individual word. 
              “One question Truth and Method raises is what would it mean to say that 
understanding itself is essentially metaphorical?”789 Gadamer explains: “Transference 
from one sphere to another has not only a logical function; rather corresponding to it is 
the fundamental metaphoricity of language.”790 Weinsheimer notes that metaphor is 
important to understanding, not that they are identical, but that they offer the power to 
expand the range of our thinking. Metaphors are not transparent, as we know, in the 
realms of the poetic and poetic truth in language, they too require understanding and 
interpretation.  
               We should not make the mistake of thinking that this “metaphoricity of 
language” means that language consists in metaphors. But in what way does this 
argument offer an understanding of language in the human sciences? Metaphor, as in 
the poem, is an enabling event that inspires us to think differently, to think beyond our 
horizons; it also shows us the power of descriptive words that are not simply reducible 
to something else. Such moments of transformation happen in linguistic encounters, 
enabling interpreters to alter themselves not because they have new information but 
because, in the totality of things, they have a new horizon of understanding: is this not 
what we expect of theory? 
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                Gadamer’s next argument concerns how we sustain ourselves in the identity 
and difference that the metaphor invites?  He asks: “How is it possible to think identity 
and difference together?”791 How can we enter another world and understand 
something that is other and yet understand the other in a way that enlarges our 
understanding? Metaphor, he claims, is the explanation, this power of language allows 
for us to be both the same and different without contradiction. Without contradiction 
because the “hermeneutic as joins at one and the same time both “is” and “is not”, and 
“in this as”, Gadamer writes, “lies the whole riddle.”792 Insofar, as we find support in 
Weinsheimer’s argument it becomes apparent that language is doing more in theory 
than we might want, but this is, in fact, the very enabling possibility of speech. 
               Poetic speech and lyric discourse is speculative. The way the word or concept 
can bring about a sense of completeness becomes in this way a special illustration of 
the hermeneutic “facts” as a power and property of speech itself; poetry illustrates this 
power of speech as it participates in the truth of the universal, as Gadamer says. 
              The poetic experience illustrates how speech establishes us in a relationship to 
something beyond ourselves, to a generality of speech that equally means for others. 
The living horizon of culture is where our true being and our effort to speak theory 
enable us but does not limit our theoretical life. In the final analysis, theory involves us 
in what we know in relation to ourselves. Nowhere, says Gadamer, is deception so near 
to us; the human sciences carry this ethical responsibility explicitly – in all speech – 
involving our self-knowledge that might fail us or mean so much when it succeeds for 
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us. Theory then is an ethical act driven by truth that brings forth a new understanding 
(horizon) that can impact our well-being. Our questions lie in our very being and truth, 
not in method, as Gadamer says: “there is no proposition that can be comprehended 
solely from the content that it presents.”793  
                Self-knowledge is at play in the human sciences. Our ethical and lyrical 
utterances concern self-illumination but also self-alienation; this paradox finds an 
analogy in the dubious position of the sophist as an educator that concerned Plato 
(Protagoras). The human sciences engage in questionability of their disciplinary world-
view as a science because their truth is their questionability. Propositions, in Gadamer’s 
view, reside in questions therefore theory concerns our ability to access the world as a 
question; in fact, the questionability of the human sciences shapes their identity. This 
questionability is not a matter of scientific protocols and their application, nor about 
various theoretical perspectives, rather it concerns the deeper framework of their 
theorizing.  
                We do not escape the living flow of speech and metaphor in the process of 
theory, yet we can alienate ourselves, and in doing so lose new insight about the world.  
We exist in our traditions of speech; therefore the horizon of our existence will be the 
shared source of our discovery and recovery of truth, specifically as we recognize the 
limits of the scientific ideal of “objectivity” and “exteriority” – the limits of the 
discourse of modernity. Gadamer says: “Speech never […] is just the subsumption of 
the individual under universal concepts. In the use of words what is given to the sense 
is not presented as an individual example of a universal, but is itself made present in 
                                                
793 Gadamer, “What is Truth?” in Hermeneutics and Truth, p. 42. 
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what is said – just as the idea of the beautiful is present in what is beautiful”.794  In 
conversation, as well as theory, what is experienced is not the “inner life” of a speaker, 
but an encounter with what is spoken. 
                To reconstruct our conceptions of rationality, Gadamer invites us to look at 
the “discourse development of thought” (dialogue) to clarify the limits of rationality, as 
well as the limits of our techno-scientific worldview. Hermeneutic understanding, 
therefore, changes our vision of theory in the modern world as well as the ways in 
which we reside in our world as speaking beings.  
                Speech, as we have seen, conveys us toward the other (and as Gadamer 
makes clear the recurring experience of speech is the real experience of the dialectic 
through the tensions of dialogue). Our dialogues are contingent on a double encounter 
with the other and with ourselves as an encounter with language; language remains 
“inadequate” to pure conceptual work but it is the very power necessary to express 
ourselves with concepts.  
                  Concepts “call to one another” in the movement of seeing and thinking 
(energeia), they are not “externally” created or constituted by an “infinite, on-looking 
mind”. Gadamer’s remark: “dialectic must retrieve itself in hermeneutics” that was not 
just a critique of the weaknesses of Hegel, but a complex acknowledgement to both 
Plato and Hegel, that conceptual speech is dialectical and speculative.  
                Conversation happens with our sense that some one else stands before us to 
who we address ourselves. Conversation as two very essential features: first 
conversation resides in something we have to say, that commits us to the domain of 
                                                
794 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second Revised Edition], pp. 445-446. 
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rhetoric, second, that conversation is built on the ethical dimension of these dialogues. 
Theory too is a two-way address, a conversation; where we address someone where we 
to be addressed; these are the same (speaking to the other and listening to the other). In 
a dia-logic relationship we address one another in the same space that theory happens, 
as Plato argues, that we strive for knowledge, and not just simply the possession of 
knowledge, but always as part of understanding ourselves. Gadamer says that there is 
no true single idea, and, accordingly, that isolating an idea means missing the truth. All 
means of knowing are ambiguous that is why a statement does not guarantee proper 
understanding of meaning, rather, as Gadamer says, we need to convert the concept 
back into the valid word. The truth of a word, the living word, exists in shared 
conversation, for there is no truth of a single idea, when speech is concerned with 
“isolating an idea [it] always means missing the truth.”795 
               Weinsheimer summarizes Gadamer’s thesis effectively when he says: 
“Gadamer conception of method is a response to the alienation of self and world and, 
[but] also an attempt to overcome it”.796  Language mirrors the human sciences and 
social theory. Language “has something ambiguous about it, like an oracle. But this is 
precisely where hermeneutic truth lies”. 797 Because of the “inner self-forgetfulness of 
language” we are open to the possibility of interpretation. Speaking, then, has “little to 
do with a mere explication and assertion of our prejudices; on the contrary, it risks 
                                                
795 “The Idea of Hegel’s Logic”, Hans-Georg Gadamer, in Hegel’s Dialectic, Five 
Hermeneutical Essays, Yale University Press, Newhaven & London, 1974. p. 80. 
796 Weinsheimer, Gadamer’s Hermeneutics: A Reading of Truth and Method, p. 15. 
797 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], p. 488. 
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prejudices – it exposes oneself to one’s own doubts as well as to the rejoinder of the 
other.”798  
               If concepts do not speak, as we find at times in the alienated conceptual 
discourse of the human sciences, we are not only presented with the hermeneutic 
problem of translation but with the question how does this discourse relate to a shared 
conversational world?  Anchoring ourselves in our modern world, being at home both 
in theory and social life, is a key concern.  The simultaneity is striking. Theory mimics 
reality. The key point is that modern science in general “accommodates it[s] own 
account of its fundamental character”, this means they use “method” as the framework 
for “constituting the very objectivity of [their] objects.”   
             Truth lies in ambiguity of the word, which lies in all presentation. The sophist 
and the philosopher share the gesture of language in the same way, yet they dispute 
how they speak truthfully (as in Plato’s Gorgias). Socrates could not defeat the sophist 
because there are no totalizing grounds upon which this could be done in speech.  The 
speaking of the word, the speaking of language, being in language: does what has 
always supported us need to be grounded? 799  
My thesis, applying Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy, argues that the human 
sciences are rhetorical in nature. The human sciences embody the ideal of theory as 
words that generate abstract conceptual expressions that reveal concrete situations in 
the logic of the flow of concepts that allow words to resonate their intended meaning. 
This is not sociology without concepts it is a sociology of dialogical speech. Theory, in 
                                                
798 Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation,” in The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of Later 
Writings, p. 216. 
799 Gadamer, Truth and Method. Forward to the Second Edition, xxxvii. 
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this regard, seen as the philosophic legacy of the Greeks, now appears to shape the 
human sciences, in a post-metaphysical setting, that is neither truly metaphysical nor 
truly ontological. The post-war period of the human sciences, with their struggle for 
self-identity as well as their differing logics of theoretical discovery, made increasingly 
visible a truth that we cannot really say in institutional speech, while at the same time 
making truth saying the key to their understanding. Here we engage with, and drawn 
upon, Gianni Vattimo’s perceptive ideas, in his essay, “Truth and Rhetoric in 
Hermeneutic Ontology”, to support our argument.  
The place of social knowing, especially in a procedural discipline like 
sociology, turns away from application and self-understanding, seeking identity in 
methods that in turn raises the question of truth into view. With the unfolding of the 
logic of modernity, truth had been subordinated to “science”, with an apparent exit of 
truth; the human sciences came to affirm the power of a long human legacy of truth 
saying: of the power of rhetoric. Such an exit from truth, if it did occur, (as was 
intended by the human sciences) in time provoked its own recovery. This is key to 
Gadamer’s thesis. When Blum asks how do we change our relationship to the 
“language of sociology” (theory)? Gadamer answers: We recognize that the space of 
cognition in the human sciences concerns our being open to the truth of the word.   
My concluding argument is that poetics, the relation of speaking and writing, is 
key to understanding the larger picture of what happens in the human sciences. What a 
theory can say, not simply whether it is true or false, is what matters for the theorist. 
Discourse is shared in what is said such that it can produce understanding through 
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concepts that do not take away from the unfolding voice of speech that provides a 
telling truth. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
I had called my approach to sociology “humanistic.” I would now question 
whether this was a felicitous adjective, though I would not quarrel with the 
basic intention. I had intended two meanings: One was to stress the contribution 
of sociology to a humane society, based on its debunking of the myths 
legitimating cruelty and oppression. I suppose that this came out of the 
Enlightenment roots of the discipline. But more relevant was the second 
meaning, sociology as one of the “humanities” (or Geisteswissenchaften), 
closely related to history and philosophy but also to the institution of the literary 
imagination.800 
Peter L. Berger. 
 
 The guiding thread of this thesis has been the question of (social) theory. What it 
means to consider theory from a non-metaphysical position – a hermeneutic position. 
We argue that theory is a question not only of truth performance, of authentic dialogue, 
but that theory concerns truth as the process of discovery – a poetics – for the theorist. 
There is one major conclusion that can be drawn: “scientific methods” do not 
guarantee truth.  
            The distinguishing feature of social theory is not that of managing 
methodological procedures or arrangements of thinking that would distinguish its 
scientific attitude and its systematic formalism.  Our aim, in each chapter, has been to 
argue that it is Gadamer's hermeneutics that provides a key to correcting the norms of 
the scientific viewpoint and arguing that, especially in the human sciences, theorizing 
rests upon the nature of argumentative discourse (theory and concept formation). In 
                                                
800 Berger, Adventures of An Accidental Sociologist: How to Explain the World Without 
Becoming a Bore, pp. 25-26. 
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light of Gadamer’s conception of language this places conceptual thinking in proximity 
to the finite being of the word.   
               I have argued at length that in authoring ourselves as theorists we cannot 
simply be arranging concepts, but rather our authoring concerns, as it does for Plato, an 
authoring process in which one can be authentic, and, as Gadamer argues, such an 
authenticity requires recognizing that social life is lived in proximity to our poetic, 
ethical and lyrical speech. Dennis Schmidt reminds us that hermeneutic theory is 
concerned to identify that we are not objective beings able to conceptualize ourselves in 
the dominant framework of science, rather we are ethical beings involved in an “ethical 
struggle to put oneself in words.”801 All understanding, Gadamer reminds us, concerns 
our intrinsic linguistic condition wherein it is the vague representations of meaning  
“that bear us along and get brought word by word to articulation and so become 
communicable.” Bringing rhetoric and understanding together “One can talk about 
everything, and everything one says has to be able to be understood. Here rhetoric and 
hermeneutics have a very close relationship. The skilled mastery of such abilities in 
speaking and understanding is demonstrated to the utmost in written usage in the 
writing of speeches and in the understanding of what is written. Hermeneutics may be 
precisely defined as the art of bringing what is said or written to speech again.” 802    
                I shall end by reminding the reader that we detected in many social theorists 
an awareness of this paradox of theory in the human sciences. Bauman, our key 
example, for example, speaks of a conceptual artificiality that can absorb the theorist’s 
                                                
801 Ibid. p. 131. 
802 Gadamer, “Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy,” in Reason in the Age of Science, 
p. 119. 
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authoring of theory when there is a loss of the poetic dimension. Alvin Gouldner, C. W. 
Mills, Alan, Blum, Berger, and others, had addressed this concern in their writings. 
Bauman’s formulation of a “false sociology,” I have argued, is a summation of these 
arguments that captures the problem of the scientific understanding of the human 
sciences, in terms close to Gadamer’s phrase methodological alienation. Theorizing, 
dominated by methodological conceptualization, Bauman says, has something false in 
its standpoint, it does not so much push the theorist toward loss and alien speech, but 
presents this loss as another version of the theorist’s concrete ethical struggle with 
words.  
              Gadamer’s hermeneutics contributes fundamentally to an understanding of 
modern life and modern theory. It shows our paradoxical predicament by demonstrating 
why alien discourse is imposed, and self-imposed, upon the theorist. Plato understood 
that when we create arguments we express ourselves in the happening of genuine 
questioning (as in a dialogue) that comes forth in what Gadamer describes as a 
dialectical ethics. Bauman in turn agrees by speaking of auto-poiesis (self-creation) in 
theory. We create ourselves in our styles of speech and writing in a “self-awareness, 
understanding, and responsibility for its forms.”803  
             Our lyrical and ethical struggle therefore composes us in the manner of the way 
we speak, and this struggle is the ground of the human sciences. The human sciences 
are shaped in the universality of speech. To listen for the truth, for truth to be visible, I 
must let myself be told something by it (speech); in other words, I must too, seek a way 
of speaking that allows me to genuinely theorize with others. Our thesis argues that in 
                                                
803 Bauman, “Afterthoughts: On Writing and Writing Sociology,” in Liquid Modernity, 
p. 213. 
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the end, like Gadamer, as we recover an authentic theoretical speech we recognized the 
true nature of the human sciences.  
              By way of conclusion I will flesh out further my understanding of the 
significance of Gadamer’s ideas to the human sciences. First, truth, in Gadamer’s view, 
lies in what it means to say something. Hermeneutic experience, therefore, is a 
corrective to the objectification of knowledge. While the poem is exemplary of the 
nature of truth speaking, theory cannot simply be poetry. Gadamer asks, does not the 
truth of the human sciences lie more in a poem rather than in its adoption of 
methodology? He means that the human sciences communicate when they are not 
bound to an unquestioned methodological presumption about their speech.  
            Truth and Method, originally published in 1960, posed a question to the human 
sciences. Basically, that truth in the human sciences, as we have seen, concerns the 
possibility of eloquent exchanges that are directed to the call of the other, while how we 
communicate with this call concerns an ongoing dialogue with ourselves. Theory, 
however, had tended to isolate us and not bring us together in the being of communal 
speech. Our conversations, our theorizing, limited in the human sciences as a 
consequence of our metaphysical heritage, where rooted in a conception of theorizing 
as a need for the overcoming of rhetoric, and not, the other way round, that true 
theorizing actually rests upon it and is best exemplified by rhetoric.  Gadamer felt the 
norm of truth, especially in the human sciences, was closer to the wisdom of the 
ancients and their concepts of prudentia and eloquentia.804  
                                                
804 Gadamer, Truth and Method, [First Edition], pp. 20-21. 
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            Jacques Derrida spoke of his friendship with Gadamer in “Rams” – an essay 
devoted to the poet Paul Celan. Derrida asks: “Will I be able to bear witness, in a just 
and faithful fashion, to my admiration for Hans-Georg Gadamer?”805 Derrida’s 
question concerns the voice of the poet, the concept of friendship, discovered in the 
proximity of our theoretical dialogue with an ethics of otherness, reflected in what is 
held in reserve and what it revealed/concealed in the poetic word. Our interminable 
interior dialogue is what comes to being in human relationships and dialogue, not in 
models of argument, our thematic content is organized by the voice that goes out to 
meet the other, rooted lyrically and ethically in the voice we struggle to speak.  We are 
divided and brought together by speaking.  
            Poetry, as we have argued, awakens us to the commonality of understanding, in 
this way it acts to resist the restraint of obedience and conformity in our words, it 
shows us that the norms of argumentation and truth possibilities of what we can say rest 
on the priority of the spoken word over and above any metaphysical grounding. A text, 
Gadamer notes, is to be understood as a hermeneutic concept, which means a text poses 
the question of what its means to say. The correspondence between what is spoken and 
written sheds light on the way in which theory is embedded in conversation. Gadamer 
writes: “extending the concept of the text to include what is spoken in oral discourse is 
hermeneutically well grounded. For in every case, whether the text is spoken or written, 
the understanding of it remains dependent upon communicative conditions that, as 
such, reach beyond the merely codified meaning content of what is said.”806  
                                                
805 Derrida, “Rams,” in Sovereignties in Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan, p. 135. 
806 Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation,” in The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of the 
Later Writings, p. 171. 
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             Interpretation follows from our understanding of something, but understanding 
might not be an interpretation. Rather it is because we live in speech that we can 
understand.807 The interpreter of a text, like the interpreter of a conversation “tries to 
impart what he or she means, and that includes the other with whom one shares 
presuppositions and upon whose understanding one relies.” We live in webs of 
discussion with the other. “The other takes what is said as it is intended, that is, 
understands it because he fills out and concretizes what is said and because he does not 
take what is said in its abstract, literal meaning.”808  
             Hence the classical debate between the spoken and the written takes on a new 
form in Gadamer. By describing his commitment to speech over the word we 
understand his view of theory as one type of utterance among others that occur in 
language. “In a living conversation one tries to reach understanding though the give and 
take of discussion, “which means one searches for those words […] that one thinks will 
get through to the other.”809  
            Gadamer says, “... a ‘virtual’ horizon of interpretation and understanding must 
be opened in writing the text itself, a horizon that the eventual reader has to fill out. 
Writing is more than fixing something spoken in writing. To be sure, everything that is 
fixed in writing refers back to what was originally said, but it must also and equally as 
much look forward. Everything that is said is always already directed toward reaching 
understanding, and this necessarily includes the other”.810  
                                                
807 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], pp. 385-386. 
808 Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation,” p. 172 
809 Ibid. p.172. 
810 Ibid. p.173. 
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             The “text” does not exclude the reader but rather includes the reader as a 
participant. The “text” resides in what Gadamer terms a virtual horizon; the text speaks, 
as it were, when it becomes a hermeneutic task not when the emphasis is on 
explanation rather than understanding. Understanding is the self-presentation of the text 
(words and concepts). The literary and the poetic texts, for example, are introduced to 
show why theory does not simply reside in a “scientific” viewpoint. Theory, then, 
signifies objects as much as literature may; the question is what are the differences and 
what can be learned from these correspondences? Derrida says this about the question: 
             “The problem,” for Gadamer, “is not that we do not understand the other 
person but that we don’t understand ourselves.”811 Methodological thinking is the 
disenchanter and resistance that is self-imposed on the truth of speech. Speech cannot 
be demarcated by a method and method cannot conceal this fact. The continuous 
tension of theory can then be summed up in the following remark: “By writing 
philosophy as drama, Plato calls on every reader to engage actively in the search for 
truth. By writing it as anti-tragic drama, he warns the reader that only certain elements 
of him are appropriate to this search”.812  
               We may once again recall the significance of art at this point. Contemporary 
art, Gadamer notes, “is really a kind of speech.”813 Art speaks to the view by bringing 
something to understanding that is new. In this way it emulates a dialogue, or poetic 
utterance that comes to address us. In Gadamer’s opinion, art asks a question of us. He 
                                                
811 Gadamer, “Hermeneutics and the Ontological Difference,” in The Gadamer Reader: 
A Bouquet of the Later Writings, p. 371. 
812 Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and 
Philosophy, p. 134. 
813 Gadamer, “The Relevance of the Beautiful,” in The Relevance of the Beautiful and 
Other Essays, p. 12 
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remarks: “In fact, the process of poeticizing is divided into two phases: into the project 
that has already occurred where language holds sway, and another project that allows 
the new poetic creation to come forth from the first project.”814 Argumentation, rooted 
in conversation, is not simply art (yet the Socratic-Platonic dialogue Gadamer brings to 
the fore raises the art of questioning to a conscious art), it is the presentational moment 
when the subject is speech and begins to speak about what is to come. This possibility 
of speech, he says, is already something other than us. Speech is both discovery and 
“unconcealment”; the power of the voice to offer to us new understanding, new 
concepts that speak to us by inviting us into the ongoing dialogue of the theorist. 
              As Heidegger puts it, it is not that we can say “I” but that we are able to say, at 
all.815  Whether viewers or participants we are all active within a dialogue. That is why 
theory has its roots in the participatory flow of ordinary speech. “False sociology” 
(Bauman’s term), is when we do not fully belong to ourselves in the words that we 
speak.  This means that we lose something in our speech concerning the ethical and 
lyrical comportment found in a dialogic mutual becoming.  
              Plato’s dialogues, display such a becoming, especially in Pheadrus and 
Phelibus, which Gadamer had focused on in his early writings. Plato’s dialogues are 
complex displays of theory, of argumentative discourse, and the self-discovery of the 
logoi, they are not simply a representation or mimesis, a copy of something, a repeating 
of ideas, but they mean the being of the thing spoken about. They represent a performed 
act, utterances not simply as correctness, objectivity, but rather an exactitude 
concerning the revelatory capacity of the word.  
                                                
814 Ibid. p. 109. 
815 Heidegger, Holderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,” pp. 90-91. 
 316 
               Similarly, what we learn from the work of art is that it “speaks itself.” While 
language calls all beings “home,” the work of art signifies an increase in being, in our 
being at home in our saying. It is an increase in Being that occurs as “presentation 
(Darstellung) [or] as the mode of being of the work of art.” Our, “self-presentation is 
the true nature of play – and hence the work of art also.” 816  Play not only functions as 
a critique of subjectivism but also shows how we become other and thereby encounter 
something substantial beyond ourselves in the play of word: “The players are not the 
subjects of play: instead, play merely reaches presentation [Darstellung] through the 
players.” 817 Such an exhibition of something interconnects to what is already known, 
inside an encounter made up of the strange and familiar. The transformation occurs 
within what remains to be known. Gadamer describes this as the capacity to “become 
another person.”818 This is only possible when speech creates shared understanding.  
                In addition, artistic creation, says Gadamer, challenges each of us to listen to 
the language in which the work of art speaks, as we seek to make it our own. Listening 
to the speech of the other, we are in the play of understanding that occurs in dialogue. 
Our “speaking” on the page, therefore, is also where we discover the experience of 
truth without method.819 For we have not obstructed our speech by adopting a 
methodologically arranged framework around what we say. Bauman describes the 
                                                
816 Gadamer, Truth and Method [Second, Revised Edition], p. 116. 
817 Ibid. p. 92. 
818 Ibid, p. 111. 
819 Gadamer, “The Relevance of the Beautiful,” in The Relevance of the Beautiful and 
Other Essays, p. 43. 
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doing and writing sociology aims, “at disclosing the possibility of living together 
differently.”820  
             In this thesis I reflect on Gadamer’s standpoint that the human sciences are not 
a question of arbitrating methodological disputes. It is more fundamental. Living in the 
music of language, we hear the poet’s word and, as we have argued, we hear the poet in 
the theorist’s word; for both, after a fashion, illustrate why we remain open to the norm 
of truth that truly identifies what the human sciences are. We disclose the possibilities 
of theory in a lyrical and ethical sharing toward the other. Not in objectifying the other. 
The changing reality of modern life is, in fact, also the changing reality of the human 
sciences, for as they engage in the matter of theorizing modern life they also question 
the metaphysical roots of theory. They also point us back to the Greeks and the struggle 
over the identity of theoria. The human sciences’ desire to theorize modern life 
generates not only a space for discovery but also creates the space where we rehearse 
the original Greek concerns, as we step into a new world beyond instrumental 
rationality and into the realm of effective modes of description and discovery, as we 
replace objective and impersonal truth with a mode of ethical discourse that 
reinvigorates a non-scientistic ideal of theory, one that returns theory back to speech, 
giving voice to concepts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
820 Bauman,“Afterthoughts: On Writing and Writing Sociology,” p. 215. 
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